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Abstract  
 
The thesis focuses on the process of international openness of Transition Countries. 
This study provides a theoretical analysis based on reference literature, and an empirical 
analysis which is aimed at estimating some main effects of Foreign Direct Investment. 
Transition has represented a highly complex phenomenon, characterized by several aspects, 
whose interaction has shaped the developmental path of each country involved. Although 
the thesis focuses on economic issues it is outstanding to underline that Transition implies 
political, institutional, and even social deep changes, which must be taken into 
consideration in the general overview of the contex. The empirical part has been developed 
along two different ways: a country analysis and a firm analysis, thus allowing to widen the 
study and delve deeper into the use of econometric instruments. More specifically, in the 
first empirical stage both static (Fixed Effects) and dynamic (LSDV Corrected) 
methodologies have been implemented, whereas in the second stage the Cox Proportional 
Function has been chosen in order to handle with  censored data.   
Thanks to all people who made this work possible.   
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Introduction  
 
On the 9th of November 1989, the Berlin Wall fall inaugurated a new phase for the 
international political relations, and the world geopolitics that so far had been focused on 
the two blocks was deeply disrupted. The gradual disintegration of the URSS followed the 
Berlin Wall fall, and it ended in December 1991 kicking off a long process of significant 
changes under all perspectives. Twenty-nine Eastern countries undertook the way of the so 
called Transition, a term referring to the shift from planned to liberal economy, at least 
according to a scarcely thorough and preparatory definition. Nonetheless, in real terms this 
new historical phase would be characterized by the interconnection of several critical 
aspects each representing a priority in the development of the ex-socialist countries, usually 
called Transition Countries (TCs). Thus, the economic system is just one of many elements 
that took part into the general restructuring of these countries; also legal, political, 
institutional, educational and social scenarios underwent a drastic revision, in order to 
adapt to the “Western” model. The economic system working before the collapse (planned 
economy) was defined by rigid rules implying that the whole functioning was controlled by 
the State. Such rigidity hampered a full development of the whole national territory and 
fostered a decentralization managed by a peripheral inefficient bureaucracy. When the 
collapse of Socialism occurred, TCs to different degrees lacked in the basic structures 
needed to implement a liberal-type economy. There was neither proper legal framework, 
nor the entrepreneurship or cultural background that would allow the growth of a market 
economy.  
Many steps forward have been done since the beginning of the Nineties, and these 
results are particularly evident for the European Union New Member States (NMS), among 
which Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic are deemed as the most successful ones in 
executing the Transition reforms. Contrariwise, many other countries still lag behind on the 
developmental way cause of the deep structural distortions (Commonwealth of 
Independent Countries) or internal non economic factors (Balkans). One of the most 
striking changes in the evolution of TCs was about the openness of their economic 
systems, through the liberalization of trade and investments, both inwards and outwards. 
This process represents a fundamental point within the study of TCs, since it allowed the 
entrance of foreign capital affecting the still ongoing process of restructuring. Furthermore, 
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the normal effects of both trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which are outlined 
by the general literature concerned may have affected TCs economies in a more 
pronounced way than in the Western Countries. At the beginning of the Nineties, the 
international openness in TCs added to other radical changes required by the passage from 
planned to market economy, that is privatization, stabilization measures, liberalization 
of prices and wages, and institutional frame restructuring, especially in the legal field.  
With regard to these general premises, the present thesis aims at delving deeper into 
the international openness of TCs with particular attention to Inward FDI. All ex-socialist 
countries have been considered within the study, even though it is well known that a quite 
high degree of heterogeneity among them exists. Nonetheless, in a way, Transition may be 
viewed as a transformation process imposed from outside. If the internal political and 
social conditions at the end of the Eighties (together with the no longer sustainable 
economic situation in some cases) led to the following collapse of the socialist block, the 
model that was supposed to be applied came from the West. All TCs, regardless of their 
specific economic conditions or structure, looked at the Western market economy and 
tried to implement the same features within the national context. For this reason, 
Transition shows very similar general elements in all TCs, but the concerning measures 
have been implemented differently, thus triggering different effects. All along the thesis, 
the analysis will try to consider this heterogeneity by stressing the Countries specificities 
relatively to the transitional process. TCs have also been divided into four “groups” 
(CEECs, BCs, SEECs, CIS) according to their socialist past and the way they adapted the 
economic system to the new order. Furthermore, the economic perspective is mostly 
considered in the present study, even though the political and social aspects are not 
neglected, due to their relevance with regard to the high complexity of Transition.  
The thesis is composed of two parts, the first one includes theoretical 
considerations stemming from the main contributions of the literature, whereas the second 
part is based on the empirical analysis. The study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 focuses 
on the main features of Transition after clarifying what the word “Transition” itself means. 
This section aims at putting on evidence both the economic situation under the planned 
system and the one emerging afterwards since the beginning of the Nineties. Among all the 
factors characterizing Transition a particular attention has been paid to privatization, 
according to different forms and Country specificities. The Chapter concludes with the 
discussion above the economic consequences of the transitional path with the analytical 
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contribution of some data. Chapter 1 allows outlining the general framework for the 
following empirical analysis, and the close examination of Transition gives the tools for 
analyzing the conditions and effects of TCs international openness.  
In Chapter 2 the analysis moves to Inward FDI in TCs. The main aim is describing 
the trend of foreign penetration in these countries over time, by using data and 
comparative graphs. The second part of this section concerns the determinants of Inward 
FDI in TCs through a structured speech based on literature references.  
Chapter 3 and 4 compose the empirical section of the thesis, concerning the 
economic impact of foreign penetration in TCs. Since many FDI effects, both positive and 
negative, have been identified so far by the economic authors, two specific fields have been 
selected. This choice is related to the attempt of giving more originality to the study, and, at 
the same time, it leads to focus on different aspects and to implement different analytical 
instruments that allow to better understand the object. Both Chapters have been processed 
as Working Papers, so that each of them is composed of a literature review and the 
description of data, the reference theoretical model applied, the econometric methodology 
implemented and the results obtained through the empirical analysis. Chapter 3 draws on a 
co-authored article, and analyzes the effects of Inward FDI on income inequality on 17 
TCs between 1990 and 2006. Empirical results on FDI have been compared with those on 
trade, after disaggregating the general measure of trade into exports and imports according 
to their origin and destination (macro-regions have been considered). The analysis starts 
from a model by Aghion and Commander (1999), later drawn on by Figini and Görg 
(2006), testing the non linearity of the openness-inequality relationship and the role of 
education in fostering the positive effects coming from the openness. The final results 
confirm what already obtained by a part of literature, that is the non-relevance of FDI 
impact on income inequality, while stressing the stronger influence by trade flows. 
According to the analysis, education might channel and contribute to spread over trade 
benefits.  
Finally, Chapter 4 aims at estimating the effect of FDI on the development of local 
entrepreneurship in TCs. A survival analysis based on the Cox Proportional Function has 
been implemented on two final samples of the Czech Republic and Estonia, respectively, 
over the period 2003-2008. The choice of these two countries among all TCs allows to 
compare two different transitional experiences. The results show that foreign penetration 
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exerts positive effects on local firms survival through vertical linkages only in the Estonian 
case, whereas in the Czech Republic FDI brings about negative pecuniary externalities on 
domestic firms. This situation may stem from both the method of privatization 
implemented in each country considered, as pointed out by previous works, and the way 
and timing in which FDI entered the economic system.        
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Chapter 1 
What is  
Transition? 
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What is Transition? 
 
1.1. THE CONCEPT OF TRANSITION  
According to the standard definition the expression Transition refers to “an 
economy which is changing from a centrally planned economy to a free market”. Although 
this definition is somewhat simplistic it catches the basic mechanism which has been 
characterizing the Post-Socialist Countries since the beginning of the Nineties. Literature 
pays low attention to the complexity of the concept of Transition, and it is easier to find 
articles which explain all the reforms that this process has been bringing about than an 
author wondering about its real nature. Finding a proper definition of Transition is far 
beyond the scope of the present thesis, other than too ambitious; nonetheless it is desirable 
to make the context of our study as clear as possible in order to broaden the range of 
viewpoints and reduce the margins of distortion. Thus first of all, it is necessary to specify 
that Transition is not only an economic condition, and it implies several social and political 
changes. Even without any close examination of the topic, it is hardly simple to forget the 
dramatic political events which marked the collapse of the socialist block. Thus we can say 
that the Transition began in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell down, and it evolved as long as 
the concerned countries needed to rebuild a new, independent reality1. The openness of the 
borders, the prevision of freedom, and the evident weakness of the State are part of that 
Transition which is not strictly economic but equally important in order to ensure a solid 
development. Furthermore, even the narrowest viewpoints which focus on the economic 
character of the Transition reassert the importance of the institutional changes, along with 
the macro-stabilization and the micro-liberalization, sustained by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) policies. It is nevertheless true that the interconnection between all 
the spheres involved does not always allow to distinguish the final effects of each. On the 
purpose of the current work the Transition will be here considered mainly in its economic 
acceptation, however without  underestimating the relevant political and social issues. 
First of all Transition can be taken as a process of events, reforms, changes which 
involve those countries - in our case the Central-Eastern (CEECs) and the South-Eastern 
                                                 
1 This statement leads to think that Transition might be still in progress, which is a controversial debate and 
an open question, certainly linked to the specific meaning given to the term (Svejnar, 2002). 
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Europe (SEECS), the Baltic Countries (BCs) and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CISCS)2 – shifting from a Command to a Market economic system. A market 
economy is the basis of capitalism, which is mostly associated with the Western World. 
This standpoint has been crucially affecting the study of TCs so far, other than the 
implementation of reforms often dictated by the international institutions. When the 
socialist  block collapsed, it seemed obvious that this broad geographical region should take 
the Western European countries as an example, and the main features of the “developed” 
capitalism had to be applied there in order to start the reconstruction. The heterogeneity 
between countries that, apart from the geographical closeness and the implementation of 
the communist model showed different cultures, histories and choices, was not the focus 
of the debate. Nowadays it is possible, and maybe easier than twenty years ago, to notice 
that capitalism does not give the same results when applied in any corner of the world. 
Neither, by looking at the Chinese experience for instance, it is straightforward to affirm 
the existence of only one type of capitalism3. Nonetheless, after the disintegration of the 
URSS it seemed that the international community - and in particularly the Western World - 
cancelled the long sequence of events that, since the XVIII century, led to the modern 
Western capitalism. In the post-socialism Eastern Countries considered the situation was 
very different and what occurred was not at all evolutionary; contrariwise the political 
events triggered a “revolutionary” process, whereby the need of a liberal system required 
also a new economic structure, which was soon identified with capitalism (Bunce, 1995). 
 For this reason Stark (1992) underlines the necessity not to neglect the specific 
paths of the ex-socialist countries, which are undoubtedly very different from the Western 
ones, and that cannot be subject to any “capitalism transplantation”. A path dependence 
approach grants countries the possibility to choose their own departure point, and to 
define following steps according to their available resources. Thus, the local development 
might be fostered by endogenous instruments, and the existing forces should not be seen 
as the main obstacles to reforms (Surdej, 2009). In this regard, by referring to the 
Evolutionary Economics, the term  “Transformation” is sometimes preferred to 
                                                 
2 In the thesis clustering based on geographical areas has been considered. CEECs: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic. SEECs: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. BCs: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. CISCs: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan.    
3 Buravoy and Krotov (1992) for instance, who write still at the beginning of the Transition, identify in this 
process some elements typical of the “merchant capitalism”. According to this view the ongoing 
transformation will result in the further reinforcement of some features of the previous system, and the loss 
of the State power will strengthen the existing regional monopolies through the use of direct bargaining.     
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Transition, in order to emphasize the focus on the process rather than on the final 
destination of the path itself (Blokker and Dallago, 2009; Stark, 1992).   
1.1.1. From command to market economies 
Before delving into the implementation of the Transitional reforms it is preferable 
to look through the general economic features of the so-called command or planned 
systems, in order to catch the core of the succeeding changes. Since the analysis of the 
typical socialist economy is not  the main purpose of the work, the following paragraphs 
take into consideration only those elements which are fundamental for our consideration. 
A deeper study of the pre-transition period would in fact require the study of further issues 
that are not actually covered in this context.  
The first element to be stressed is the “over control” of the State, represented by 
the Party and the governmental entities, whose orders were channeled through a tight 
bureaucracy4. The State was the owner of all natural resources and means of production, 
and most of the productive apparatus was composed of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
and collective firms, whereas the private sector was very limited, and restricted to a small 
number of activities (e.g. art and crafts, small scale agriculture, private housing 
construction) (Ericson, 1991). Private activities existed, both in the agricultural and in the 
cooperative sectors, but they were hardly counted since not independent at all and mainly 
connected with the shadowed and irregular economy  (Kolodko, 2000). It is noticeable that 
being almost the entire capital in State’s hands, State itself played a role of 
entrepreneurship, depriving individuals of their natural attitude of creating and 
transforming reality (Hillman and Milanovic, 1992). It should also be obvious that in the 
absence of a developed private sector Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) – broadly 
recognized as a fundamental piece along the developmental path of a society – were totally 
neglected. A few large firms in the strategic industries (defense, military and heavy 
industries) represented the core of the economy, leading to a strongly unbalanced 
exploitation of the territory. Contrariwise, the sector of services was unproductive 
according to the Marxism, and consequently it was almost inexistent. The limited number 
of firms allowed the State to exercise its control on the whole economy in a more direct 
way.     
                                                 
4 For a more comprehensive framework of the overlapping hierarchies within the soviet power sphere, see 
the concise but detailed description by Ericson (1991). 
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The functioning of the economic system, both in terms of production and 
distribution, was totally ruled by the central organs and the planning5, which defined the 
precise quantity of inputs and output to be produced. Command economies focused on 
quantities, rather than quality of production; they were based on extensive production, 
whereby growth was to be given by the increase of the amount of resources, instead of a 
concrete improvement in efficiency. If firms achieved the quantities imposed, afterwards 
the threshold was raised; however the production was generally quite below the maximum 
limits, because of the scarce correspondence between inputs available and inputs required 
for firms necessities. Even when possible, it was not properly desirable to achieve limits 
higher than the threshold, as the following step of the new planning would be much more 
difficult. The whole system, including the huge hierarchy in charge of controlling its 
implementation, revolved around the central planning, and the aims required were so high 
that information was highly distorted. It was a common habit that reports by subordinates, 
having in practice a low autonomy, were far from reality just in order to meet the central 
approval, whereas the more detailed operational plans were often unreliable (Ericson, 
1991). In a context where the productive actors had almost no autonomy relatively to the 
organization of production, firms were forced to work under the level of maximum 
efficiency. De facto, as pointed out by Kornai (1979) command economies were based on a 
resource-constrained system, whereas constrains typical of capitalist economies depend on 
demand. Nevertheless it does not mean that in a socialist economy firms could exploit the 
totality of available inputs, since the limited quantities of some resources undoubtedly 
implied the limited use of some others. If it is straightforward to conclude that these 
inefficiencies could threaten the survival of firms, it is also necessary to consider the 
relevance of the soft budget constraint; in command economies firms were not subjected 
to strict financial constrictions, and in case of critical losses they could rely on State’s 
instruments (e.g. subsidies or exemptions).  
Together with the industrial quantities also prices, wages and salaries were decided 
and fixed by the centre. Managers had no decisional power relatively to labor retributions, 
and promotions (very often given randomly) soon became the only instrument to motivate 
workers (Roland, 2000). This kind of internal mobility undervalued personal real 
improvements, and did not lead to efficiency upgrading. In addition, money did not play 
the same role we expect from a market economy; while in the limited private sector it was 
                                                 
5 Two types of plans were implemented: five-year plans conveying the general objectives to be achieved, and 
yearly plans with more detailed instructions.  
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only used for wages payments and purchases, in the State sector it functioned as counting 
unit in the books of the State bank. The imposition of administrative criteria and the 
release of economic variables from market mechanisms led to a general disequilibrium 
within the production system. The allocation of goods and services did not meet the needs 
of consumers, that is to say that demand and supply followed parallel or divergent 
trajectories. Shortage, given by the fact that demand was always higher then supply, is the 
word that best represents all the distortions of the time. Individuals found on the market 
neither the quantity nor the quality of goods they needed; even the essential commodities 
were often not sufficient, causing frequent queues outside the shops. Shortage was 
accompanied by the increasing phenomenon of the shadow economy, a parallel system 
based on private networks that allowed consumers to bypass the system in order to satisfy 
their needs. It obviously represented an adaptation mechanism in order to face the 
unbalance between demand and supply. Irregular economy led to higher availability of both 
factors of production and final goods; in addition, since there was a full employment of 
resources, hidden networks of redistribution allowed a better allocation between individuals 
and firms (Dallago, 1994). The phenomenon was spread across all the social strata, 
nonetheless its higher and worst expression involved the emergence of a middle class 
(Nomenklatura6) very close to the local governments and the police. Thus, this middle class 
played the role of intermediate between the Party and the influent economic élites, by 
providing scarce inputs (Estrin et al., 2005). Full employment was a further peculiarity of 
the system; it stemmed on the one hand from the level of wages and salaries which were 
much higher than the labor productivity, and on the other hand from the soft budget 
constraint (Kornai, 1979)7.  
Finally, it is important to approach briefly the relationship between planned 
economies and international trade, in order to better develop the succeeding sections on 
TCs openness. As a matter of fact, the expression “international trade” may appear not 
appropriate for this kind of economies, since the commercial connections with foreign 
countries were very limited and strictly linked to the functioning of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), better known as Comecon. Comecon was an organization 
created in 1949 which aimed at representing the reference point for the economic 
                                                 
6 The term Nomenklatura refers to a list of labor positions which were considered relevant within social life, 
and therefore prestigious; those who wanted to occupy these positions had to receive the Communist Party 
approval. In most of literature the term is used as synonymous of member of the Party, or everyone 
integrated in the Party hierarchy (Harasymiw, 1969). 
7 The soft budget constraint led to persisting increasing demand of resources; nonetheless since inputs were 
scarce, the only resource further exploitable was labor.  
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cooperation between the socialist countries8. It was an instrument to coordinate the 
developmental path of each country involved in order to act within a common project, that 
could bring about the maximum results through the minimization of costs. Three research 
institutes (the Institute of Standardization, the Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist 
System and the International Centre for Scientific and Technical Information), two banks (the 
International Investment Bank and the International Bank for Economic Cooperation) and a number 
of specialized agencies were attached to Comecon. In reality, although the project was quite 
ambitious, the internal mechanisms did not allow an efficient implementation of the whole 
system.  
Several features added up to the muddled functioning of the Comecon. The foreign 
trade of each country was defined within the general economic plan and balanced over a 
certain period of time, usually five years. It is difficult to consider the trade within and 
outside the Comecon area as added value for the regional economic growth, since it was 
merely supposed to fill the gaps in the production of countries: only scarce goods were 
imported and only surplus goods were exported (Buttino, 1980). Also trade followed the 
general economic mechanisms described in the first part of the paragraph; the benchmark 
for the exchanges were the physical quantities of goods, rather than their prices. The so 
called “hard” goods (foodstuffs, fuel, raw materials) could be exchanged only with goods 
of that category, and the same was to be for “soft” goods (poor-quality consumer goods or 
machinery). Trade with the rest of the world was related mainly to the exports of “hard” 
goods, whereas the external demand for “soft” goods, whose technological level did not 
meet the international standards, was much lower. The volume of trade within the 
Comecon area was limited also by the price system, since prices were fixed accordingly to 
administrative criteria, and they created distortions within the trade balance, since exports 
were paid according to the internal prices. Generally, prices of the world market were 
higher than the ones imposed within the Comecon area, and the consistent exports of 
“hard” goods did not lead to exploit the comparative advantage related to their production 
as their economic value was underestimated. Not only prices were fixed, but also money 
played a minor role, since the Rouble9 was not convertible. This feature made impossible to 
operate in a multilateral market and those countries with a commercial surplus could not 
                                                 
8 It included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, the German Democratic 
Republic and the ex-URSS, other than Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam. The Former Yugoslavia was not a 
member but just an associate state, although this position allowed it to participate as a member in some 
organs of the organization.  
9 In 1964 the Rouble became common currency transferable (although not convertible) within the Comecon 
area.  
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use it to trade out of Comecon. In that case, countries had to make do with goods supplied 
by the other Comecon members, even though they might not meet their real economic 
needs.      
Practically, trade within this area was mainly based on bilateralism which favored the 
accumulation of debts and credits. In order to get around the problem, it was necessary to 
limit the volume of the exchanges between countries. Since 1964 multilateralism was 
introduced, but the system remained centralized as every country had to settle accounts 
with the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (Ausch, 1980). In addition, all the 
exchanges hinged on the capacity to export of URSS which supplied basically fuel and raw 
materials, so that the other countries were totally dependent on their imports from URSS 
relatively to their agricultural and manufacturing production. Such features did not 
contribute to the economic growth of the countries, on the other hand the inefficiency of 
the system prevented its natural development. The whole trade with foreign countries was 
handled by the plan and there were no direct contacts between internal and external firms. Even 
though, since the Fifties, some firms were allowed to directly export, the number of 
reforms which were introduced in order to increase the autonomy of enterprises was still 
too small, and it was not accompanied by proper improvements in the administrative, 
institutional and legal fields. At the same time, this attempt to liberalize the commercial 
activity of some firms was counterproductive since the ones gaining more autonomy were 
attracted by the high quality of foreign products; while they required more responsibility 
relatively to their direct connection with foreign commercial partners, their opportunities to 
increase in competitiveness was hampered by the rigid system to which they belonged 
(Gumpel, 1980). Thus, not only the productive structure of these countries was responsible 
for the internal economic distortions, but also trade mechanisms led to the creation of a 
“second choice” market, where firms could not maximize their real potentialities. 
A further important feature of Comecon was the specialization of production 
within the area. This mechanism was based on the socialist concept of “international 
division of labor” which was supposed to bring about economies of scale and cost 
advantages. Nonetheless, specialization  was conducted not always according to the 
comparative advantages of each country, and this recklessness led to distorted economic 
integration. Soon after the Second World War, when specialization started to be conducted, 
it reflected the inequality between countries relatively to their level of development. In 
order to satisfy the common needs of Comecon, many countries were forced to change 
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their productive specialization: for instance Czechoslovakia, which used to supply 
equipment for the consumer goods industry, was prompted to produce machinery for the 
heavy industry. Later on, the division of labor involved also intermediate goods within the 
same sector, in order to foster economic cooperation between countries, and compensate 
the existing productive shortfalls; for instance, Hungary was asked to increase its 
production of aluminum, that was later exported to URSS to be transformed, and exported 
again to Hungary (Buttino, 1980). This mechanism had nothing different from the actual 
productive specialization occurring all over the global market, unless for the fact that it did 
not follow the logic based on comparative advantages.     
1.2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITION 
Transition basically rests on four processes:  
 Macroeconomic stabilization that was implemented through tightening 
monetary and fiscal policies in order to restore price stability and external 
balance, while fostering a consistent rate of growth. Stabilization programs were 
quite broad; nonetheless the most important reforms concerned: reduction of 
credits, to the State-owned sector and, in a lower extent, to firms; reduction of 
government subsidies in order to decrease the public deficit; increase of the interest rate 
so that loans are more expensive and investments are stimulated; devaluation of 
currency, a common strategy of the past aimed at fostering competitiveness by 
increasing exports (Bhaduri, 1994). Wage control reforms were also included in the 
stabilization package since wages, previously set by the centre and almost fixed, 
had to be linked to a free market mechanism (Fischer and Gelb, 1991).      
 Liberalization of prices, that was applied to all goods categories except those of 
housing, energy and basic consumption goods. It was one of the most critical 
measures undertaken, since the first effect was a drastic increase of the prices 
level, causing inflation; therefore these policies were supposed to be strictly 
connected with the macroeconomic stabilization measures responsible for the 
price equilibrium, especially monetary policies in charge of adjusting the quantity 
of money, wages and the exchange rate (De Melo et al., 1996). Liberalization also 
concerns market opening, in order to improve the allocation of resources and 
revitalize competitiveness. Besides the concrete dismantling of Comecon, which 
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leads to the demise of protectionism, a first shift from quantitative to price 
restrictions occurs.    
 Privatization, the central instruments to shape the figure of the “entrepreneur”, 
through the development of SMEs and the concept of corporate governance.10 
Privatization was to transfer proprietorship of firms and institutions from State 
to individuals, and it was implemented in heterogeneous ways and speed 
depending on the country considered.   
 Institution building, which was a crucial step along the process of 
transformation of TCs. After the political events that accompanied the 
dismantling of the socialist block, an institutional vacuum arose in the society. Such 
a situation was very dangerous for the stability of the new regimes, and it could 
favor the old Nomenklatura to take back their old privileges (Bunce, 1995); that 
is exactly what occurred in Romania, Russian Federation and in the CIS, where 
the Transition started later and gave weaker results, cause of the political 
impasse. On this purpose, new institutions, or renovated ones, had to be 
established in order to support the reforms, while facing uncertainty of the 
change and prevent the negative consequences of the macroeconomic policies. 
Besides the market and non market (both political and social) structures existing 
in all democracies, the concept of institution building also refers to the legal 
system which should safeguard individuals and protect private property rights. It 
is to underline that the privatization programs contributed to create a new sector 
in TCs, which was supposed to be run no more by the State; rules and laws 
consistent with the liberal market structures helped preventing encroachment 
attempts from the centre and the rent-seeking behavior typical of command 
economies (Roland, 2000).   
The first three blocks of reforms (macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization and 
privatization) fall into the logic of the Washington Consensus supported by international 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World bank, and later on the 
European Union. On the other hand, the section on institutional building measures was the 
reference point by a minority group of experts. This distinction is not negligible since it 
reflects the different paths of transition that were implemented across countries. On the 
                                                 
10 According to the definition of the World Bank the corporate governance is the set of structures, including 
rules and laws, and processes working for the functioning and control of a company 
(http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/corporategovernance.nsf/Content/DFI_Statement).  
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one side the international institutions pushed for a shock therapy, in order to overturn the 
critical situation stemming from the fall of the previous regimes. This strategy, followed by 
most countries11, was based on a neoclassical economic approach, and focused on the 
establishment of an irreversible change, which was to be achieved by the total and 
immediate dismantling of the old system. Countries were on the way to the market 
economy, so that it was necessary to neutralize all the existing forces which had interfered 
with the economic system so far. In other words, economy had to be subjected to a 
“depoliticization”, aimed at preventing any State intervention (Roland, 2000). The 
instruments most valuable according to the shock therapy concerned the micro and 
macroeconomic reforms mentioned above. Speed of adjustments was a crucial issue to be 
given attention, since it enabled to keep under control the interdependence of economic 
relationships, in order to prevent the strengthening of some measures at expense of some 
others. Certainly, changes such as the launch of price liberalization were expected to trigger 
consequent mechanisms that required further measures, i.e. the convertibility of currency 
and the opening of the market. Thus, simultaneity of reforms was required by supporters 
of the shock therapy, and it was this simultaneity that was supposed to counteract the 
negative consequences of Transition (Marangos, 2002). Furthermore, the supporters of this 
approach tended to underline that a rapid and comprehensive change would increase 
supply, that in turn would diminish inflation, one of the main distortions of the early 
transitional period caused by price liberalization. Nonetheless this conclusion appears too 
simplistic: although in planned economies demand was higher than supply according the 
Keynesian theory it is the demand that must be fostered in order to boost the economic 
growth (Jeffries, 2002). The institutional sphere was not totally neglected, considering the 
legal and financial apparatus a relevant support for the new rising economic system; 
nonetheless the institutional change took the second place as for importance, just below 
the economic revolution.  
Poland and Russia represent two emblematic cases under the shock therapy, both 
because they implemented transition policies based on a radical approach, and reported 
very different results at the same time. The history of Polish reforms was basically 
characterized by continuity, which later on contributed to the economic and social 
equilibrium of this country. Poland undertook alternately shock therapy measures, thus 
                                                 
11 Given the obvious differences a sort of “shock therapy” was implemented especially in Eastern Germany 
and the Baltics. The case of the Russian Federation and CISCs is more complex and peculiar, since in those 
countries Transition began much later and the reforms had to face several difficulties both due to the political 
situation and the structural macroeconomic problems.   
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allowing to stem economic damages to society; in this way we can also refer to Poland as a 
“controlled shock transition economy”, using the expression of Gomulka (1994). What is 
very important to underline is the early start of reforms, dated to the Eighties, and based 
on the reduction of centralization and the strengthen of external relationships, through 
exports and the law enabling joint ventures between firms. The first step of the shock 
therapy began at the very end of the Eighties, in correspondence with the weakening of the 
Communist regime; in 1988 the government awarded the right to compete equally in all 
economic activities, thus fostering the rise of private entrepreneurship, especially of “small 
type”. The measures concerned mass privatization, strong price liberalization and a radical 
modification of the wage distribution. This first “attack” to the existing system was 
followed by a continuous process of reforms, in which strong interventions alternated with 
more moderate ones. The attempt was to maintain the cohesion of society which could be 
negatively affected by the impact of new policies interventions, as it will deepened in the 
following paragraphs dedicated to the consequences of transition reforms. On this purpose 
the Solidarity government (Solidarność)12 went on more gradually with the attempt of 
bringing the budget into balance, by pursuing both price and trade liberalization, and by 
implementing monetary devaluation in order to stimulate exports. Again this attitude was 
substituted by a new shock intervention, and later on, from the end of the Nineties, 
gradualism was established again by reducing the narrowness of monetary and fiscal 
policies. The decision of pursuing a constant but systemic path of reforms, which was not a 
priori choice but derived from the capacity of Poland of catching the economic and social 
needs of the moment, gave the country the possibility to recover from the decline periods 
and restore the disequilibrium (Murrell, 1993). In this sense, Poland is often taken as a 
successful example of TC implementing a shock therapy strategy; nonetheless the real facts 
put Poland in the middle way between those countries which implemented a strong radical 
range of reforms, and those which opted for a moderate one.   
In Russia the situation was very different, mainly because of the starting point of 
the country which had not already previously implemented economic reforms, or it had 
                                                 
12 Solidarność is a trade union federation born in 1980, which undertook a crucial role in the political 
development of Poland. Its strength were the solid catholic support and the non-violent attitude, taken as 
instruments against the absolutist centralization of the communist power. Only in 1989 the movement was 
legalized and it participated to the national elections. Solidarność obtained a surprising popular support and in 
1990 Walesa, the leader of the movement, became the new President of Poland.     
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proceeded in a inefficient way13. Moreover, the approach adopted relatively to the 
transition measures can be deemed as even more radical than the one observed in Poland. 
The change path of Russia was characterized mainly by radical interventions, yet with 
scarce results; for instance by the end of 1991, liberalization and privatization programs had 
been largely implemented but the “new” private sector was still strongly linked to the State 
sphere. Nonetheless the real attack began in 1992 and the Yeltsin presidency gave the 
reforms the go-ahead with a strong price liberalization, the removal of the old supply 
system, the convertibility of Ruble and the other policies included in the classical 
stabilization approach. The negative consequences that followed the shock therapy 
measures was much more impressive than the concrete positive gains, and, more 
important, lasted longer than in the Polish case. Although the government tried to 
counteract the critical situation by weakening the impact of reforms, on the example of 
Poland, the gradualism was based on inappropriate decisions, such as the introduction of 
state subsidies in order to recover firms in difficulty. A part from the different starting 
position of Poland, more oriented towards international markets and more exposed to 
external economic theories, Russia showed great difficulties in understanding the real 
meaning of some important policies, for instance the restrictive fiscal and monetary 
measures which had never been implemented before. Furthermore, in the attempt to 
demise the old system especially from the administrative standpoint, Russia did not paid 
enough attention to the reinforcement of the new market-oriented institutions, other than 
to the redistribution of property rights. This was a big problem arising in the 
implementation of the shock therapy in general, and in Russia it led to a controversial 
increase of influence from the old interest, such as those related to the largest heavy 
industrial groups (Murrell, 1993; Roland, 2002).        
On the other side there was the evolutionary approach, already mentioned in 
paragraph 1.1., based on a more gradual shift to a new economic order. This position 
gathered less consensus than the shock therapy, and was supported  principally by new 
academics. Reforms had to be conducted starting from the institutional context14 
considered as an important basis for the development of market and the growth of 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, reforms had not to be settled all at once. This was a 
fundamental issue in the opposition between the two theoretical groups. For the 
                                                 
13 Gorbachev in 1987 introduced the Law on Individual Labor Activity, and in 1988 the Law on 
Cooperatives, within a primordial program of privatization. Nonetheless the measures had a very weak 
impact since cooperative could not own productive assets, yet (Gerber and Hout, 1998). 
14 The focus was especially on legal environment, property rights and development of business services. 
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international institutions changes had to occur as soon as possible; for most academics 
speed depended on each country context, and basically a process based on a “boom and 
boost” approach would hamper the natural development of local economies (Surdej, 2009).  
According with this viewpoint it was not worth to introduce all the reforms at the same 
moment and in the same way, in order to have the possibility to modify them in case that 
consequences were negative. In the evolutionary approach the complementarily across 
reforms, so much envisaged by the Washington Consensus strategy, was however 
important but in the background, since every change was supposed to be first partial, and 
afterwards it could be eventually integrated with further measures. Thus, one of the most 
relevant features was the consequential order of reforms that enabled to implement 
measures on the bases of previous results (Marangos, 2002). The total disruption of the 
existing institutional system was not always necessary, and in some cases it could even 
become a starting point toward the prevention of disorder.  
A prime example, other than successful case of Transition, can be viewed in 
Slovenia. This small country adopted a gradual approach to reforms and obtained very 
good results in terms of stabilization of the economic systems, so that nowadays Slovenia 
can be still distinguished for its solid growth and slow inflation rate. The starting point of 
Slovenia, which had already implemented some reforms in the pre-transitional period, 
certainly contributed to the good outcomes of the Nineties. The country showed a good 
initial level of economic development, much higher than those registered in the other 
Balkan countries; in order to preserve this economic situation drastic measures were 
avoided. On the one hand, it is noticeable that gradualism was favored by the democratic 
turning point that Slovenia was able to welcome and consequently develop. A legal 
framework aimed at reinforcing the system was established, and a general popular support 
fostered the political pluralism, the latter mainly stemming from the self-management 
participatory organization typical of the Balkan command economy (Bebler, 2002). On the 
other hand, the persistent gradual path adopted by Slovenia may have caused controversial 
effects, such as a loss of competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances. Nevertheless, 
price and trade liberalization in the financial and infrastructure sectors was, especially at the 
beginning of the transition, very slow, and a few efforts were made to reduce at minimum 
level State intervention. In spite of a solid socio-economic stabilization of the country (and 
also a political one, relatively to the other countries of the area), gradualism may have 
provoked a low level of dynamism, which should be deemed as the engine of future growth 
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and development (Simoneti et al, 2005). The Slovenian experience is one of the empirical 
manifestations of the theoretical debate between supporters and opponents of gradualism.   
1.3. THE PROCESS OF PRIVATIZATION 
Among all the reforms that were applied in TCs during the shift from command to 
market economy, it is quite interesting to delve deeper into the privatization methods 
implemented in order to reduce – or eliminate – the monopoly of the State in the 
economy. Also in this case it is possible to distinguish radical approaches to privatization 
from others which were less drastic; the classification depends on the specific features of 
each country, and the way in which privatization measures were undertaken led to different 
final consequences, still evident nowadays. Thus privatization approaches must be studied 
within the economic framework in which they were implemented, and it is quite hard to 
state which is the most suitable one, since each strategy reported both advantages and 
disadvantages. Moreover, although it is possible to individuate a leading privatization 
method, it also true that each TC often chose to implement more than one. Poland, for 
instance, adopted a diversified range of privatization methods, and this issue allowed the 
government to compensate for negative consequences following some less appropriate 
strategies (e.g. sales to insiders). The main aims of privatization programs was to remove 
the limits to private sector, which had to become the engine of growth. In command 
economies State was the owner of most economic system, so the shift from public to 
private ownership and management of production and everything that was related to it, had 
to be irreversible. Furthermore, it had to guarantee individual economic agents equal rights 
and treatment for public and private sectors (Hillman and Milanovic, 1992). 
Fig. 1.4.1. shows the trend of privatization in TCs, grouped into areas (CEECs, 
SEECs, BCs, SEECs), from 1989 to 2010. The so-called Privatization Index has been 
computed from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
transition indicators, which range from 1 to 4+ and include the following nine fields of 
reform: - large scale privatization; - small scale privatization; - governance and enterprise 
restructuring; -  price liberalization; - trade and foreign exchange system; - competition 
policy; - banking reform and interest rate liberalization; - security markets and non-bank 
financial institutions; - infrastructures. Indicators close to value 1 refer to low development 
from a centrally planned economy, whereas value 4+ reflects a situation very similar to a 
market system. The Privatization Index used in Fig. 1.4.1. is the average of the first two 
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EBRD indicators listed above: large scale privatization and small scale privatization. 
In all cases considered the Index shows an increasing trend, at least till 2005, when the 
curve seems to remain at constant levels. The Figure demonstrates that TCs have been 
steadily pursuing privatization policies, even though it does not mean that all of them have 
managed to achieve efficient results in reality. Nonetheless, it is noticeable that nowadays 
BCs are very close to industrialized market economies in terms of privatization (value of 
4+), followed by CEECs (value of 4), whereas SEECs and CISCs are still far from this 
threshold, and the Index does not cross the value of 3.5. The lowest level, corresponding to 
the position of CISCs, indicates that in these countries a significant share of firms is still in 
State’s hands. An interesting aspect of the graph is represented by the starting point of 
privatization processes in each group. CEECs, BCs and CISCs all report a Privatization 
Index of in 1989, and CEECs register the strongest increase in the first three years. 
Contrariwise, SEECs show a higher level of privatization already in 1989. When we look at 
the specific indicators related to each individual country, we can notice that initial small 
scale privatization is equal to 3 in all SEECs but Albania, whereas in the countries 
belonging to the other regions is either 1 or 2. According to the definition of EBRD level 3 
of small scale privatization corresponds to a “comprehensive program almost ready for 
implementation”. A part from the Privatization Act included within a wide program of 
reforms launched in 1989 which led to the creation of 160,000 Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME) (Lazic and Sekelj, 1997), the Former Yugoslavia was characterized by 
the self-management system15 that, in a way, could have fostered, at least at the beginning 
of Transition, the process of privatization. This kind of structure based on the concept of 
“social ownership” (and not State ownership) enabled the Former Yugoslavia to place itself 
in a middle way between planned-type economies and market-oriented systems. 
Nonetheless, due to the following dismantling of the Federation, the critical politic facts 
and the structural economic difficulties, the privatization process became progressively 
slower and less efficient.      
 
                                                 
15 With the self-management scheme the Former Yugoslavia of Tito partially turned from the Sovietic 
centralized management of firms. Employees played a prime role in the decision making process within firms, 
and their power was channeled through the Workers’ Council, an organ set up to important business 
strategies, such as the choice of managers and the allocation of surplus. While the enterprise policy making 
appertained to employees, the execution of policies was up to managers. The most important reform of this 
system occurred in 1952 with the establishment of the Social Ownership, according to which workers were 
allowed to appropriate the surplus of the firm (Estrin, 1991). 
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Fig.1.4.1. Evolution of Privatization in TCs, by groups of countries, over the last twenty years 
 
Source: author’s  elaboration on data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – 
Transition Index.  
Note: the Czech Republic is not included since, due to its progress, it graduated from EBRD programs in 
2007. CEECs: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic. SEECs: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. BCs: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. CIS: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.    
Privatization did not evolve in a quick transformation, even though some countries 
focused on the extension of the change, and it is well known that in some TCs this process 
is still in place. Equally, diverse constraints had to be faced, changing according to the 
privatization policy. Roland (2000) stresses the importance of five types of constraints, 
which have to be considered in the analysis of the efficacy of each policy. The availability 
of funds to invest is one of the main problems (stock-flow constraints), limiting the 
opportunity of individuals to buy shares of SOEs. On the other side, and related to the 
previous point, the fiscal constraints had to be taken into account since, given the quasi-
inexistence of a tax system in former socialist economies, the revenues of the State were 
not sufficient to incur in a deep restructuring. In this sense privatization might represent a 
solution bringing flows to the centre.  
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Political constraints, mainly coming from managers, arose when rent-seeking16 
habits were established and lobbies competed each other in order to obtain the largest 
shares from the State. Finally, on the one side it was hardly simple to identify the best 
managers who had to be responsible for the restructuring of firms (informational 
constraints), and on the other side the scarcity of good administrative skills led to long 
bureaucratic processes and waste of time (administrative constraints). 
In literature there are several ways to classify the privatization strategies used by 
TCs since the early Nineties (e.g. Carlin and Landesmann, 1997; Hillman and Milanovic, 
1992; Jeffries, 2002; Roland, 2000). The current paragraph will try to suggest a subdivision 
following the book of Jeffries (2002), giving a broader picture of the topic.  
 The first type refers to the sale to outsiders, either in the top-down form or in 
the bottom-up one. In the former situation, common above all in East Germany 
and Hungary17, firms were given away both to domestic and foreign owners, by 
auction or tenders. This way led to collect funds for both the new privatized firms 
and the government, other than new knowledge and capital, especially when 
investors were foreign. The instruments of auctions and tenders allowed for a first 
selection of buyers, since it was very likely that the winners - or those who 
accepted to pay a specific price – were very interested and able to sustain a proper 
restructuring. De facto, the new ownership, although very interested in the 
investment, could be diffused instead of being related to one single person; in this 
case the risk that the management was inefficient and in old managers’ hands was 
very high. Besides to this aspect, this method hid some other disadvantages. First, 
there could be a resistance from the insiders, the old managers not willing to lose 
their firm, causing an attempt to strip the assets before the sale. Second, the 
stock-flow constraint stressed the necessary availability of liquidity to invest, 
which was a big deal in TCs soon after the collapse of the regime. And third, 
cause of the stock-flow constraint, many firms were sold to foreigners, thus 
somehow increasing the risk of erosion of the domestic capital. Contrariwise, the 
bottom-up privatization, undertaken especially in Hungary, Poland and Estonia, 
                                                 
16 Rent-seeking refers to a corrupted attitude emerging when agents gain economic revenues as result of the 
manipulation of political leaders. Thus, since revenues do not stem from goods and services exchange, there  
is no productivity supply. Rent-seeking was a common practice in command economies, and it became a hard 
core to defeat also during Transition. 
17 In Hungary most of the privatization program was based on sales to foreign investors (Kalotay and Hunya, 
2000). 
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was based on the opposite principle, since it was the investor (domestic or 
foreign) the one making an economic proposal, in order to gain a specific firm. 
Generally this method was implemented through non-cash bids (i.e. leasing, 
partial purchase) and could have more advantages than the privatization from the 
top. Certainly, it was much slower, but it contributed to the development of a 
stronger corporate governance. In addition, although they allowed to bypass the 
stock-flow constraint, bottom-up privatizations favored the sale of the most 
efficient firms first, since the investor could choose the object of its offer.  
 An additional strategy to give ownership to public hands was the management 
and employee-buy out, mainly implemented in Russia and CIS and in the 
Balkans. In this case shares of firms were transferred through vouchers (mass 
privatization to insiders – see the following point) or cash to the old managers 
and employee within the firm. It was a sort of sale to insiders, which allowed not 
to lose the internal human resources existing and, at the same time, to reinforce 
their role in the management of the firm. In fact on the one hand, insiders could 
boast a deep information about firm functioning, problems and potentialities, on 
the other hand, leaving the whole responsibility of the management, they could 
feel more motivated. Nonetheless management and employee-buy outs did not 
represent the best solution in order to foster entrepreneurship, since they favored 
the same entourage which could easily turn into an oligopoly. In such a situation 
the replacement of both managers and employees was very hard to occur and the 
influence of new external skills was prevented. Thus, due to a distorted allocation 
of resources, the whole society had to pay the inefficient management of the firm.  
 With the mass privatization SOEs were given away through vouchers for free or 
at nominal cost; afterwards, the vouchers could be exchanged (for shares of the 
ownership) in the enterprises concerned, in private funds, or in government funds 
specifically created on this purpose. This method could refer both to outsiders 
and insiders (management and employee-buy outs through vouchers). The first 
case was preferable, since problems linked to the risk of establishing an oligopoly 
could be avoided. Mass privatization enabled the whole society to be involved in 
the process of transformation, facing the stock-flow constraint of the moment, 
and offering new capacities and skills. Nonetheless, this change was only apparent 
since such a privatization path led to a diffuse ownership, which in turn favored 
the old managers and employees of firms. Sometimes, SOEs managers themselves 
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suggested ministers to implement a voucher privatization, as they knew that the 
consequent dispersion would have favored a weak degree of monitoring (Roland, 
2000). An additional negative consequence to this privatization could occur: due 
to asymmetrical information the poorest citizens could be induced to sell their 
shares in exchange for prices much lower than the real value of the vouchers. In a 
way, mass privatization to outsiders, contrary to bottom-up sales, was very quick 
to implement, totally in line with the shock therapy promoted by the international 
institutions. It was largely adopted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, 
Romania, but also (in a lesser extent) in Poland, even though in the latter country 
the proposal was blocked in the Parliament for many years. Mass privatization to 
insiders, already discussed in the previous point, was common in Russia, and it 
can be deemed as one on the explanations for the maintenance of high levels of 
corruption and patronage still existing in this country. 
 The last method of privatization that can be mentioned is the restitution, 
according to which firms ownership returned to previous proprietors. This action 
was significant, since the State engaged itself in promoting a fair development of 
the  privatization process, while fostering entrepreneurship among population. 
However, it was not assumed that the ones subjected to restitution could manage 
properly a firm, due to their lack of previous business experience.         
1.4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSITION: THE MARKETS OF 
GOODS, PRICES AND LABOR  
   The transitional reforms were applied according to the previous scheme in all the 
countries concerned, with some important differences. Svejnar (2002) makes a distinction 
between “Type I” and “Type II” reforms, which were adopted by every TC at different 
times and different ways, respectively. According to the author, Type I measures were the 
ones assuming primary importance within the shock therapy approach, basically:  
 macro stabilization (through restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, wage control, 
fixed exchange rate…);  
 strong price liberalization;  
 dismantling of the communist system;  
 reduction or removal of state subsidies;  
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  market liberalization. 
To these changes Svejnar (2002) adds other steps, such as the elimination of the 
mono-bank system, the introduction of social safety elements, and the small scale 
privatization. It is easy to understand that all these policies represented the first “package” 
of reforms that countries were prompted to realize, and almost all TCs implemented them; 
in a way, these reforms were also the most urgent (again according to the prevailing current 
of thought based on the shock therapy), and for that reason, they were required since the 
early begin of transformation towards a democratic and market-oriented economy.  
At the same time there was an additional reforms package, the so-called Type II 
measures which, contrary to the previous case, was not implemented in all the countries 
considered. These reforms concerned:  
 the development of a proper institutional and legal framework;  
 the building of modern infrastructures;  
 the regulation of the labor market;  
 the introduction of commercial bank;  
 and large scale privatization.  
These measures were the focus of the gradual approach, as already mentioned, and 
considering the range of TCs in which they were soon implemented, it is clear that they 
represented the real engine of development. De facto, CEECs and BCs were quite 
successful in adopting the Type II package, whereas the SEECs and CISCs showed a more 
complicated path in this field. This situation is stressed in the following Figure 1.4.1 
reporting the evolution of the EBRD Transition Index in TCs, dismantling by group. In 
this case the Transition Index, already described in the previous paragraph, is an average of 
all fields listed before (large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and 
enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, 
competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, security markets and 
non-bank financial institutions, infrastructure). Although in all groups of countries the 
trend is increasing, showing a positive approach to transformation, the CEECs and the 
BCs are leading, and report a significant detachment from the CISCs and the SEECs. 
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Fig. 1.4.1 Evolution of the Transitional Path in TCs, by groups of countries, over the last twenty years.  
                  
Source: author’s  elaboration on data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – 
Transition Index.  
Note: the Czech Republic is not included since, due to its progress, it graduated from EBRD programs in 
2007. CEECs: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic. SEECs: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. BCs: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. CISCs: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.    
De Melo et al. (1996) compute a Cumulative Liberalization Index (CLI)18, in order 
to analyze both the depth and duration of the transition path. The authors divide TCs into 
four groups, according to the value of CLI: - advanced reformers (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia); - high-intermediate reformers (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); - low-intermediate reformers (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation); - slow reformers (Belarus, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan). A fifth category is identified in the case of the SEECs, since the economic 
performance of these countries was negatively affected by regional tensions occurring in 
                                                 
18 The authors first compute an annual liberalization index (from 1989 to 1994) based on data about internal 
and external markets, respectively, and private sector entry; this index ranges from 0, corresponding to 
unreformed countries, to 1, related to those countries implementing reforms in an extensively way. The CLI 
is the sum of each country liberalization indices over the period considered (De Melo et al., 1996). 
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the first phase of transition. It is possible to notice that this categorization is very similar to 
the trends reported in the previous Figure 1.4.1.   
While introducing this distinction, Svejnar (2002) explains the so different 
economic performance between TCs that, due to their specific structural features and 
degree of involvement in the previous communist system, handled differently the 
transitional path. Nonetheless, although initial conditions may matter, as pointed out by 
Heybey and Murrell (1999), the outcome of such a complex transformation process must 
be depended on the will of governments and their capacity of managing the changing 
political, economic and social system. Thus, TCs implemented differently transitional 
reforms and their following economic performances were different. However some 
consequences of the first part of this path were common to all countries. These 
consequences concerned the evolution of the market of goods, prices and labor.  
In all TCs a collapse of GDP occurred in the first period of reforms, mainly due 
to the price liberalization policies implemented. These measures caused the reallocation of 
resources, through the change of price ratios. In particular, capital shifted from non-
competitive industries with decreasing prices to competitive industries with increasing 
prices, leading to a strong unbalance within the productive system (Popov, 2007). This 
situation, together with the very low availability of investments necessary to restructure 
industries in crisis, caused a fall of output which was very deep, considering that most of 
these economies were non-competitive. Nonetheless, Transitional Economies registered 
different economic performances, although all negative; generally, the higher was the GDP 
before the Nineties, the deeper was the fall of the same during the first period of transition. 
Figure 1.4.2, reporting the growth rates of each group of TCs, shows the negative evolution 
of GDP between 1989 and 1995, shaping a sort of J-curve. The curve of the CEECs is the 
one with the least sharp trend, since both the initial fall and the following recovery are 
lower  relatively to the other countries. The BCs and the CISCs show the lowest growth 
rates during the first period of Transition; these groups include all those countries whose 
pre-transitional economy was strongly linked to the soviet command system, so that they 
were less prepared to face the transformation of the Nineties, and the relative impact was 
very strong. It is noticeable that in the last ten years the trend of the CISCs is the best one 
among all groups, followed by the BCs, CEECs and SEECs. These latest show a sharp 
increase of GDP between 1995 and 1997, due to the end of the Balkan war (1991-1995). 
The conflict weighted heavily on the economic performance of these countries, and made 
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the initial implementation of reforms very difficult, thus affecting the consequent recovery. 
Nowadays, the Balkan territories are still far behind within the process of recovery and 
catching up of the EU although many important progresses have been achieved by national 
government and local societies. Finally, the Figure shows the significant decrease of output 
as a consequence of the international financial crisis in 2008; all TCs suffered the impact of 
that historical moment, especially in those sectors with high concentration of foreign 
investment, and their transitional path was put to the test.         
Fig. 1.4.2 GDP growth in TCs over the last twenty years, by groups of countries. 
   
Source: author’s  elaboration on data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
Note: CEECs: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic. SEECs: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. BCs: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. CISCs: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.    
Gomulka (1994) stresses also the importance of cumulative effect of reforms of 
GDP evolution. In this case, along with the start of the collapse due to the introduction of 
transitional reforms, the specific structural constraints of each country should be take into 
consideration. According to this viewpoint the negative trend of growth occurred in TCs 
between 1989 and 1995, was the consequence of systemic distortions of these economies, 
unable to face the transformation. Gomulka (1994) occupies the opposite position to the 
supporters of the Keynesian theory who stated that the fall of demand was the prime cause 
of recession.  
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Liberalization occurring during the period of reforms also brought about an 
increase of inflation, due to the sharp disappearance of fixed prices system. In the graph 
below (Figure 1.4.3) all groups of countries show a peak of inflation (measured as annual 
GDP deflator) between 1991 and 1995-6. After this period a sharp drop is noticeable, so 
that it is difficult to distinguish the curves. The highest values are attained by the CISCs in 
1993, followed by BCs, SEECs and CEECs. The evolution of GDP deflator within each 
group of countries confirms the positive relationship between prices rise and fiscal deficit, 
very high in the CISCs and lower in the CEECs. Price liberalization might not be the only 
cause of inflation; the attempt of maintaining high subsidies, and the consequent monetary 
expansion, during the first period of transition contributed to the persistence of inflation 
till 1995-6. In addition, depreciations in the real exchange rates, while sustaining external 
balance, did not drop price levels. De Melo et al. (1996), proving that the quickest 
reforming TCs boasted lower inflation rates, state that price liberalization helps absorbing 
monetary liquidity in the long run, thus leading to stabilization.      
Fig. 1.4.3 Inflation in TCs over the last twenty years, by groups of countries. 
 
Source: author’s  elaboration on data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
Note: CEECs: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic. SEECs: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. BCs: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. CISCs: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.    
The third important consequence of transition was the unemployment. It is more 
difficult to analyze the situation of that time due to the consistent lack of data on 
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employment rates. Statistical surveys and researches represented a very inefficient 
instrument before the collapse of the command economy, since data were expected to 
reflect the compliance between the central planning and the real productive activity. With 
the beginning of Transition statistics, as a tool for the interpretation of reality and the 
development of appropriate policies, began to take on greater importance; nonetheless, the 
recovery in this field was very low, especially at the beginning of Transition, and required 
the support by international offices and experts. These shortcomings are particularly 
evident when considering the labor market of TCs, characterized by problems of 
registration, increasing informal employment, lower and lower participation rates and the 
so-called hidden unemployment, represented by workers doing part-time jobs, sometimes 
with no compensation, or in administrative leave (Keune, 2004). For these reasons, 
national statistics referring to the period of Transition cannot always show the real picture 
of countries, and unemployment is often underestimated19. This is the case of the CISCs, 
whose data are reported in Figure 1.4.4.b: in this graph all the curves (except for Armenia 
whose availability of data is however extremely limited) seem to show much lower levels 
than the ones reported in the other three Figures concerning the SEECs, CEECs and BCs. 
Other than the statistical issue, the relatively low level of unemployment in the CISCs is 
also linked to the resistance to change typical of these countries. At the beginning of 
Transition soviet rules still persevered in the area, and wages continued to be centrally 
determined both in private and state sector; in view of the limits imposed on the freedom 
of dismissal and the high payouts to workers made redundant, firms preferred to reduce 
the number working hours instead of laying off workers, limiting the reallocation of labor 
required by transition (Pavlova and Rohozynsky, 2005). In addition, CEECs and BCs 
adopted more social safety measures than the CISCs, devoting a consistent quantity of 
resources to non employment benefits and contributing to generate a sort of 
unemployment trap (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). Although the four graphs are in some cases 
difficult to interpret, due to incomplete information, in Figures 1.4.4.c (CEECs) and 1.4.4.d 
(BCs) it is possible to catch the evolution of unemployment characterizing TCs during the 
first years of reforms. The trend follows an inverted-U curve with high values between 
1991 and 1995-6 and decreasing values in the immediate aftermath. CEECs show lower 
rates of unemployment than BCs, especially in the case of Hungary, the Czech Republic 
                                                 
19 In order to take into consideration the lack of information on the labor markets in TCs, four different 
graphs reporting data on each country have been shown. Aggregated graphs, as in the previous cases of GDP 
growth and inflation, could not explain the situation efficiently, since many data are not available for the first 
period of transition, especially in the SEECs and the CISCs.  
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and Romania. The increase of unemployment in TCs since the collapse of the planned 
system is directly related to the privatization policies implemented during that period, and 
the reallocation of labor which followed. The dismantling of the state-owned sector 
brought about a large number of people looking for a new job who could not be totally 
absorbed by the limited number of private new born enterprises. Moreover, most people 
who had migrated from countryside to town in order to be employed in the SOEs, were 
now forced to go back to their original regions, thus increasing the agricultural 
unemployment (Crane, 1995). Certainly, the fall of GDP caused a decrease of labor 
productivity whose effect emerge in the initial persistence of unemployment (Boeri and 
Terrell, 2002). The highest levels of unemployment can be noted in Figure 1.4.4.a in the 
case of SEECs, with the exception of Slovenia which has always represented the most 
virtuous country in the Balkan area and the nearest one to the EU members from the 
structural aspect.     
Fig. 1.4.4.a/b/c/d Unemployment in TCs over the last twenty years. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
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Source: author’s  elaboration on data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
 
 
 
Source: author’s  elaboration on data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
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Source: author’s elaboration on data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
1.4.1. Other consequences of transition 
The fall of GDP and the concomitant increase of both inflation and unemployment 
over the first years of Transition are the most evident features common to all countries. 
Generally, the range of reforms consequences is very wide, including both negative and 
positive effects stemming from the demise of such a rigid and muddled socio-economic 
system.  
On the one side, transition brought about a decreasing availability of social 
services due to the forced dismantling of the State system. Since in the command 
economy the private initiative was extremely limited and the national production was run 
mainly by the industrial sector, social services were also provided by State through its 
SOEs. At that time, the social safety nets were quite efficient, and a discrete amount of 
resources was spent for health care and education. Contrariwise, in the first phase of 
transition, while the nascent private sector did not have yet the instruments for supplying 
social services, the state sector was becoming too weak, both in the financial and 
bureaucratic spheres. These problems were mainly connected with the pension system, 
which almost covered the entire population under socialism; since the collapse of the old 
system this measure was no longer sustainable, cause of the limited availability of State 
resources that now had to be spent for the whole restructuring of the economic and social 
context (Sveynar, 2002).    
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Privatization and the raise of prices due to liberalization increased social 
inequalities, also enhanced by the difficulties of finding a job. This aspect, deeply analyzed 
in the last part of the thesis, represents a phenomenon just as important as complicated to 
study, due to the lack of data in some countries on the one hand, and the tangle of causes 
on the other one. Privatization and price liberalization were not the only changes leading to 
more inequality; this term must be also referred to earnings inequality, due to the 
reallocation of labor retribution. The liberation of the system from the distorting planning 
led to a reallocation of resources and some industries, especially within the private sector, 
assumed an increasing relevance, or appeared for the first time. Imports also contributed to 
diversify the market, by favoring some industries instead of others. In particular, an 
improvement of high-skilled workers position occurred, whereas the socialism system gave 
more consideration to blue-collar workers, whose wage was relatively higher than the one 
of white-collars; this feature was the consequence of the very low demand of high skills in 
the command economies, related to the lack of innovation policies. De facto, Transition 
allowed the returns to education to increase, which notwithstanding was not accompanied 
by favorable measures for the oldest workers. This situation resulted in the 
underestimation of labor experience that people had accumulated up to the moment. 
TCs governments, stunned by the change, tended to go along with market requirements, 
still unable to distinguish between old features to remove and the ones to maintain in order 
to strengthen the functioning of the economy. The skill premium differential was even 
more remarkable regarding the comparison between the public and private sector, since in 
the second case, the higher level of competition  attracted more high skilled workers, 
especially in those TCs which were more oriented towards the international markets 
(Rutkowski, 1996).  
Certainly, security and paychecks were running out with Transition, and not 
everybody was able to grasp the new opportunities given by the market, as the institutional 
context was nearly absent and the transformation required competences that still lacked. 
The result was the emergence of poverty and the unequal distribution of incomes. In this 
situation, the irregular economy, which was a typical feature of the socialist countries, did 
not disappear, on the contrary it got stronger, although changing its form. Some activities 
such as the black market of currency and goods reduced their influence in favor of new 
ones, like the tax evasion and the partial registration of firms, according to which some 
businesses were kept hidden. Moreover, before Transition the competition between 
irregular and regular economy occurred especially on inputs markets, whereas after the 
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implementation of measures competition spread to the output side (Dallago, 1995). These 
channels were favored by the institutional vacuum and general uncertainty; where in a 
country neither the private nor the public sector intervenes agents are forced to search 
alternative solutions, and the irregular economy generally represents a better reallocation of 
available resources. At the same time the very weak nascent private sector could not even 
compete with the illicit counterpart, and the incentives for firms became not useful at all. 
At the moment, notwithstanding irregular economy is still one of the prior problems of 
TCs, governments and especially the EU (relatively to the New Member States and 
candidates) are implementing a more consistent number of policies aimed at challenging 
this phenomenon.  
While considering the confusion created by Transition, some relevant positive 
changes occurring within the socio-economic system cannot be neglected. In particular, 
some of the features listed above (inequalities, irregular economy…) may hide interesting 
potentialities for the development of TCs. What should be remarked is that during 
transition, economy and society represented much more dynamic contexts than the 
political sphere, which showed a greater difficulty in breaking the linkages with the old 
structures and schemes. This lack of parallelism is the main cause of the slow and difficult 
path to capitalism followed by TCs; essentially, the political integrity should always be the 
reference point for the restructuring and growth of a country, and whenever it lacks, the 
creation of stable and balanced relationships between different social actors turns to be 
more risky. Thus, price liberalization and the gradual openness of trade relationships led to 
a reduction of shortage, given by a wider availability of goods and services, although the 
latest were still very limited at the beginning of transition. The constraints imposed by the 
State to production were eliminated, so that supply could respond to demand of consumers 
as in market-oriented economies. Moreover, the new regime entailed the possibility of 
choosing among much more varieties of goods than before, so that consumers’ tastes could be 
now satisfied and became priorities within the new system. This is a revolution not to be 
underestimated, since new products coming partly from new firms, partly from imports, 
reduced queues at the shops and improved the quality of life of consumers.   
As mentioned in previous lines, transition brought about a reallocation of factors of 
production, including labor and its retribution. While this change may have been the cause 
of earnings inequalities, it is not to ignore that the higher wage premium related to high 
skilled workers boosted people to work, especially young people who were looking for 
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future guaranties in labor markets. Thus, the unbalance between blue-collars and white 
collars wages can be viewed as an incentive for innovation and improvement of 
production, other than growth of services and higher standard of living, since TCs just 
opened to the international markets and needed to create their own potentialities against 
foreign competition. As a consequence, transition allowed to increase incentives aimed 
at acquiring new skills and improving product competition. Regarding to this aspect 
foreign penetration, made possible by the opening of the internal markets, was very 
important as a channel of new knowledge and technologies transfer. FDI will be deeper 
analyzed in the following section; for now it is just important to underline the significant 
impact that openness had in TCs economic development, at least at the beginning of 
transformation, especially thanks to the higher credit availability brought about by the 
increase of international reserves and the decrease of internal debt-export ratios (Gomulka, 
1994). 
Transition became finally very important for the relevance given to individual 
initiative through privatization policies. Irrespective of the implementation of different 
measures and final outcomes within each country - more or less successful - privatization 
gave TCs the opportunity to develop their own paths of entrepreneurship. This aspect 
was almost impossible before the Nineties, with some well known exceptions of countries 
that started to introduce forms of privatization before the collapse of the soviet system 
(e.g. Hungary, Poland, Slovenia). In a command economy the whole productive structure 
was in State hands, and private activity was extremely reduced. Thus, Transition 
represented a chance to emerge for those people who wanted to be protagonists of the 
current development of their country. The types of privatization discussed in paragraph 1.4 
regarded big SOEs; privatization of Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was much quicker 
and accompanied by an increasing number of new activities, especially of micro scale. 
SMEs were able to respond to market needs better than big firms, both because they 
managed to accumulate more capital and because their dimension allowed for a higher 
degree of dynamism, such an important feature in the first phase of market development.  
Generally, SMEs are strongly linked to local development as these forms of 
entrepreneurship manage to wrap the cultural capacities of a community and, afterwards, 
canalize the same ones in concrete profiting activities. In the Schumpeterian view of 
innovation as a process of disruption and creation SMEs fit perfectly in a context of 
evolution, since their internal structure does not provide rigid links and hierarchies. In TCs 
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the reduced presence of SMEs before the transition was strictly related to the irregular 
economy, as pointed out previously. Private activity was often at the basis of shadowed 
trade flows supplying both final goods and inputs difficult to be found in the legal market. 
For this reason, the success of SMEs since the beginning of transition also depended on 
the way governments dealt with irregular economy, which is obviously counterproductive 
within a pure economic logic, but it can be handled in such a way as to obtain the final 
desired result. Most of irregular economy turned into informal activities with the launch of 
reforms, which represents a typical form of production and trade within countries 
undertaking a transitional path. Thus, just to mention the two most evident examples, while 
in Poland the informal economy was tolerated, in Romania strong measures were taken in 
order to suppress it; the outcomes related to SMEs were quite different, since the number 
of SMEs became much higher in the first case than in the second one (Kolodko, 2000). 
Nonetheless, the diffusion of SMEs has never been enough supported by TCs 
governments which tended to follow more foreign directives rather than their own local 
capacities. However, the private initiative in TCs is featured by characteristics directly 
stemming from the underdevelopment of entrepreneurial capacities and the neglect of 
implement specific policies aiming at filling these gaps. In regard to this issue Scase (2000) 
distinguishes two forms of private economic activity: entrepreneurship and proprietorship. 
Entrepreneurs work in order to increase their businesses, so they accumulate capital and 
invest their profits in new activities which should offer new opportunities of growth on the 
markets. The figure of proprietors is quite different, since these economic actors 
accumulate capital just to make profits for themselves, and there is no future re-investment 
in new activities of what has been previously gained. Unfortunately, the second case 
illustrates well the situation still now occurring in TCs, where proprietors may represent an 
opportunity for increasing employment, but they do not contribute to the national real 
growth. Certainly, local development in TCs is not run by proprietors, and national 
governments (especially under international pressures) are making efforts to favor the 
existing entrepreneurs, although it is not easy to identify in reality these two theoretical 
categories. Nonetheless, proprietorship can be related to different figures connected with 
the old soviet system: people who used to handle cash and received foreign currency 
through these relationships (i.e. men working in the hotels); members of former state 
bureaucracy; people involved in informal economy or illegal traffics; people who inheriting 
previous state owned activities providing social services (Scase, 2000).                   
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Inequalities emerged especially between regions, due to the structural change 
undergone by economy. In his analysis on regional development focused on Central and 
Eastern Europe Gorzelak (1998) identifies different paths of evolution across countries, 
which are strictly connected with the complex transformation occurring during the 
transition. The author depicts a Central and Eastern Europe characterized by four types of 
countries. The first two categories,  the leaders and the strong followers respectively, refer to 
those countries which managed to either catch or even surpass the level of GDP growth 
showing in 1989 before the implementation of reforms (all CEECs, Slovenia and Belarus). 
On the other hand, the last two categories include those countries whose economic 
performance still lacks in dynamism and capacity of recovery; the strugglers and the losers did 
not manage to restore their previous economic conditions (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria) or 
their internal structural distortions, together with their weak progress in the legal and 
institutional field, led to a detrimental evolution (notably the CISCs). These inequalities also 
extend to the development within each countries, which is often unbalanced and 
concentrated in a few territories. Thus the leader and winner areas are usually the 
metropolitan and re-industrialized territories which were able to catch the positive 
spillovers coming from openness; contrariwise, whereas the “losers” are the ex-
industrialized regions which lost their previous productive relevance, the “laggards” are the 
rural and peripheral areas in which development is still slow to come.   
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Chapter 2 
The International Openness 
in Transition Countries: 
Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment 
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The International Openness of  
Transition Countries:  
Inward Foreign Direct Investments 
 
2.1.     SOME DATA 
So far we have been focusing on the general context in which the international 
openness of the countries concerned took place, that is the Transition from planned to 
market-oriented economy. In the previous chapter the main features of this complex 
phenomenon have been discussed, trying to shed light on those mechanisms which 
contributed to mark the developmental path of TCs. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
beginning of the socio-political transformations in each country and the establishment of 
the new economic reforms, TCs started to look beyond their national borders aiming at 
creating stronger linkages with the rest of the world. In 1991 TCs left behind the rigid 
functioning of CMEA (or Comecon, already discussed in Chapter 1), the organization 
which limited considerably the competitive capacity of each national economy and did not 
allow the full exploitation of the productive and exporting potential of firms.  
Dunning (1993) analyzes the Inward FDI trend in TCs20 and suggests three models 
that could explain the developmental path undertaken by these Countries, from the 
perspective of their integration into the world economic system. According to the author 
each of the Countries so far considered can be associated to a model, so that the study of 
its openness process may appear easier. The first model is the Developing Countries one. This 
label refers to countries like Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and Singapore that in 
spite of quite serious problems in the social and institutional fields, undertook an economic 
boom  in the last ten years, and registered important rates of growth. Albania, Bulgaria and 
Romania could be likened to this first group, although the ex-socialist countries show levels 
of education higher than the Developing ones, so the same for the human capital 
endowment. The second typology discussed by Dunning (1993) is the Reconstruction model, 
and it refers to countries with enormous potentialities that can be exploited when the 
economic (but also the institutional and social) national system must be totally rebuild. This 
                                                 
20 The author does not account the CIS. 
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is a post-war situation of those countries, namely Japan and Germany, that achieved 
successfully the economic recovery thanks to their technological, organizational and 
management capabilities. While most of TCs still lack of these capabilities, or of tools to 
increase them, similar situation can be found in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, for 
instance. Finally, the last model is represented by the Systemic one, a combination of the 
best elements from the two previous typologies, added to macro and micro economic 
factors which are essential to carry out the economic progress. Since the first two models 
are at the opposite sides of the capacity of putting the Transition into practice, the systemic 
model should be the one adopted by all countries. In fact, it stresses the implementation of 
policies in favor of both structural and institutional changes that, in turn, foster the 
entrance of foreign investors. Even though this classification was proposed by Dunning in 
1993 and many steps forward have been done by TCs, this reasoning allows to create a 
general image of the heterogeneity in regard with foreign penetration. Each model is 
associated to a specific set of elements that contributes to define the investment climate of 
a country; the way each country exploits its potentialities and triggers proper micro and 
macro structural changes in all fields, from economy to the institutional apparatus, strongly 
influences its future competitiveness on international markets.  
The aim of this chapter is to give a picture of the ongoing openness of TCs, since 
the beginning of the transformation process, by focusing on FDI made by foreign 
investors within the economic system of the countries concerned. The choice of FDI, 
rather than trade, as measure of international openness enables to develop an interesting 
analysis on a recent trend with such an important impact of the future of these countries. 
In particular, due to the lack of data, only inward FDI are concerned, together with the 
elements leading international entrepreneurs to invest in TCs and the relevance of these 
business projects within the transitional frame. On the other hand, trade flows are not 
ignored, as the following Figures can show; imports and exports may represent an 
interesting benchmark to go deeper the effects of openness, as will be considered in 
Chapter 3, and they provide a valid starting point to make some initial considerations. In 
addition, the expansion and augmentation of trade flows represent the first expression of 
the openness of countries, which may not yet have the economic, financial and legal 
structures required by foreign investors.  
 
47 
 
On this purpose, Figure 2.1.1. shows the trend of imports and exports of all TCs, 
over the period 1988-2010. It is clear that both flows increase as the Transition takes place, 
with some downward picks, in 1992 and 1999 and finally in 2009, as a consequence of the 
international economic crisis which strongly affected most of these countries.      
Fig. 2.1.1. Trend of TCs trade flows (both merchandise and services) over the last twenty-two years. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
Notes: the sample includes the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Russian Federation, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine. In order to take into account the splits of some 
regions which occurred during the Nineties, data from Czechoslovakia, URSS, Serbia including Montenegro 
and Former Yugoslavia have been included. Missing data per country: Armenia (1992); Azerbaijan (1992-
1994); Belarus (1992); Georgia (1992-1996); Kazakhstan (1992-1994); Kyrgyzstan (1992); Lithuania (1992); 
Moldova (1992-1993); Russian Federation (1992-1993); Tajikistan (1992-1995); Turkmenistan (1992-1994); 
Ukraine (1992-1993).    
The next Figure 2.1.2. uses the same data but processed differently, showing the 
portion of imports and exports of TCs which became members of the EU and the other 
TCs, respectively. The pie charts refer to three years each corresponding to the beginning, 
the middle, and the end of the transitional path. It is to infer that during the Nineties the 
share of trade flows related to the so called New Members States (NMS) on the total of 
TCs increases, moving from 21% in 1990 to 38% in 2000 for imports, and from 24% to 
33% in the case of exports. At the same time the percentages for the other TCs decrease. 
Contrariwise, in the following decade, from 2000 to 2010, there are no drastic changes, and 
the percentages remain almost the same, which means that the integration of ten TCs to 
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the EU occurred in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) did not significantly 
influence the trend of trade. Thus, while the last ten years may represent a period of 
stabilization for the trade patterns of the NMS, the Nineties gave those candidates the 
possibility to establish (or strengthen) their commercial relations within the world market, 
and in particular with the UE itself. Thus, we can deduce that although the UE 
enlargement has been important in order to strengthen gradually the economic linkages 
with the NMS, it was not the prime engine of their commercial upgrading. In this latter 
case, we would have obtained significant differences in statistics in the second period 
considered (2000-2010) rather than in the first one (1990-2000), and we did not. The higher 
degree of dynamism of the NMS must derive from other structural features of these 
countries, such as:  
 the transitional path that the NMS launched earlier than the other TCs did;  
 the speed and efficiency in the implementation of economic and institutional reforms;  
 the large campaign of privatization sustained in order to reduce the share of 
economic activity in State’s hands, which still represents a central issue in CIS 
economic development; 
 the country endowment of human capital;  
 the geographical proximity with the EU markets which represent most of the NMS 
trade.  
These factors, and in particular the first four ones, may also explain the trade 
patterns of NMS and their evolution over time. Especially during the Nineties these 
countries managed to gain comparative advantages in manufacturing and high tech 
products, rather than natural resources and raw materials. In this perspective. they 
implemented a market re-orientation of production which tried to respond to the current 
needs of both the international and the close European market. In particular, the relatively 
high capital endowment still contributes to foster the reliability of these countries in the 
eyes of the international markets and allow to upgrade the quality of exports (Zaghini, 
2005).  
A different situation is depicted for the other TCs, which basically include the CIS 
and part of the SEECs. These countries are still characterized by strong distortions within 
their productive system which are reflected on their external balance. This is particularly 
true for CISCs; as for trade, the most relevant economies of the region are the Russian 
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Federation, Kazakhstan and the European CISCs. Since the beginning of Transition all 
these countries have not been able to upgrade their production to gain comparative 
advantages in sectors with high value added, so that raw materials, mineral, metals and 
chemical products remain the basic goods exported, in exchange of machinery and 
transport equipment (Kandogan, 1999).  A further aspect to be taken into consideration is 
the evolution of spatial directories of CISCs during Transition. Before the beginning of the 
Nineties, the affiliation to the Comecon required a strong specialization both in terms of 
production and trade; most of trade flows occurred within the area of the now-called 
CISCs. With Transition the new commercial regime led to 90% decrease of that intra-
CISCs trade, re-orienting exports/imports to/from the rest of the world (Shelburne, 2006). 
Intra-CISCs exports diminished more than imports (except for Belarus and Moldova), 
trend that occurred also in the SEECs, whose most of current flows are now established 
with the EU. The geographical re-orientation of CISCs trade occurred with Transition 
depended on the geographical position of each country, so that Caucasus strengthen the 
linkages with Turkey and Iran, whereas the European CISCs developed more flows with 
the SEECs. In general, while the intra-trade decreased commercial flows with international 
markets increased very slightly, thus leading to a negative total external balance (Freinkman 
et al., 2004).  
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Fig. 2.1.2. Trade flows of TCs in 1990, 2000, 2010. 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
Note: CEECs and BCs enter the EU in 2004 (except Romania and Bulgaria in 2007) 
Finally, it is noteworthy to take a look to the position of TCs in relation to the 
WTO, deemed as a further prove of the economic integration of these countries. Most of 
them entered the WTO after 1989; Table 2.1.1 shows that the first ones in 1995 were the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, which belong to the 
CEECs group. The Table report also the current “observers”, which are now in 
79% 
21% 
Imports
Import UE
76% 
24% Exports
Exports UE
62% 
38% Imports
Import UE 67% 
33% Exports
Exports UE
65% 
35% Imports
Import UE 67% 
33% Exports
Exports UE
2000 
2010 
1990 
 
51 
 
negotiations to access WTO. They are all countries from the CIs, except for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. The path of accession of TCs reflects the difference 
between the degree of economic development and implementation of the transitional 
reforms.  
Table 2.1. Accession to WTO of TCs  
COUNTRY ACCESSION TO WTO OBSERVERS 
BULGARIA 1996 Azerbaijan 
CROATIA 2000 Belarus 
CZECH REPUBLIC 1995 Bosnia and Erzegovina 
ESTONIA 1999 Kazakhstan 
MACEDONIA 2003 Montenegro 
HUNGARY 1995 Russian Federation 
KYRGYZ 
REPUBLIC 
1998 Serbia 
LATVIA 1999 Tajikistan 
LITHUANIA 2001 Uzbekistan 
MOLDOVA 2001 
POLAND 1995 
ROMANIA 1995 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
1995 
SLOVENIA 1995 
UKRAINE 2008 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the WTO website. 
Transition also marked the signature of several trade agreements, both bilateral and 
multilateral, with European and international markets and regional agglomeration.  
2.2.      FDI IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: A LOOK AT THE DATA 
The attention on data is now focused on Inward FDI in TCs, measured as stocks, 
which is “the value of the share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits) 
attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent 
enterprises” (WIR, 2009). While the stock measure shows the total amount of foreign 
capital within the host country, flow measure relates to the temporary entry of foreign 
investment, that is why the first one is generally preferred, especially for empirical 
comparisons (Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao, 1979). Figure 2.2.3. tells us that the growth of 
Inward FDI flows in TCs has been quite drastic in the last 2 years. In 2008, the fall caused 
by the international crisis was more evident in TCs than in Developing and Developed 
Countries, although the rates of the latter and those of TCs slightly differ (- 0.174 in 
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Developed Countries and - 0.19 in Transition Economies). In the same way, the recovery 
in 2009 was stronger in TCs although followed by a further decrease in the last year. 
Contrariwise, Developing Countries have been keeping on attracting Inward FDI, and 
probably part of TCs stock deviated to them. This may be due to many factors, including 
the gradual catching up of TCs (or at least some of them, namely the CEECs and BCs) that 
persuades foreign investors to focus their businesses in those countries offering better cost 
advantages: the growth rate of TCs shifts from 0.25 in 2009 to 0.05 in 2010.    
Fig.2.2.3. Inward FDI in TCs between 2008 and 2010, compared with Developed and Developing 
Economies. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
Figure 2.2.4. shows how the amount of FDI in the countries considered developed 
since the beginning of Transition. Following the availability of data and in order to avoid 
too many missing years, statistics have been elaborated since 1993. In all four cases Inward 
FDI increases led by the CEECs and followed by the CISCs, BCs and SEECs. The trend is 
quite constant during the whole first decade of the period considered. According to the 
literature and statistical evidence, 1995 is the year of the substantial increase of FDI 
inflows, at least in the CEECs and BCs (Bandelj, 2002). In the following ten years foreign 
penetration keeps increasing but shocks are more frequent. Also in this case, the negative 
pick between 2008 and 2009 emerges and it must be related to the world economic crisis 
which curbed the international investors; due to the high volatility of the CISCs markets 
these countries shows on the graph the worst fall among all TCs. Nonetheless, it is 
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opportune to underline the important role of the Russian Federation within the CISCs that 
is evident in the following Figure 2.2.6.b; this huge country absorbs most of Inward FDI of 
the region, thus raising the level of total foreign business there.  
Fig.2.2.4. Evolution of stocks of Inward FDI in TCs over the period 1993-2010, by groups of countries. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
Note: CISCs: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. SEECs: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovenia, Macedonia. CEECs: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia. BCs: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.  
Transition offered an unique opportunity for Western countries (EU first) to 
enlarge their markets in Eastern Europe and beyond, in order to expand businesses to that 
part of the world where so far economic relations had been hampered by the complicated 
political situation. It is not easy to get sectoral data on FDI in TCs and the few available 
ones usually do not date back to the end of the Nineties.  
Till 1998 most of FDI had been concentrated in a few countries, namely Hungary 
and Poland; later on other countries emerged as concrete destinations for 
internationalization strategies, namely the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. The 
investment occurred especially in manufacturing, in spite of the exponential growth of the 
services sector. In some countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland) also the 
financial sector started to be attractive, thanks to the government attempt to give it a 
proper structure and functioning. (EBRD Transition Report, 1998). The CEECs have 
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always been the prime choice for international investors, represented mainly by the EU. 
This may follow the same considerations made in the previous paragraphs on trade flows 
evolution, and it can be related to the efficient implementation of the privatization 
policies21, together with the positive government attitude towards the future European 
integration, finally occurred in 2004 and 2007. The accession of some CEECs and BCs to 
the EU led to a shift of FDI, since investors could now choose among several countries 
which offered very convenient conditions for new business. Actually, in 2005 a fall of net 
FDI in Estonia, Hungary and Czech Republic was offset by increases in Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia; all these countries, except Poland, gave foreign 
investors the opportunity to expand their business activities abroad at lower prices. In 2006 
in CEECs and BCs the FDI cover of the current account deficit generally started to 
decrease, although the inflows in the regions were still high. This trend gave way to 
increasing dependence in dept-creating capital flows, such as portfolio investment in 
Hungary and financing from foreign banks in the BCs (EBRD Transition Report, 2007). 
Inward FDI kept increasing also in the SEECs and CISCs, especially in the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan due to the rise of prices of imported gas. In 2007 the SEECs 
reached the highest peak of inward FDI (14735.17 US$ millions), thanks to the slow but 
important progress in Transition that was mostly pushed by the governments will of taking 
part to the EU. Furthermore, it is to underline the progress in privatization which led to 
the acquisition of some National Banks by foreign investors. At the end of 2008 the fall of 
FDI due to the international crisis was already noticeable; previous levels started to be 
recovered only during 2010, and in the case of CEECs the amount of inward FDI 
(97271.14 US$ millions) overcame that of 2007 (88321.82 US$ millions).  
Figure 2.2.5. summarizes what has been discussed so far, and clearly reports the 
current situation: CEECs attract 56% of total FDI of TCs, and it is followed by CIS with 
29%, BCs with 8% and SEECs with 7%.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 At the end of the Nineties the sectors objects to privatization were mainly the telecommunication on the 
one side and the banks on the other one; for instance in Czech Republic two large banks were privatized and 
given to foreign investors, the Ceska Sporitelna to the Erste Bank of Austria and the Cekoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka to the KBC of Belgium (EBRD Transition Report, 2000). 
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Fig.2.2.5. Shares of Inward FDI in each region on total of FDI inflows in TCs in 2010. 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
Note: CISCs: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. SEECs: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovenia, Macedonia. CEECs: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia. BCs: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.  
The following Figures report the situation for each country so that it is possible to 
pick out the different paths. From Figure 2.2.6.a. we can notice that Poland overcomes the 
other CEECs almost throughout the whole period, except for the very beginning of the 
Nineties: in 1994 FDI inflows in Poland accounted for 3789 US$ millions, whereas 
Hungary and the Czech Republic received already 7086.816 and 4546.811 US$ millions, 
respectively. According to the data from UNCTAD Database the amount of Inward FDI 
in Poland strongly increased in 1995 (7843 US$ millions) and in 1998 overcame the one 
registered in Hungary (20732.84 US$ millions), so reaching 22478.88 US$ millions. This 
large amount of Inward FDI and its steady growth are connected with the stabilization 
program launched early on, other than the successful privatization policies concerning 
especially the creation of new firms, rather than the reduction of State properties. That 
factor represented an incentive for the local entrepreneurship, and a new dynamic 
economic society contributed to improve the investment climate within the country. The 
last places in the ranking are occupied by Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria, whose 
transitional path has been slowed down by the quite high degree of corruption, other than 
the deep economic distortions. Nonetheless, a clear improvement is noticeable since 2005, 
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after their access to the EU (Slovak Republic in 2004) or in view of it (Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2007): in 2004 the stock of Inward FDI in the Slovak Republic increased from 
30970.29 US$ millions (2003) to 43008.45, whereas in 2007 similar growth occurred both 
in Romania (from 25816.44 in 2005 to 45452.07 US$ millions in 2006) and Bulgaria (from 
13850.97 in 2005 to 23482.62 US$ millions in 2006). 
Fig.2.2.6.a. Evolution of stocks of Inward FDI in CEECs over the period 1993-2010.    
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
In the CISCs foreign investors privileged the primary sector, fact that underlines 
both the institutional weakness along their transitional process (in regard to the 
privatization polices and incentives for private initiative), and their structural production 
distortions. Most FDI inflows are directed to the sector of natural resources extraction and 
all the activities connected, such as energy transportation infrastructures projects, through 
large privatization transactions and debt/equity swaps. Shiells (2003) distinguishes three 
groups of CISCs, according to the type and amount of Inward FDI: group A includes the so-
called energy-exporting countries, i.e. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan; 
group B is composed of energy-importing countries which implement market-oriented reforms, i.e. 
Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine; finally, group C refers to energy-
importing countries not pursuing market-oriented reforms, i.e. Belarus and Uzbekistan. This 
classification helps to better analyze the structure of FDI within the region, and the 
motivations why the degree of attraction on foreign investors is much lower than in 
CEECs. Fuel importers (group B and C according to Shiells’ reasoning) draw more 
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diversified FDI including also banking and telecommunication sectors; this features 
presume a stronger similarity than group A with CEECs, showing a more evident 
productive shift, from manufacturing to services (Dubrovskiy and Ustenko, 2005). In 
Figure 2.2.6.b. we can see that the Russian Federation is the prime recipient of Inward FDI 
in the area, with a peak in 2007 of 491052 US$ millions. Unfortunately, the Figure is not so 
clear for the other CISCs since they all show very low levels of FDI; it is still possible to 
distinguish the curves of Kazakhstan (in 2010, 81351.82 US$ millions), followed by 
Ukraine (57985 US$ millions), Belarus (9940.4 US$ millions) and Azerbaijan (9592.882 US$ 
millions), whereas the trends of the other countries are almost overlapping. In 2010, after 
the four countries mentioned above which attract most of FDI in the region, come 
Turkmenistan (8186.02 US$ millions), Georgia (7821.129 US$ millions), Uzbekistan 
(4459.5 US$ millions), Armenia (4205.52 US$ millions), Moldova (2837.48 US$ millions), 
Kyrgyz Republic (973.7 US$ millions) and Tajikistan (914.75 US$ millions), respectively.      
Fig.2.2.6.b. Evolution of stocks of Inward FDI in CIS over the period 1993-2010. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
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In Figure 2.2.6.c. which refers to the BCs, it is possible to notice that at the 
beginning of the period considered the differences between values of Inward FDI in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not so high. In 1994, 472.11US$ millions entered Estonia, 
435.84 US$ millions entered Latvia and 321 US$ millions entered Lithuania. Over time, 
although all three countries grew and attracted increasing amounts of Inward FDI 
differences in levels have been slightly increasing and Lithuania overcame Latvia at the end 
of the Nineties; in 2010 Estonia attracted 16437.93 US$ millions, Lithuania 10837.76 US$ 
millions, and Latvia 13448.62 US$ millions. The position of Estonia in the ranking proves 
the engagement of this country in pursuing market-oriented reforms, liberalization and 
privatization stronger than in the other two BCs. The investment climate in Estonia attract 
FDI, and represents the departure point for foreign investors aiming at penetrating also 
Latvia and Lithuania. In general, most Inward FDI in this area are made by Nordic 
companies, whereas a more troublesome economic relationship occurs with the Russian 
Federation, clearly due to historical reasons. The service sectors represent the main focus 
of FDI: transport, storage, telecommunication, financial intermediation are the activities 
that have the highest presence of foreign business. At the same time, low-tech 
manufacturing sectors have been attracting more inflows (Hunya, 2004).   
Fig.2.2.6.d Evolution of stocks of Inward FDI in BCs over the period 1993-2010. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
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The SEECs do not occupy the most favorable position in regard to Inward FDI, 
even though foreign investors, in particular coming from the EU, show now an increasing 
interest in the region. Actually, these countries have considerable opportunities due both to 
the progress along the transitional path and some structural features of the economic 
system (e.g. the human capital endowment, the availability of natural resources and young 
and dynamic labor). Although the region lags behind its Central-Eastern neighbors the 
comparison must take into account the political instability that hit the SEECs, other than 
historical and cultural factors which are peculiar within the transition. The conflict broke 
out soon after the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia in 1991 and lasted till 1995, that 
can be seen as a crucial period for the transformation of TCs. Thus, the complicated 
political situation stopped abruptly the early process of Transition, and the consequences 
of the war were so heavy for all the countries involved that the recovery was very slow. 
Moreover, as for the privatization path, this process in SEECs produced less revenues for 
the State and low inflows of foreign capital (Hunya, 2000). From Figure 2.2.6.d. Croatia 
emerges as the first destination for FDI, with a peak in 2007 of 45063.19 US$ millions. It is 
a candidate country for the EU, together with Macedonia, and this fact certainly favored 
the liability of the current economic system. In addition, Croatia implemented a slow but 
strong privatization program and growth-oriented measures that attracted many foreign 
investors since 1999. Looking at the graph we infer that now Croatia is followed by Serbia 
and Montenegro22 (26039.94 US$ millions) (Režepagić and Richet, 2008). Although 
Slovenia is the only EU member among SEECs and its economy is the most solid one, the 
country does not show to receive the highest amount of FDI, and in 2010 it is placed in 
third position with 15022.09 US$ millions. This is due its small local market and partly to 
the privatization polices adopted which, in spite of being quite successful, favor internal 
buy out rather than external purchasers. Bosnia and Herzegovina (7151.592 US$ millions in 
2010), Macedonia (4493.33 US$ millions) and Albania (4354.736 US$ millions) lag behind 
the other SEECs; the reasons may be found both in the difficult political and civil situation 
(especially regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina) and in the still uncompleted and slow 
privatization process.        
 
 
                                                 
22 The position is mainly due by the former one, since Montenegro has a small amount of FDI however 
increasing 
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Fig.2.2.6.d Evolution of stocks of Inward FDI in SEECs over the period 1993-2010. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on data from the UNCTAD Statistics Database. 
2.3.      THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI 
The previous paragraph has stressed an important feature of the recent TCs 
transformation: the relevance of foreign penetration into the economic system of these 
countries as well as its increasing trend over the latest years. In order to better understand 
the dynamics undergoing this process, this section will focus on the determinants of FDI in 
TCs, according to the main literature concerned and some of the most influential empirical 
works on this subject. The aim is to catch the principal TCs-specific features that attract 
FDI, while referring both to the general theoretical approaches and to the heterogeneous 
reality of each region. So far, a wide literature has dealt with identifying FDI determinants, 
and a thorough attempt to summarize all the diverse trends is given by Dunning (1993), 
starting from the theories developed prior to the Sixties and adapting the most interesting 
contributions to the characteristics of the current time, such as in Dunning (2004). As a 
matter of fact, globalization led to such a significant increase of internationalization that 
these changes must be taken into consideration when analyzing the Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) production strategies. Furthermore, the focus here is on TCs which 
represent quite new economic subjects into the international scenario, and that, unwittingly, 
gave a further boost to the economic globalization. The transitional process itself must be 
related to the increasing attractiveness of TCs in terms of investments; but in what extent 
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has transition affected the relationships between those countries and the rest of the world? 
Can Transition be considered as one of the determinants of Inward FDI in these regions? 
Perhaps, some features of the transitional path are worth to be taken into account, rather 
than the phenomenon as a whole. In the current part, the thesis will try to identify these 
features. 
FDI occurs with the simultaneous presence of three conditions leading to specific 
advantages: Ownership advantages favoring the investing MNEs over local firms; 
Locational advantages prompting MNEs to produce abroad; Internalization 
advantages which imply to create a subsidiary abroad instead of exploiting the host 
country resources through other channels and forms of business collaboration (e.g. 
licensing) (Dunning, 1993; Brenton 1999; Resmini, 2000). This is the so called “OLI 
Paradigm”. 
Table 2.3.1, developed by UNCTAD and inserted into the World Investment 
Report (WIR) 1998, sums up the principal host country determinants of FDI discussed 
over time by the concerning economic literature23. Three blocks are outlined: policy 
framework of FDI, business facilitation and economic determinants. 
  
                                                 
23 The Table elaborated by UNCTAD has been integrated in the part of “Economic Determinants” with 
some points suggested by Dunning (1993).  
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Table 2.3.1. Main location-specific determinants of FDI.   
1-POLICY FRAMEWORK OF FDI 2-BUSINESS FACILITATION 
 
 economic, political and social stability; 
 rules regarding entry and operations; 
 standards of treatment of foreign affiliates; 
 policies on functioning and structure of markets (especially 
competition and M&A policies);  
 privatization policy; 
 trade policy (tariffs and NTBs) and coherence of FDI and trade 
policies; 
 tax policy. 
 
 
 investment promotion (including image building and investment-
generating activities and investment-facilitation services); 
 investment incentives; 
 hassle costs (related to corruption, administrative efficiency, etc.); 
 social amenities (bilingual schools, quality of life, etc.); 
 after-investment services.       
 
3-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS 
 
A. Market-seeking  
 market size and per capita income; 
 market growth; 
 access to regional and global markets; 
 country-specific consumer preferences; 
 structure of markets; 
 the relative costs of producing goods in 
different countries; 
 the lack of opportunities of expansion 
in the home countries  
 the need to diversify risks. 
 
 
B. Resource/asset-seeking 
 raw materials; 
 low-cost unskilled labor; 
 skilled labor; 
 technological, innovatory and 
other created assets (e.g. brand 
names); 
 physical infrastructure (ports, 
roads, power, telecommunication). 
 
C. Efficiency-seeking  
 cost of resources and assets listed under B, 
adjusted for productivity for labor resources; 
 other input costs, e.g. transport and 
communication costs to/from and within host 
economy and costs of other intermediate 
products; 
 membership of a regional integration; 
 agreement conducive to the establishment of 
regional corporate networks. 
 
 
Source: author’s adaptation on UNCTAD World Investment Report (1998) table. 
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In order to have a clear framework of the potential host country determinants of 
FDI, we discuss the principal points of each cluster, starting from the one of economic 
determinants, that can be deemed as the traditional ones identified by the literature. In turn, 
they are grouped into three categories according to the specific motivation driving the FDI. 
So, in the first case (market-seeking based investment) firms are supposed to invest 
abroad in order to find new markets in which to expand their productive activity or 
commercial businesses. In spite of the advantages offered by a large new market, it is 
necessary to evaluate its economic growth which largely represents the result of efficient 
national economic policies adopted. However, the size and growth of a specific product 
market may go in the opposite direction compared to those of the whole market. Investing 
in some countries can be a strategic decision to enter neighboring markets, by exploiting 
trade channels and preferential trade agreements with other countries24. This is even more 
relevant when the national (or regional) market of the investing firms is in crisis or does 
not offer good opportunities to grow; another case occurs when host countries show 
dynamic markets where the demand of the good produced by foreign investors is high. De 
facto, proximity is an element often influencing market-seeking based FDI, since 
geographical and cultural affinity can push investors towards neighboring countries. The 
seeking of new markets is also connected with the costs issue, so that production may be 
cheaper when internationalized, through horizontal investments25.   
In the second case (resource/asset seeking) the aim of acquiring both resources 
and competences is stressed, so that firms chose the foreign location of their investments 
according to the quantity and quality of both natural and human resources available abroad. 
In both cases the availability of the production factor must be compared with its real cost, 
which is supposed to be lower than in the home country. Moreover, the typology of labor 
sought (skilled or unskilled) depends on the activities and the sectors implied in the 
investment project; FDI regarding high value added activities, such as in the service sector 
rather than in the manufacturing one, requires skilled labor, and investors may be attracted 
by the possibility of giving rise to innovations at lower prices in the host countries.  
                                                 
24 For instance, Serbia is the only European country that signed free trade agreements with the EU, Russia 
and Belarus, condition that attracts many European investors (in particular from Germany, Austria and Italy) 
aiming at penetrating the Russian market.  
25 While horizontal FDI implies that “subsidiaries serve the local market in the host country” vertical FDI 
“concerns subsidiaries that add value to products that are not destined (necessarily) for the host country 
market” (Helpman, 2006). The former responds to a logic of market-seeking, whereas the latter can be related 
to the efficiency-seeking motive based on cost-advantages.   
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The third case refers to the opportunity for investors of profiting from cost 
advantages when producing in a specific foreign market (efficiency-seeking based FDI). 
Among these determinants some are related to the advantages stemming directly from cost 
differences, whereas some others refer to the benefits coming from the establishment of 
economies of scale (i.e. membership of a regional integration and agreement conducive to 
the establishment of regional corporate networks) (Dunning, 1993). In the first definition 
cost advantages are related to all resources listed in B (resource/asset seeking based FDI), 
but labor remains the most relevant factor influencing FDI choices. This is particularly 
evident in highly competitive labor-intensive industries, where the very low cost of labor in 
some countries (e.g. China and the South Eastern Asia) leads Western MNEs to invest 
abroad and extend the product value-chain.  
The interesting  point of the Table is that the evolution of international markets 
and globalization are considered in the process of classifying the determinants into diverse 
categories. Both group 1 and group 2 play an important role relatively to the improvement 
(or establishment) of a proper investment climate able to attract foreign investors. 
Nonetheless, while the first block is more focused on the general framework which is 
supposed to receive foreign penetration at the beginning, the second one pertains strictly to 
the attitude of the host country towards the new foreign business in its national system.   
Group 1 mostly refers to market liberalization policies (i.e. rules regarding entry of 
foreign firms and related operations, standards of treatment of foreign affiliates, policies on functioning and 
structure of markets, trade policy and coherence of FDI and trade policies), including both trade and 
FDI. FDI liberalization is given by the removal of all restrictions applied to foreign 
investors, the strengthen of some existing treatments that favor foreign business and the 
introduction of market control mechanisms (WIR, 1998). Over the latest years, countries 
have adopted FDI liberalization policies more and more consistently, leading to a steady 
extension of firms value chains and a higher level of production internationalization. This is 
part of what we call economic globalization and the two processes are one another 
reinforcing. Privatization and tax policy, meant as tax reduction, are both very important 
in the eyes of foreign investors. The former, which has been largely discussed in Chapter 1, 
implies a reduction of the State interference in the economy and in many case channels the 
entrance of foreign capital (sales to outsiders). Tax policies are instead relevant cost-
advantage determinants of FDI.   
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Nowadays, liberalization alone cannot attract FDI, but it must be reinforced by a 
set of governmental actions meant to improve the general entrepreneurial framework 
within each potential “host-country”, and that are included in group 2 – Business Facilities 
of Table 2.3.1. That is to say that all facilities needed to receive investments must be either 
introduced or consolidated, such as promotion initiatives, incentives, policies or institutions for the 
reduction of costs related to corruption and lack of administrative efficiency, social services and agencies 
supporting foreign firms from beginning to end of investment operations. Incentives are among the 
most important interventions in support of FDI, and include both fiscal and financial 
benefits. While the former consist of tax holidays, tax reductions, investment allowances, 
investment tax credits, preferential treatment of profits, the latter refer to cash grants 
related to the value of assets invested or the number of employees or training costs, and 
subsidies. In addition, it is more and more frequent that governments plan the creation of 
special areas in which foreign investors profit by advantageous measures. These are the 
Export Processing Zones (EPZ), Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Free Trade Zones 
(FTZ) combining some fiscal and financial benefits among the ones mentioned with 
particular administrative systems. Other than simply attracting FDI, these incentives can be 
also seen as a tool for host countries (cost-effective FDI) to influence the choices of 
foreign investors towards sectors that are strategic for the national economy (Dunning, 
1993). In TCs investment incentives have been increasing over time, especially in CEECs 
and BCs, whereas in SEECs (except Slovenia) and CISCs the application of these measures 
lag behind, although a positive and almost steady trend has been registered since the 
Nineties. Thus, these incentives still play an important role, and this was true especially at 
the beginning of the transitional path. Actually, in the early Nineties they represented very 
attractive markets for Western Countries but could not guarantee yet the efficient 
functioning of their economic systems, mainly featured by structural distortions and weak 
political organization. Incentives could fill the gap between the necessity to draw FDI and 
the lack of a proper framework that was totally under reconstruction. Moreover, incentives 
could offset the incertitude created by the noteworthy tax reforms26 and leave foreign 
investors outside this internal transformation (Cass, 2003).  
The reduction of corruption is another important task for the increase of TCs 
reliability in the eyes of foreign investors. In fact, corruption is part of the worst legacy of 
                                                 
26 Tax reforms represented a crucial issue in TCs since under the planned system taxes on entrepreneurial 
activities were very high and represented an important share of GDP. With transition, privatization and 
restructuring policies led to a whole reorganization of the contribution system.  
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the communist past of these countries, and it does not seem to diminish, at least for the 
majority of them. Under the command economy the heavy bureaucratization of the State 
apparatus and the scarce autonomy of the economic actors fostered patronage 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the shortage, the distortions of the productive system, and the 
unbalance between demand and supply led consumers to look for goods through non 
official channels, enhancing all shapes of informal economy, from the households activities 
to the black ones. Contrary to what was expected, in many cases transition worsened the 
situation. Because of the macroeconomic and liberalization reforms some people found 
themselves poorer than before and could rely mainly on informal or illegal traffics, so 
corruption would be strictly linked to these transactions (Wallace and Latcheva, 2006). In 
spite of promises of change the inefficiency of the new political governance was not (and 
still not) able to reduce the privileges of the old bureaucrats, thus not implementing a real 
redistribution of wealth. Diverse can be the motives for increasing corruption, and not all 
necessarily connected with the transitional process. Nonetheless, this complex ongoing 
transformation should not be disregarded on this purpose. Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 
(1996), in studying the relationship between privatization and the current level of 
corruption, stress the gap between the holding of “control rights” (whether and how to use 
a good or resource) and the one of “cash flows rights” (benefiting from the use of that 
good or resource) occurring under the socialism when politicians had the former but not 
the latter, that was part of the State Treasure. This situation led bureaucracy to 
misappropriate the second right and exercise it in order to increase its own wealth on the 
one side, and to scarcely promote the growth of entrepreneurial profits on the other side.   
Table 1 in the Appendix, with data from the survey by the agency “Transparency 
International” reports the scores of the Corruption Perception Index 2010 (CPI 2010), 
related to TCs. This index “measures the degree to which public sector corruption is 
perceived to exist in 178 countries around the world” (CPI 2010 Report), and it ranges 
from 0 (very corrupted) to 10 (very clean)27. As it is possible to see, except for some 
CEECs and BCs placed in the first twenty positions of the ranking the general current 
scenario in TCs regarding corruption is not so bright.  
                                                 
27 According to Transparency International corruption is the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This 
definition encompasses corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors. The CPI ranks countries 
according to their perception of corruption in the public sector. The CPI is an aggregate that combines 
different sources of information about corruption, making it possible to compare countries.  
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2.3.1. Evidence from Transition Countries 
Starting from the general considerations stressed in the previous paragraph, the 
following task lies on the identification of the main determinants of Inward FDI in TCs. 
Why do international MNEs decide to invest in those countries? The attempt is to provide 
a coherent survey of the literature concerning with this issue, while considering the natural 
differences between all TCs. By the evidence on the main contributions of the economists, 
both in theoretical and empirical terms, it is possible to catch the common features 
explaining the location investment decisions regarding the TCs; likewise, some regions such 
as the CEECs and BCs have been studied more in depth than the SEECs and CISCs, due 
to the higher availability of data and the stronger relevance of the phenomenon itself. Some 
studies concern a pool of countries, whereas some others focus on one single transitional 
market. Nonetheless it would be quite difficult to separate literature according the region 
considered, due to the unbalanced information available.     
One of the first contributions in this field comes from the work of Wang and 
Swain (1995) who make a comparison between Hungary and China, both countries 
undertaking outstanding changes between the last of the Eighties and the begin of the 
Nineties. Market size and political stability result as the most important location-specific 
determinants in the Hungarian case, over the period 1978-1992. Especially in the case of 
market size, almost all the contributions mentioned in the following rows identify it as one 
of the prime FDI motives, generally together with market growth (e.g. Pye, 1998; Benacek 
et al., 2000; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Janicki and Wunnava, 2004). The larger is the 
host country market, the higher are FDI inflows, and the same direct correlation can be 
seen between foreign penetration and political stability. Nonetheless, the expression 
“political stability” is meant as political situation preferred by foreign investors rather than 
disorder; in view of this clarification the estimates show that Hungary gained plausibility 
with political transition, after 1989. In the case of the SEECs political instability assumes a 
different meaning, related to the presence of institutional and social disorder in the area; it 
seems quite obvious that the conflict during the years at the beginning of transition led to 
heavy incapability of going on with the national path of transformation. In this regard 
political instability can be vied as a very important factor deterring FDI in SEECs (with the 
exception of Slovenia, which was the first country to exit the war and the first one to begin 
the recovery) (Brada et al. 2006). Finally, what is striking in Wang and Swain (1995) is the 
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non relevance of either growth or labor cost, the latest instead highly significant in the case 
of China.  
In addition to the political situation, the macroeconomic and legal stabilities 
represent a crucial point in the attempt of restructuring the whole system. The lack of legal 
institutions appropriate to the passage from a command to a market economy and the 
existence of strong structural distortions may weigh heavily on investors decisions, which is 
particularly evident in the case of CIS (Baniak et al., 2005). The lower degree of 
attractiveness of TCs still unstable from the legal and macroeconomic aspect generally 
implies short run (rather than long run) inward FDI.  
In their study on Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland between 1991-1993 
Lansbury et a. (1996) stress on the importance of privatization, as one of the underlying 
elements of transition, that is confirmed by the forthcoming literature (e.g. Holland and 
Pain, 1998; Resmini, 2000). The final estimates show that other than the number of 
patents and the intensity of trade with the host countries, the method of privatization 
strongly influences foreign investors choices. In particular, in Hungary the sale to outsiders28 
(and especially foreign outsiders) was the most implemented way of privatizing State 
properties. The direct consequence, also evident in the reality, was the higher capacity of 
attracting investors than what occurred in the other two countries. While in Poland the 
majority of assets was assigned through tenders and auctions to insiders, the mass 
privatization with vouchers implemented in Czech Republic allowed the entrance of 
foreign investors only afterwards. These results are confirmed by following studies 
(Holland and Pain, 1998; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004). The same can be said for the 
Baltic region, where especially Estonia implemented forms of privatization (e.g. sales to 
outsiders) largely involving foreign investors (Hunya, 2004). Finally, the study stresses also 
the importance of relative labor costs, opposite to Wang and Swain (1995) results, 
suggesting that probably the comparative advantages stemming from different costs must 
be related mainly to the Czech Republic and Poland. These conclusions are in line with the 
evidence from the BCs where foreign investors show a greater sensitivity to labor costs, 
whereas the size and growth of the markets, together with the privatization process do not 
appear as the prime determinants of FDI (Holland and Pain, 1998). However, cheap labor 
costs that is ordinarily deemed as the main driver of the current production fragmentation, 
is quite controversial in literature, and hardly never indicated as the most influential one. 
                                                 
28 See Chapter 1 for a revision of privatization methods. 
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Nonetheless, what should be pay attention to is the relativity of these costs. Labor costs in 
the TCs chosen as FDI location may be lower than in the investor country but higher than 
in other candidate countries, especially Developing Countries. Thus for instance, generally, 
it is found that labor costs relatively to other TCs are more important determinants than 
those relatively to other low-costs locations in EU (Benacek et al., 2002).     
Beyond some factors already found in previous studies (market size and growth, 
relative labor costs, political stability of the host country), in the survey conducted by Pye 
(1998) by sending questionnaires to firms generated from Western FDI operations in 
CEECs new relevant elements emerge as potential determinants: the availability of skilled 
labor and the gain of first mover advantages on the market target (Lankes and Stern, 
1999). Contrariwise, literature gives little attention to tax policy in the host countries, so 
that it is difficult to assess whether it could be among the relevant determinants. 
Woodward et al. (1997) prove that in CEECs special measures taken by the governments 
to reduce the fiscal burden to foreign investors were highly influential in attracting FDI 
(Cass, 2003). Trade costs (in the definition of tariffs applied to import and export flows) 
are neither frequent among the determinants tested empirically, but Carstensen and Toubal 
(2004) find that in CEECs tariffs exert negative influence on foreign investors, so that 
trade and FDI are complementary in the region. In the same study, the authors evidence 
also that the higher the differences in relative labor and capital endowment between 
the host country and the investor, the more likely is the FDI toward that country.  
Resmini (2000) tests the role of Transition as FDI determinant on 10 countries29 
from 1991 to 1995. The study lies on the distinction of different activities30 within the 
manufacturing sector. By using a proxy that measures the country business environment, 
the authoress obtains a significant coefficient underlying that those countries (notably 
CEECs) which are ahead in the transitional path attract the highest inflows of FDI, 
especially in science-based and capital intensive manufacturing sectors. Economic 
determinants, such as market size and labor costs are also important, even though they 
appear stronger in the traditional manufacturing activities than in the other categories 
considered. Transition acquires the same relevance also in Altomonte (2000) whose study 
aims at put on evidence the contextual transformation of TCs near the traditional 
determinants of FDI. As in the previous paper of Resmini (2000) the transition variable is a 
                                                 
29 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia.  
30 Scale-intensive, science-based, specialized producers and traditional activities.  
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proxy measuring the degree of influence of host country institutions on investors’ 
expectations, and in this empirical analysis carried out by the author it shows the highest 
coefficient among the significant ones. In Lankes and Stern (1999), FDI in countries 
considered as the most advanced ones along the transitional process, is usually export-
oriented or implies host countries local subsidiaries to supply the domestic market.  
Resmini (2000) also finds that, in the traditional branches FDI is driven by the 
degree of openness of the host country and the eventual existence of agglomeration 
economies, whereas in knowledge-based activities the proximity to EU markets assumes 
more relevance. Likewise, in the analysis by Kinoshita and Campos (2003) agglomeration 
economies result as a driving determinant, however not in all TCs. Agglomerations are 
meant to be as a self reinforcing process usually based on specialization, and it implies 
several advantages deriving from positive spillovers, the establishment of economies of 
scale and a greater demand provided by the creation of a larger market. This study is 
interesting since aims at distinguishing the determinants according to FDI destination, both 
in terms of country and sector. So, the final empirical analysis on 25 TCs (CEECs, BCs and 
CIS) shows that in CEECs and BCs where the manufacturing sector accounts the majority 
of FDI, foreign investors ground their expectations on the quality of host countries 
institutions, the degree of economic reforms and the existence of agglomeration 
economies. Contrariwise, in CIS the main determinants are the large availability of natural 
resources at low prices and the existence of good infrastructures (Shiells, 2003). In 
CIS, FDI is often deterred by the high degree of corruption, the non full security of 
property rights, the bad tax administration and the macroeconomic instability, so that the 
extended presence of natural resources, especially in the energetic field, represents the 
prime motive for investors (Dubrovskyi and Ustenko, 2005).   
Also Bevan and Estrin (2004) achieve similar results by analyzing a sample of 11 
CEECs and BCs (plus Slovenia and Ukraine) over the years 1994-2000, where inward FDI 
is likely to be driven by the geographical proximity and positive perspectives on the EU 
accession, other than the market size and labor costs. Even though empirical literature has 
not paid enough attention to regional integration effects so far – except for Brenton et al. 
(1999) with no impressive results – this aspect is a crucial passage in the current increase of 
commercial and productive international linkages. The role of geography is stressed also by 
Deichmann et al. (2003), according to whom FDI is in TCs is linked both to economic and 
social conditions and to the location of the host countries.    
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A quite different study is made by Bandelj (2000) who focuses on the role of 
embedness as determinant of FDI in 11 TCs31 between 1995-1997, explained as the set of 
social, political, economic, cultural relations between the investors and the host countries. 
With an economic sociological perspective, the author confirms his initial hypothesis 
according to which political alliances, networks and cultural ties can be very influential 
in the decision process on the investment location.  
2.4. SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Table 2.5.1 sums up the principal studies concerning FDI determinants in TCs 
discussed in the previous paragraph. Theoretical and empirical contributions have been 
divided according to the principal factors driving investments choices that emerge in 
literature. The scheme allows to develop some conclusive remarks.   
  
                                                 
31 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia 
 
72 
 
Table 2.4.1 Literature on FDI determinants in TCs: summary 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Determinants Literature 
Political stability 
Wang, Swain (1995); Woodward et al. (1997); Benacek et al. (2000); 
Brada et al. (2006)  
Macroeconomic stability 
Benacek et al. (2000); Carstensen, Toubal (2004); Janicki, Wunnava 
(2004); Baniak et al (2005); Dubrovskij, Ustenko (2005); 
Legal stability Baniak et al (2005) 
Privatization Holland, Pain (1998); Lansbury et al. (1996); Carstensen, Toubal (2004) 
Tax policy Woodward et al. (1997); Cass (2003); Carstensen, Toubal (2004) 
Transition Altomonte (2000); Resmini (2000); Brada et al (2006)  
Trade costs Carstensen, Toubal (2004) 
Institutions (quality of) Kinoshita, Campos (2003) 
Economic reforms Brada et al (2006); Kinoshita, Campos (2003); Hunya (2004) 
BUSINESS FACILITIES 
Determinants Literature 
Policies promoting FDI Brenton et al. (1999); Cass (2003); Hunya (2004) 
Administrative efficiency Dubrovskij, Ustenko (2005) 
Political alliances/networks Bandelj (2000); Dubrovskij, Ustenko (2005) 
ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS 
Determinants Literature 
M
ar
ke
t 
se
e
ki
n
g 
Market size and 
growth 
Wang, Swain (1995); Woodward et al. (1997); Pye (1998); 
Altomonte (2000); Benacek et al. (2000); Resmini (2000); Bevan, 
Estrin (2004); Carstensen, Toubal (2004); Janicki, Wunnava (2004)  
Trade 
Holland, Pain (1998); Benacek et al. (2000); Resmini (2000); 
Kinoshita, Campos (2003);  
Gain of first mover 
advantages 
Pye (1998); Lankes, Stern (1999) 
Proximity 
Holland, Pain (1998); Resmini (2000); Deichmann et al. (2003); 
Bevan, Estrin (2004) 
Accession to EU Hunya (2004) 
R
e
so
u
rc
e
s/
ac
ce
ss
 
se
e
ki
n
g 
Natural resources at 
low P 
Kinoshita , Campos (2003); Shiells (2003) 
Availability of skilled 
L 
Pye (1998); Lankes, Stern (1999); Carstensen, Toubal (2004); 
Lansbury et al. (1996) 
Differences in 
relative L and K 
endowment 
Carstensen, Toubal (2004) 
Infrastructures Shiells (2003) 
Ef
fi
ci
e
n
cy
 
se
e
ki
n
g 
Unit L costs Kinoshita, Campos (2003); Bevan, Estrin (2004) 
Relative unit L costs 
Lansbury et al. (1996); Holland, Pain (1998); Altomonte (2000); 
Benacek et al (2000); Carstensen, Toubal (2004); Janicki, Wunnava 
(2004)  
Agglomeration 
economies 
Benacek et al. (2000); Resmini (2000); Kinoshita, Campos (2003)  
Source: author’s elaboration 
Economic factors are detected as the prime determinants of FDI, also in TCs. The 
majority of them refers to market seeking based FDI, such as market potential (inclusive of 
both market size and growth), the degree of trade relations with other countries and 
geographical proximity. In addition, also the relative labor costs (efficiency seeking based FDI) 
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and the availability of skilled labor (asset seeking based FDI) are usually considered by 
foreign investors. Although the lower level of productive factors in the host countries, 
especially labor, relatively to the investing countries matters it is not found to be the first 
driver of inward FDI in TCs, and not surprisingly the presence of skilled labor (whose 
price is however lower) is considered.   
Due to the unbalanced availability of studies on TCs, the sources have not been 
split according to the country or region accounted; nevertheless, the relevance of each 
determinant strongly depends on countries heterogeneity. For instance, efficiency seeking 
based FDI and the higher sensitivity to labor costs occur more frequently in SEECs, BCs 
and CISCs than in CEECs. In fact, the latest offer favorable economic determinants, 
mostly connected with the stable macroeconomic framework and the efficient implementation of 
economic reforms. The empirical evidence shows that some countries, i.e. Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, have been attracting more FDI than the other TCs 
whose cost of labor is much lower. The explanation lies on the fact that efficiency gains 
must be counterbalanced by the risk of the investment, so that MNEs first wish to go to 
the most developed TCs, and afterwards evaluate the cost advantages as well. In this 
regards privatization policies and the transitional path of each country matter significantly, and 
“policy framework” is given high importance by the literature concerned. Thus, initial 
conditions, both economic and political, can be seen as an useful parameter in the analysis 
of determinants. The structural differences among TCs and their capacity of develop the 
national economic system along with globalization, shape also their capability of attracting 
FDI. The considerable problem existing in the CISCs has to do with the macroeconomic 
instability of this area, which leads MNEs to short run investments. In the case of SEECs 
the main deterrent during the Nineties has been represented by the political instability, even 
though these countries have recently shown important recovery attempts and aspire to 
enter the EU. Nonetheless, both regions lag behind to CEECs and BCs in attracting FDI, 
and much more should be done in terms of both macroeconomic and business policies. It 
is clear that these difficulties are related in a sense to the condition of transition of the 
countries concerned, and to the instruments implied to face it, obtaining clearly very 
diverse outcomes. 
Finally, from Table 2.4.1 is possible to notice that still scarce attention is paid by 
literature to “business facilities” determinants. Contrariwise, the channels aiming at 
promoting a favorable business climate at foreign investors’ eyes must be enforced and 
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added to policies for the increase of administrative efficiency and the reduction of 
corruption in the relationship between politics and economy.  
2. 5.     FURTHER STEPS 
Now that a general framework of FDI in TCs has been given, the following 
chapters will focus on some consequences of foreign penetration in the host economic 
systems. The initial aim was to delve deeper into the real impact of TCs openness, and in 
particular their world integration through FDI, by implementing an empirical analysis of 
data. Thus, by keeping in mind the theoretical remarks of the first part and the main 
experts’ contributions, Chapter 3 and 4 use econometric methodologies in order to deepen 
two very specific questions related to TCs and Inward FDI.  
General literature on FDI impact in host countries is fairly wide and includes 
several studies, both theoretical and empirical, that show a heterogeneous scenario of final 
results. The low degree of convergence that we can find in this research field has to be 
related to some important factors: the host country taken (Developing Country, Least 
Developed Country, Developed Country), considering that economic conditions of each 
context matter in foreign investors’ choices; the type of econometric technique 
implemented for the analysis; the quality and availability of data. Thus, it is very difficult to 
provide a general summary without considering this heterogeneity.  
Very briefly, the main issues on FDI impact addressed by literature concern the 
following fields:  
 host country labor markets, both in terms of wages and employment: the 
presence of MNEs can affect domestic labor markets both positively and 
negatively. As for wages, while the first case occurs when the MNEs wage premium 
leads to a general increase of wages, in the second case MNEs may hire only skilled 
local workers decreasing the potential of the market (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004). 
Yet, the starting point to be clarify concerns whether the MNE offers wages that 
are higher than the one given by domestic firms, which is particularly true in 
Developing Countries taken into consideration by most literature on FDI effects. 
When the level of employment is considered, the general conclusions often find a 
positive impact of Inward FDI, even though the demand of only skilled or 
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unskilled labour may cause distortions within the domestic market and, eventually, 
decrease the quality of its supply.    
 Productivity of the host country firms regarding a large part of the literature. 
Positive effects can be detected, and they may be due to the establishment of 
technological externalities operating through spillovers from foreign to domestic 
firms. A consequent rise of host country firms productivity may also derive from 
the higher level of competition brought about by MNEs; in such a context local 
firms are forced to produce better and more efficiently. Nonetheless, it is to remark 
that in many countries MNEs take over the more efficient local firms causing an 
“impoverishment” of the domestic entrepreneurial context (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 
2004).    
 Growth of the host country economy, an argument on which there are very 
controversial positions. This aspect is strictly related to the previous point and the 
existence of technological externalities, since positives spillovers increasing the 
productive capacity of local firms may contribute to a general economic growth. 
This is the most analysed aspect so far. Nonetheless, growth may originate by 
higher competition or an enlargement of the market due to the “capture” of more 
consumers. Regarding to the TCs Kinoshita and Campos (2003) support the 
positive linkage between Inward FDI and growth by underling the good availability 
of human capital endowment in these countries, which would ease the transfer of 
know-how and knowledge.   
 Structure of the host country productive system due to the introduction of new 
goods on the markets or new technologies. The entrance of a MNEs on a market 
certainly exerts some effects on the functioning of the internal economic 
relationships, across industries and between competitors. The degree of this change 
depends on the flexibility and dynamism of the host country; in Developing 
Countries foreign penetration may modify the domestic market more markedly. 
 Competitiveness of the host country market; due to the likely increase of 
exports. This positive effect may occur thanks to the better knowledge of the world 
market that MNEs have in comparison to host countries firms, especially in 
Developing and Transition Countries. This higher awareness allows 
entrepreneurship to adopt proper instruments to face international markets and to 
implement good strategies in order to gain competitive advantages. 
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One of the main issues is related to the capacity of host countries firms to begin an 
independent developmental path based on local forces and competences. While on the one 
side there is a lack of entrepreneurship, on the other side FDI tends to concentrate on 
locations with higher quantity and quality of resources, which may correspond to specific 
sectors. Sometimes MNEs exploit the economies of scales deriving from existing industrial 
clusters in the host country, and add up to their local enlargement; or, FDI, especially in 
services, may be directed to big towns offering may facilities and advantages. Whether this 
process is important for the host country itself it depends both on the way it is established 
and the recipient. What is clear is that a polarization of investment occurs and it may lead 
to uneven and dependent development. Foreign penetration is very often linked to the 
establishment of a “dual economy” composed by two types of firms. First there are the 
local firms taken over by MNEs: they are able to catch the positive spillovers from them 
and are generally introduced into transnational networks; second, there are the domestic 
owned enterprises whose productivity capacity is lower than MNEs since it may be still 
dominated by old socialist linkages. For this reason this latest type satisfies a local and very 
vulnerable demand  (Pavlínek, 2004). The lack of knowledge and know-how transfer causes 
that only some regions benefit from foreign presence, whereas the majority of the host 
country keeps living in the same conditions. Furthermore, this polarization comes with 
other relevant problems, such as the urbanization and poverty raise.  
The following Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to deal with two effects which literature 
has not paid so much attention to: the impact of foreign penetration on host countries 
income inequality and how the presence of MNEs affects the domestic capacity of develop 
entrepreneurial initiatives. This two levels of analysis strongly differentiate both for the 
study perspective and the empirical methodologies used in data processing. The aim is to 
deepen the investigation on TCs along two fields which contribute to expand the 
knowledge of these countries, thus giving more originality to the work. At the same time, 
both income inequality and the degree of development of entrepreneurship, measured in 
this case as the capability of survival of domestic firms, go beyond the simple concept of 
“economic growth” often stressed by traditional literature. Rather, both arguments may be 
connected to a sort of “developmental growth” that combines social and economic factors. 
In regard to the specificity of TCs this kind of analysis allows to consider some features 
that are peculiar of the transition, using the first part of the work to interpret the results of 
the second one. Furthermore, while Chapter 3 uses a pool of TCs and country data, 
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Chapter 4 focuses on what happens only in two TCs by processing firm specific data and 
accounting for the issue concerned more in detail.    
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Chapter 3 
International Openness  
and Income Inequality  
in Transition Countries 
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International Openness and Income 
Inequality in Transition Countries 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will try to analyze the relationship (whenever it exists) between 
the openness process of TCs and the level of income inequality within each country. The 
attention paid to “within” inequality rather than to “between” inequality deals with the 
objective of identifying the well-being evolution of the population in TCs after the collapse 
of the Eastern bloc. There are several reasons to believe that there is a connection between 
the two phenomena, especially because Transition brought about radical changes in the 
economic sphere. The shift to a liberal system and the absence, at least at the beginning, of 
proper institutions together with the lack of a deep knowledge of the markets functioning, 
led to profound unbalances whose effects rebounded on the living conditions of people. 
Thus, if the first effects were on the economic structure of TCs, the most painful and 
visible consequences had to do with the social sphere, and the general unrest within it. 
Along with the analysis conducted in the previous two Chapters the focus is on FDI, 
compared with trade, as a potential determinant of social inequality, and a valid indicator of 
international openness.   
All the mechanisms occurred since the beginning of the Nineties in the CEECs, 
SEECs, BCs and CISCs have been discussed in Chapter 1, and in particular with the drastic 
fall of output and employment and the rise of inflation, these countries entered a period of 
economic recovery which also corresponded to a radical structural transformation. The 
economic Transition supported by specific policy reforms was supposed to bring new 
opportunities of development, but transformation also hid threats whose impacts were 
harder in these “new born” economies. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union 
unemployment was nearly nonexistent and wages (as prices) were fixed; in this context 
inequality was very low and trade represented only a State monopoly. With privatization 
and liberalization, in spite of the large labor supply, demand was lower and, consequently, 
labor market was much more selective: at the beginning of Transition many SOEs were 
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being restructured whereas some others were simply dismantled, and the private sector was 
still too weak. In such a context, one of the most evident consequences of transition was a 
general rise of income inequality in all TCs, despite the differences among countries due to 
the heterogeneity of paths of reforms, especially in terms of speed and conditions 
(Gomulka, 1994; Svejnar, 2002). Fig. 3.1.1 shows the income inequality trend within some 
of TCs; the indicator used is the coefficient of Gini ranging from 0 (absence of inequality) 
to 1 (maximum level of inequality). The presence of just a part of TCs depends on the 
availability of data, which strongly influences the following empirical analysis as well. It is 
possible to notice that in almost all countries there is an upgrading trend of the Gini index, 
although in a few contexts this trend is barely perceptible and in some others it is 
downward; nonetheless, this latest case might be caused by the missing data in the middle 
years, as in the case of Ukraine, where the graph lacks of values between 1995 and 2000. 
Fig. 3.1.1: Income inequality in TCs, measured by the Gini coefficient, 1990-2006 
 
Source: UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c, May 2008 (WIID2) 
Both theoretical and empirical literature has singled out several potential 
determinants of within country inequality relatively to TCs. Ferreira (1999) recognizes that 
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three factors are at the base of income inequality increase: privatization, the establishment 
of new markets in sectors that were previously under state control and changes in the 
returns associated to different skills. Following Ferreira’s (1999) analysis, Milanovic (1999) 
underlines the relevant shift of workers from the state sector being dismantled to either the 
private one or unemployment; the result is a rising wage inequality among sectors. In the 
same way, Aghion and Commander (1999) shed light on price liberalization, changes in the 
level and structure of public spending, tax reforms and trade liberalization, assessing that in 
the long run the trend of income inequality depends basically on the differences between 
sectors productivity and wages concentration within each of them. With respect to external 
flows of knowledge that may be seen as potential determinants of inequality as well, we can 
notice from data the steady increase in FDI and trade flows in almost the whole area. The 
neglect of the planned system gave a boost to private initiative, opened countries borders 
and pushed them towards the international economic system. This trend represents the 
evidence of the higher foreign openness adopted since the first year of transition. 
The investigation of the effects of openness on host countries has been at the 
center of the  literature concerned from several points of view and using different 
theoretical backgrounds. In particular, the role played by FDI in fostering host countries 
growth has proved to be a relevant issue, even though the empirical results obtained are far 
from being conclusive (Smeets, 2008). Contrariwise, the effect on inequality has been to a 
certain extent disregarded from the analysis. In this respect the openness-inequality 
relationship was even less thorough in the case of TCs, since very few studies have tried to 
account for it so far (Bhandari, 2007; Grimalda et al., 2010; Barlow et al., 2009). In order to 
delve deeper into the analysis in this field and to offer further contributions to future 
studies, this chapter includes both a theoretical and empirical section. The use of 
econometric methodologies gives the opportunity to make a comparison with reality, while 
accounting all the features of Transition discussed so far. Thus, based on previous findings 
related to the general globalization impact on income distribution, the aim of this section is 
to find evidence of a causal relationship occurring from FDI to income inequality. For a 
more exhaustive comprehension of the causal dynamics, some attention has been paid also 
to trade flows taken as comparison point of FDI.   
In particular, the theoretical underpinnings of our study are based on the model by 
Aghion and Commander (1999), later taken up by Figini and Görg (2006), in which it is 
considered the effect of inequality in the long run. The contributions we give to the 
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literature are mainly two: first, we provide new empirical evidence of the non linear effect 
of both FDI and trade in TCs by comparing an econometric static model, that is through 
Fixed Effects estimator (FE), with a dynamic one, that is through Least Square Dummy 
Variable Corrected estimator (LSDVC). Second, we consider the role played by education 
in mediating the effect of openness on inequality. The sample used is an unbalanced panel 
of 17 TCs32 with observations spanning over the period 1990-2006.  
3.2.     THE LITERATURE 
The literature on the relationship between income inequality and international 
openness is not very rich and it is quite recent. In this section, we go through the main 
contributions about FDI and trade, respectively. Until now, only a few studies have 
attempted to analyze this issue in TCs, while focusing on much larger and heterogeneous 
samples of countries.  
 
3.2.1. FDI and income inequality 
Globalization era is characterized by an increasing and widespread inequality and 
this fact has probably led recent literature to focus on distributional effects of FDI rather 
than on those related to economic growth. Modernization and Dependency theories can be 
deemed as the first attempts to delve deeper into the matter; while those supporting the 
Modernization standpoint, closer to neoclassical positions, identify a positive effect of 
foreign industrial penetration on host countries, the Dependistas deny the idea of 
development transfer. Dependency theorists highlight the neocolonial mechanism (Chase-
Dunn, 1975) or “development of underdevelopment” (Frank, 1969) which occurs when 
the internal élites linked to the export-oriented sectors favor foreign penetration and 
prevent the development of indigenous manufacturing (Rubinson, 1976). Consequently the 
result is an uneven distribution of wealth both between and within countries, which puts 
back, or even hampers, the economic growth process. 
Nonetheless not all the analysis predicting negative effects on income distribution 
find statistically significant results (Kaufman et al, 1975), which suggests to take into 
consideration different factors that may filter the direct effects on foreign penetration, such 
                                                 
32 Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine. 
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as the GDP growth, the original level of development or the role of the central 
government. In Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao’s (1979) study the government intervention 
into the economy shows a negative and highly significant coefficient relatively to the Gini 
index. Further empirical analysis demonstrate that FDI tend to control over the power 
structure, eventually preventing the state from a greater intervention into the economy and 
a higher promotion of distribution policies which could damage FDI.  
The literature on FDI and income inequality which follows the first Modernization 
and Dependency studies is quite heterogeneous, due to the introduction of new factors 
which allow for a deeper analysis of the economic mechanisms underlying inequality. 
According to Kholi (1984) the political regime assumes a greater importance than FDI in 
order to explain short term changes. FDI eventually affect the long-term structure of 
countries but, in the short run, the level of democracy is a better indicator for income 
distribution. Many authors focus on labor market structure and wages. Evans and 
Timberlake (1980) hypothesize that in Developing Countries FDI lead to a distortion of 
the local labor market and finally demonstrate that the effects on income inequality are 
mediated by the growth of the service sector. Bhandari (2007) uses a sample of 19 TCs 
recognizing that while FDI are not relevant and eventually may reduce income inequality, 
they affect negatively wage distribution. As a logic consequence, since the overall level of 
inequality does not seem to be altered by FDI, capital income inequality in selected 
countries should decrease. If the existence of some sort of labor market distortion due to 
foreign penetration is assumed, we have to investigate on the wage premium paid to local 
workers by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and on the decreasing returns to capital after 
its accumulation in the host countries which drives up wages (Jensen and Rosas, 2007).  
All these issues are related to the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor. 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) by analyzing the impacts of FDI and trade penetration in 
Mexico, find that skilled labor demand and wages increase in both countries through FDI 
and trade, leading to a more unequal distribution of income. In the USA the use of skilled 
labor is more intensive, whereas Mexico has a comparative advantage when the production 
processes require a more intensive use of unskilled labor. The shift of intermediate goods 
production from the USA to Mexico increases the demand of skilled labor in the latter one 
relatively to other Developing Countries and increases the demand of unskilled labor 
relatively to Developed Countries. Figini and Görg (2006), following the reasoning by 
Aghion and Commander (1999), find evidence of a non-linear relation between FDI and 
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income inequality in Developing Countries, due to the introduction of new technologies. 
The process outlined by FDI follows an inverted U-shape curve: at the beginning host 
country’s firms need more skilled labor to adopt the new technology the demand and the 
relative price for skilled workers increases thus raising labor market segmentation and wage 
inequality. In the second phase, when the amount of FDI increases, local firms are able to 
shift to a higher technological level by imitating foreign companies, in this way reducing the 
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. At the end of the process only skilled 
labor is employed. Some authors have paid much attention to human capital as a measure 
of a country’s capacity of adopting new technologies. Basu and Guariglia (2007) analyze 
this effect considering that the initial distribution of human capital may affect FDI 
outcomes in different ways; if the level of human capital is low, i.e. below the minimal 
threshold, the correlation between FDI and income inequality will be negative, because the 
country’s growth rate is faster than the one occurring with higher levels of absorptive 
capacity (Basu and Guariglia, 2007). To take into account this effect, Figini and Görg 
(2006) include a variable representing the interaction between FDI and the level of 
education into their model: the new variable is significant and positively correlated to the 
Gini coefficient in OECD countries case, thus confirming previous assumptions.  
Further studies have put forward interesting results by linking the analysis to the 
specific context considered. Geographical dummies are introduced into the models to 
show how the correlation between FDI and income inequality may vary according to 
geographical differences. For example FDI coefficients for Latin American countries seem 
to be generally significant and positive (Tsai,1995; Bussmann et al, 2002; Choi, 2006). As 
regards the analysis of economies in transition, Barlow et al. (2009), in their study on 
twenty TCs over the period 1990-2004, do not found any significant role of FDI in 
increasing inequality. More specifically, the significance of FDI vanishes when the time 
dummies and some specific institutional factors, like privatization and price liberalization, 
are added into the model. Nonetheless in their subsequent paper (Grimalda et al., 2010) the 
disaggregation of FDI according to their destination underlines relevant inequality-
enhancing effects of FDI in the case of the EU NMS, relatively to CIS and SEECs. 
3.2.2. Trade and income inequality 
Literature on trade and income inequality relations is slightly richer and deeper, 
even though not necessarily more homogeneous concerning studies’ outcomes. The topic 
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has been analyzed both by international and labor economists; recent literature has 
considered the two standpoints together, in order to explain the way in which openness 
affects wage distribution (Richardson, 1995). Nonetheless analysis cannot be limited to this 
issue since labor income does not represent the total income, as it is evident especially in 
Developing Countries (Spilimbergo et al, 2003). The starting point of the debate is to be 
found in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems assumptions. The 
theorems predict that a country exports (imports) the goods whose production employs the 
factor relatively more (less) abundant; since the income of this factor will increase, the 
consequence of trade is a shrink of inequality in Developing Countries and an increase in 
Developed ones. However, most of the theoretical and empirical studies, hardly support H-
O-S reasoning. Reuveny and Li (2003) find only a partial evidence of the theorems since 
the empirical tests show that trade decreases income inequality in Developing Countries, 
but the same occurs in Developed ones. Davis (1996) states that the dynamics may be 
reversed if local, instead of global, country’s factor abundance is taken. In this perspective a 
Southern country can be deemed as capital abundant relatively to its production cone, and 
it will see its wages reduced by trade. Both Cooper (2001) and Milanovic (2005) provide 
results that underline how trade increases income inequality in poorest countries and causes 
a decrease in middle income and rich ones. The same conclusion is drawn by Spilimbergo 
et al. (2003) whose study focuses on countries relative factor endowments. The authors 
find a negative correlation between inequality and the relative endowment of factors whose 
accumulation can be limited, such as the skill intensity. The introduction of variables of 
interaction between trade openness and those factor endowments allows the authors to test 
the negative effect of trade on income distribution in countries with a relatively high 
endowment of skilled workers and a positive effect of the same variable in those which are 
relatively capital-abundant. This is due to the fact that globalization and technological 
change in the skill-intensive sectors produce a multiplicative effect which increases income 
inequality (Learner,1994).  
Several studies on this argument seem to differ in results depending on the measure 
used for openness. Lundberg and Squire (2003) find that the Sachs-Warner index on 
openness policies positively affects income inequality, whereas trade volume, measured by 
the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, is not significant. The same 
conclusions are drawn by Dollar and Kraay (2004). In Li et al. (1998) exports are taken as 
openness measure and they are negative; conversely, in their study on China, Wei and Wu 
(2001) find out that exports decrease rural-urban income inequality, which is the major 
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component of the overall within inequality. This divergence could be explained by 
accounting for the presence of new industrial agglomerates within Chinese rural areas. 
Meschi and Vivarelli (2009) show how trade can affect income inequality in Developing 
Countries through a skill bias technological change. Skill-intensive technologies shift from 
Developed to Developing Countries through trade channels and by increasing the skilled 
labor demand and the relative wage, as already predicted by Feenstra and Hanson’s model 
on FDI (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). More relevant, by disaggregating the overall trade by 
imports and exports according to the partner country, especially exports with Developed 
Countries appear to be significantly and positively correlated with income inequality. The 
authors test the initial hypothesis on two subsamples, Low Income Countries (LICs) and 
Middle Income Countries (MICs), and find that only in MICs, which have a higher 
technological catching up potential than LICs, trade negatively affects income inequality. 
Similar results have been found in the case of Transition Economies, where the 
trade structure based on intermediate goods leads to a fall of unskilled labor demand and a 
consequent raise of inequality (Aghion and Commander, 1999). In Barlow et al.’s (2009) 
only exports show a significant and positive effect, whereas imports do not seem to be 
relevant. Nonetheless, the impact of both privatization and price liberalization is stronger 
than the one exerted by globalization. After combining globalization and institutional 
factors, the authors find that exports may eventually weaken the negative consequences of 
small scale privatization and price liberalization. Moreover Grimalda et al.’s (2010) study 
reveals again that the impact of both exports to and imports from EU is stronger in the 
case of the NMS than CISCs and SEECs. 
3.3.     THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework used to specify our empirical strategy follows the one 
employed in Figini and Görg (1999; 2006) that draws in turn on the model developed by 
Aghion and Commander (1999). The model is based on a production function in which 
output Y is given by using intermediate inputs x, and labor is the only factor of production 
in sector i. 
   {∫  
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In equation (1) A represents technology; if A>1 new technology is adopted, 
whereas if A=1 old technology is used. In Aghion and Commander (1999)’s model two 
different stages of domestic firms technological development are described. The authors 
envisage a process of adaptation leading the economy to switch from old to new 
technology, after the introduction of new technological knowledge into the system. It is 
assumed that the new technology requires skilled workers, but firms need time to adapt so 
that initially both unskilled and skilled labor is employed in the old-technology sectors. 
Workers from both categories are paid the same amount. At a further stage, if firms are 
successfully able to adopt the new technology, demand for skilled labor increases thus 
raising inequality. When technology is adopted by all firms, unskilled labor demand is non-
existent, eventually only skilled labor is employed, and inequality decreases. Thus, a 
fragmentation of the labor market occurs, and it leads inequality to follow an inverted U-
shape with an upward trend in the short run which turns downward in the long run.  
We interpret this model by assuming that new technology can be introduced by 
both FDI and trade. In particular, we hypothesize that when new technological 
knowledge is available to the domestic production system of the host country an 
initial rise in inequality occurs, as domestic firms, trying to adopt the new 
technologies, employ a higher ratio of skilled workers. However, inequality should 
progressively decrease as firms continue the process of imitation and raise the 
amount of skilled workers employed. The speed of the adjustment described depends 
on the initial conditions of each country, so that a good absorptive capacity may shorten 
the transition period related to the technological adaptation. Different effects also depend 
on whether trade with Developed or Developing Countries is considered. In the latter case, 
trade flows may involve older technologies and cause an equalizing effect eventually 
reverted in the long term. Differently, trade flows with Developed Countries may show an 
early skill enhancing effect eventually weakened in the long run. Reasons are however 
different with respect to imports and exports. Countries import embodied foreign 
knowledge that, besides having a positive impact on productivity, may cause an increase in 
inequality. Specific skills may be required to absorb imported technologies thus causing 
higher wage differentials (Robbins, 2003). As for exports, if receiving countries require 
specific high quality standards, the increasing employment of qualified workforce still leads 
to the already mentioned fragmentation of the market (Fajnzylber and Fernandes, 2006). 
Nonetheless, these expected signs may change when the human capital endowment of 
receiving countries is taken into account. Indeed, as evidenced in Anderson (2005)’s review 
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the role played by human capital needs to be investigated further as it may result 
ambiguous: Spilimbergo et al. (1999) and Fischer (2001) ascertain that the greater the 
endowment of human capital of a country the stronger the effect of openness on 
inequality.  
3.4 THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH  
The empirical strategy carried out reflects the theoretical framework described in 
the previous section aimed at investigating a potential non linear effect of both FDI and 
trade on income inequality. The baseline of the empirical specification is the following:  
GINIit  =  β0 + β1 OPENit-1 + β2OPEN 
2 
it-1 + Σ βkXikt + ηt + ui + eit 
(2) 
where GINI is the Gini index measuring within income inequality in country i at time t; 
OPEN represents the openness variable that is considered to be FDI and trade, 
alternatively. However, we also assume that trade can be decomposed to take into 
consideration that imports and exports, together with their origin and destination, may 
influence inequality in different ways. OPEN squared is added to test the non-linearity of the 
relationship with the Gini index. In all specifications both openness variables are included 
in the model lagged one year: in this way we are able to control for a delayed impact on 
inequality, also mitigating a possible problem of endogeneity.  
Xk is a vector of control variables (GDP per capita, education, inflation, service 
sector), ui is the idiosyncratic component that measures time invariant country specific 
effects and eit is the traditional error term. Through the use of panel data we are allowed to 
account for individual country heterogeneity avoiding, or at least minimizing, potential 
misspecifications. Indeed, pooling all countries together may lead to potential wrong 
estimates as it omits unobserved country specific effects. For these reasons, in the first step 
of the empirical analysis we estimate the model by using the FE estimator. Indeed, the use 
of the simple pooled OLS model would produce unreliable estimates as the F-test 
demonstrates the existence of heterogeneity across countries33. Two points are worth 
noting: first, we include time dummies (ηt) in order to account for business cycle effects, 
and de facto the F-test always rejects at 1% level of significance the null hypothesis of non 
                                                 
33 The null hypothesis is always rejected at 1% level of significance. 
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relevance of those variables; second, through the modified Wald test of groupwise 
heteroschedasticity34 we always reject at 1% level of significance the null hypothesis of 
homoschedasticity forcing us to estimate the model with robust standard errors.  
In the second step of the empirical analysis, we include the lagged dependent 
variable to take into account a dynamic specification. In this way, we are able to control for 
the fact that inequality may be persistent across time, and furthermore it may be dependent 
on factors that change slowly. The model estimated is the following:  
GINIit = β0 + β1GINIi,t-1 + β2OPENit-1 + β3 OPEN 
2 
it-1 + Σ βkXikt + ηt + ui + eit 
(3)               
However, due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable we encounter 
problems of endogeneity. There are two possible methodologies to solve this problem: the 
first is that of using a LSDVC estimator (Bun and Kiviet, 2003) which can also deal with 
unbalanced panel, as it has been extended by Bruno (2005). Starting from an autoregressive 
panel data model, we suppose to adopt the LSDV estimator by applying a within 
transformation to wipe out individual effects. Nevertheless, the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable may bias the estimates. A way to tackle the bias is to measure it: 
through Monte Carlo simulations, Bun and Kiviet (2003) and Bruno (2005) calculate three 
possible nested approximation of the bias; in our regressions we use the one deemed to be 
the most accurate (B3) in their notation.  Thus the LSDVC estimator is equal to:  
LSDVC = LSDV – B3 
   (4) 
The procedure needs to be initialized by a consistent estimator that can be chosen 
among the Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond: in this study, we initialize 
the bias correction with the Blundell-Bond estimator even though the three options are all 
asymptotically efficient. Furthermore, we test the significance of LSDVC coefficients using 
bootstrapped standard errors (200 iterations); this methodology may correct the poor 
approximation which is provided by the estimated asymptotic standard errors leading to 
unreliable t-statistics. However, one of the main limit of the LDVC estimator is that all 
independent variables need to be considered as strictly exogenous: besides variables 
                                                 
34 This test is run after having estimated model with fixed effect. 
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measuring openness, this may be also the case for some regressors standing as proxies of 
the level of education or the level of GDP, as a reverse causality may actually be present 
(Benabou, 1997; Galor and Zeira, 1993) 
Another method to deal with the endogeneity problem of both lagged dependent 
and independent variables is the Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM), and in 
particular the System – GMM estimator (SYS-GMM), as proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). However, this econometric technique may not result efficient in the case of small 
sample, especially when the number of N is so low (N=17). For this reason, we report the 
results in Appendix bearing in mind to interpret them with caution. When using this 
estimation technique, we instrument possible endogenous variables by using their own lags. 
Finally, as Madariaga and Poncet (2007) sustain, we use the one step instead of the two step 
estimator, in order to prevent biased estimates even though the latter would be more 
efficient.  
The final step of the empirical strategy tests whether the effect of education may 
result more relevant when we interact it with the openness measures. Our hypothesis is 
that higher levels of education may decrease inequality and accelerate the process of 
adjustment to the adoption of new technology. The panel we use is made up of 17 TCs 
observed over the period 1990-2006. The natural logarithm of all the variables is taken in 
order to interpret the coefficients as elasticities and to minimize the likely influence of 
outliers. Furthermore, we test the presence of unit roots following Maddala and Wu (1999) 
and finding that all series are stationary35. 
3.4.1.  Data description 
Income inequality is measured by the Gini index (GINI) which ranges from 0, when 
the income distribution is perfectly equalitarian, to 1, representing the highest level of 
inequality. This index is not necessarily the best and the latest measure available for such an 
analysis; nonetheless, both the set of countries included in our sample and the widespread 
use of the Gini index in literature, have strongly influenced the choice of this measure with 
respect to others. Data come from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, 
Version 2.0c, May 2008 (WIID2). The WIID2 is an updated edition of the previous WIID1 
                                                 
35 We always reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 1% level of significance. 
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Version 1.0, September 2000, and the sources for data, other than the national ones, are the 
Deininger & Squire database from the World Bank, the Luxembourg Income Study and 
Transmonee, the latter mainly concerning TCs. Since the database is quite heterogeneous in 
terms of inequality conceptual base and statistical unit used, a strict selection of data has 
been made to facilitate their comparison (Ivaschenko, 2002; Bhandari, 2007). The current 
sample contains 170 observations based on similar income definition (income 
disposable/gross, monetary income disposable/gross); the unit of analysis is the household, 
when considering a group of people who share some resources and a dwelling, or the 
family, when considering only natural linkages between components; the household/family 
per capita equivalence scale has been chosen to account for the size of the 
households/families; observations refer to the entire population of the whole national 
territory and to all ages. Finally, we keep those data with the highest quality rate. The index 
is reported in percentage points. 
The variable OPEN (openness) includes data on inward FDI, overall trade, imports 
and exports. Data on FDI (FDI) come from the World Investment Report (2009) edited by 
UNCTAD. We decided to take the stock value of inward FDI, “which is the value of the 
share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent 
enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprises” (WIR, 2009). It 
is measured as percentage of GDP. As Bornschier (1978) notes, the choice of using FDI 
stocks rather than flows, is quite relevant; whereas the first measurement shows the total 
amount of foreign capital within a host country, the second one relates to the temporary 
entry of foreign investment. The measure of overall trade (TRADE) is represented by the 
sum of imports and exports as percentage of GDP and it is taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI, 2009) database of the World Bank. In further 
specifications, in order to deepen our analysis, trade is disaggregated into imports and 
exports as percentage of GDP, specifying the origin and destination of these flows. Goods 
coming from Developed Countries (IMPED) may be very different from those coming 
from Developing Countries (IMPING) and this difference is mainly concerned with the 
technological level embedded into the products. The same reasoning can be extended to 
exports towards Developed (EXPED) or Developing Countries (EXPING). Data on 
imports and exports from and to Developed and Developing Countries are taken from the 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2009).  
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GDP per capita (GDP), as a traditional measure of economic development, has 
been included into the model. Many papers test the linearity of the GDP-income inequality 
relationship in order to assess the existence of an inverted U-shaped curve as predicted by 
Kuznets (1955). Empirical evidence of the Kuznets curve is quite controversial and much 
of recent literature has not confirmed such theory according to which in the long run, as 
GDP grows, income inequality decreases, after an initial period of worsening of income 
distribution (Ivaschenko, 2002; Bussmann et al., 2002; Choi, 2006; Meschi and Vivarelli, 
2009). For this reason, we decided not to include the quadratic value of GDP per capita 
into the model but to include only the GDP per capita variable. It is computed in terms of 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) with reference to 2005 constant international Dollars.  
Based on previous theoretical specifications we add a variable measuring the 
educational level. The secondary school enrollment (SEC) is computed as a percentage of 
gross enrollment ratio. The relevance lies in the increase of skilled labor eventually caused 
by the higher level of education and connected with the decrease of inequality (Tsai, 1995; 
Bussmann et al., 2002; Basu and Guariglia, 2006; Jensen and Rosas, 2007). Due to the 
distributional impact of inflation (Ivaschenko, 2002; Ferreira, 1999), and considering that 
the first years of transition were characterized by high inflation rates, we include this 
indicator into the model (INFL). Instable macroeconomic conditions may influence 
inequality positively by raising wages, especially in the lowest part of the distribution. This 
variable is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator. The last variable 
included into the model is strictly connected with the particular economic structure and 
transformation undergone by TCs.  
Liberalization and privatization policies laid down by the Washington Consensus 
“pack” contributed to the development of the service sector, which either did not exist 
before or was very limited and totally run by the State. The service sector represents an 
outstanding share of the entire privatized economy, where wages are linked to labor 
productivity (Bhandari, 2007). Moreover, before the collapse of the socialist system, wages 
were much higher than the labor productivity, and unemployment was nearly absent; 
changes in economic structure may be among the determinants of income inequality in 
those countries. For these reasons, we add a variable representing the added value of the 
service sector (SERVICE), which accounts also for the growing privatized share of 
economy. All these control variables are taken from the WDI of the World Bank. Some 
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descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2 in Appendix along with 
pairwise correlations. 
3.5.     THE RESULTS  
The empirical analysis is built around two baseline models including openness 
measures in general terms and the specific components of trade, respectively. Before 
moving to more detailed analysis we make a first approach only with FE, in order to have a 
first impression of the possible interactions between the variables of the model. The 
regressions include the lagged term of those variables measuring international openness, 
which allows to take into account the dynamicity of the relations with the inequality 
phenomenon, as explained previously. In Tab. 3.5.1, in the first specification only FDI 
measures have been included; in the second one only trade measures; finally, in third one, 
both of them have been considered. None of the two variables results to be significant, 
whereas GDP and SERVICE are, both showing a positive coefficient. In particular, the 
significance of SERVICE and its potential negative effect on inequality is part of the 
evolution of TCs economy. This issue has been discussed in Chapter 1; in the planned 
system the service sector, as well as the whole private sector, was very restrained since it 
was deemed as an unproductive activity. Moreover, the dominant role of the state tended 
to weak the attitude of entrepreneurship (Hilman and Milanovic, 1992). Thus, even though 
services activities existed they were concentrated in the informal economy, and developed 
through informal networks. With the collapse of the command economic system, people 
had more opportunities to legally run into their own business, so that the service sector 
started to increase notably. From this first passage of the analysis the service sector can be 
deemed as a determinant of income inequality, since the availability of new business 
opportunities allows some people to gain more, especially at the beginning, within an 
economic context still not well defined under the economic and legal perspective. Also the 
empirical analysis of Evans and Timberlake (1980) stressed the negative impact of the 
service sector growth on income inequality.  
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Tab. 3.5.1 FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs, 1990-2006. Fixed Effects regressions. 
(Dependent variable: Gini index) 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 
        
FDI 0.0674 
 
0.0640 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
FDI(-1) 0.0237 
 
0.0254* 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
TRADE 
 
0.1778 0.1170 
  
(0.19) (0.22) 
TRADE(-1) 
 
-0.0557 -0.0920* 
  
(0.08) (0.05) 
GDP 0.0511** 0.1654* 0.5250* 
 
(0.19) (0.16) (0.28) 
INFL 0.0188 0.0178 0.0190 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
SEC -0.2703 -0.1202 -0.2034 
 
(0.31) (0.42) (0.33) 
SERVICE 0.4256** 0.1821* 0.3788** 
 
(0.16) (0.30) (0.18) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99 103 99 
R-squared 0.373 0.338 0.383 
Number of countries 17 17 17 
F test 162.78*** 35.82*** 16.79*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We go further with the empirical approach, by testing the initial hypothesis based 
on the conceptual framework.  
In Table 3.5.2 columns represent different specifications of the models. First FDI 
and TRADE have been included separately, and the quadratic term of both has been added 
to test the non-linearity of the inequality-openness relationship, according to the theoretical 
premises; then TRADE has been replaced by specific flows according to their origin and 
destination, in order to deepen the analysis on the technological issue. On the one side we 
first note that, nor FDI neither TRADE variables (columns 1 and 2) are relevant in 
explaining the variation of the Gini index. It is also to be noted that, although not 
significant, the size of the coefficients is rather different, being much higher for trade than 
FDI. These results confirm what found in other studies, and especially in Meschi and 
Vivarelli (2009) who consider aggregate trade flows. However, we notice that, by isolating 
the effect of imports from Developed Countries (IMPED and IMPEDSQ in column 3) we 
see significant coefficients and an inverted U-curve as expected. The explanation lies on the 
fact that since TCs can be deemed as a middle way between Developed and Developing 
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Countries in terms of technological knowledge embodied in goods, imports from 
Developed Countries bring more sophisticated technology creating a gap between those 
firms able to upgrade their assets and the rest of firms. This mechanism follows the one 
described by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) in the case of trade between Mexico and the 
USA. To correctly interpret the size of the coefficients we have to compute the marginal 
effect. In this case, we need to calculate the partial derivative as follows: δGINI/δOPEN = 
β1 + 2β2(OPEN). As the marginal effect is not constant we calculate it considering OPEN 
at its mean. So the marginal effect of imports to Developed Countries is -0.155, which 
means that 1% increase in the level of imports decreases by 0.16% the GINI index. This 
value (16%) can be also considered the point of inflection, that is the level of the Gini 
index at which rising levels of imports to Developed Countries cause a decrease in 
inequality. 
Instead, exports to Developed Countries both with respect to the single variable 
and the squared term, stress the existence of a non linear relationship with the Gini index, 
yet on the opposite direction. This result could be explained by the fact that requirements 
of higher technological export production may lead to an upgrading in TCs, causing a gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers, which is difficult to be filled in the long run. In this 
case, by calculating the marginal effect we obtain that 1%increase in exports to Developed 
Countries generates an increase by 0.62% in the GINI index. Finally, the quadratic term of 
exports to Developing Countries (EXPINGSQ in column 6) shows a significant and 
negative but small coefficient: indeed, the increase of exports to Developing Countries by 
1% causes only a small decrease in the Gini index which is about 0.09 %. This result is due 
to the fact that exporting firms in TCs are not required to improve the technological level 
of goods when they export to Developing Countries, given that most of them are primary 
commodities, causing in the long run an equalizing effect. As for the other control variables 
of the model, none of them seems to be particularly relevant. However, we recognize that 
the GDP variable is usually negative even though significant only in column 5. This stands 
for the fact that a higher level of economic development may be associated with higher 
government effectiveness: this may smooth the negative consequences of transition 
attaining a lower level of inequality. The variable representing the service sector 
(SERVICE) is weakly positively significant in the model considering exports to 
Developing Countries (column 6). Contrary to expectations, education (SEC) seems not to 
affect at all the Gini index, as it is always not significant.  
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As a sensitivity analysis, we run the regressions by substituting the percentage of 
secondary education with the one representing tertiary education (TIER). This variable is 
measured as a percentage of gross school enrollment and it is also taken from WDI. We 
find that this variable is either never significant, appearing however always with a positive 
sign, except  when we use as a regressor exports to Developing Countries in which it is 
positively significant at 5%36.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 The signs and significance of the other openness variables remain the same except for the case of 
IMPED and IMPEDSQ that are no more significant. The table summarizing these results is available in the 
Appendix. 
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Tab. 3.5.2 FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs, 1990-2006. General trade variable 
disentangled in trade flows according to origin and destination. Fixed Effects regressions. (Dependent 
variable: Gini index) 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
FDI(-1) -0.0188      
 (0.049)      
FDISQ(-1) 0.0002      
 (0.002)      
TRADE(-1)  3.2296     
  (1.920)     
TRADESQ(-1)  -0.3466     
  (0.208)     
IMPED(-1)   2.1729**    
   (0.987)    
IMPEDSQ(-1)   -0.2924**    
   (0.134)    
IMPING(-1)    0.0598   
    (0.201)   
IMPINGSQ(-1)    0.0173   
    (0.042)   
EXPED(-1)     -2.0095**  
     (0.687)  
EXPEDSQ(-1)     0.3246***  
     (0.091)  
EXPING(-1)      0.1065 
      (0.065) 
EXPINGSQ(-1)      -0.0504*** 
      (0.017) 
GDP -0.0735 -0.0585 0.0663 -0.1267 -0.4422** -0.1515 
 (0.341) (0.223) (0.208) (0.197) (0.200) (0.195) 
INFL 0.0290 0.0252 0.0222 0.0200 0.0385 0.0306 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024) 
SERVICE 0.0048 0.0955 0.3657 0.0953 0.3201 0.5394* 
 (0.231) (0.111) (0.223) (0.103) (0.246) (0.287) 
SEC -0.0950 0.3751 -0.0577 0.1521 0.1445 -0.2698 
 (0.315) (0.429) (0.246) (0.266) (0.240) (0.281) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.375 0.388 0.397 0.416 0.474 0.487 
Number of 
countries 
16 16 16 16 16 16 
F test 24750.66*** 1204.26*** 80445.92*** 1420.59** 143.72*** 74.57*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We also compare the estimates obtained with the FE method with a dynamic 
estimator. As explained in the empirical section, the need to control for the persistence of 
the Gini index leads us to estimate a model with the one year lagged dependent variable 
among the regressors. Table 3.5.3 summarizes the results obtained alternatively by using 
the LSDVC estimator. We notice that no variables show statistically significant coefficients; 
nevertheless covariates that were significant in the FE model (IMPED, IMPEDSQ, 
EXPED, EXPEDSQ, EXPINGSQ) report exactly the same sign, partially confirming our 
previous estimates. However, we also recognize how the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is always positive and strongly significant, thus confirming the fact that 
a high degree of persistence affects the inequality phenomenon. 
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Tab. 3.5.3 FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs, 1990-2006. LSDVC regressions. 
(Dependent variable: Gini index) 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
GINI(-1) 2.0235*** 1.4642*** 1.8851*** 1.8669*** 1.9400*** 1.9514*** 
 (0.012) (0.428) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
FDI(-1) -0.0371      
 (0.421)      
FDISQ(-1) -0.0014      
 (0.078)      
TRADE(-1)  0.5379     
  (9.414)     
TRADESQ(-1)  -0.0609     
  (1.010)     
IMPED(-1)   1.5414    
   (4.152)    
IMPEDSQ(-1)   -0.2361    
   (0.606)    
IMPING(-1)    0.1405   
    (0.263)   
IMPINGSQ(-1)    -0.0057   
    (0.063)   
EXPED(-1)     -0.9027  
     (1.346)  
EXPEDSQ(-1)     0.1493  
     (0.199)  
EXPING(-1)      0.0807 
      (0.310) 
EXPINGSQ(-1)      -0.0261 
      (0.061) 
GDP -0.4682 -0.2046 -0.2852 -0.4452 -0.6569 -0.4509 
 (0.876) (0.797) (0.620) (0.583) (0.779) (0.622) 
INFL -0.0061 0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0067 0.0158 0.0004 
 (0.058) (0.091) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054) 
SERVICE 0.7005 0.4826 0.7981 0.7734 0.9765* 0.9437* 
 (0.643) (0.580) (0.604) (0.483) (0.528) (0.547) 
SEC 0.3708 0.4355 0.2842 0.4670 0.2105 0.1445 
 (2.126) (2.267) (1.957) (2.174) (1.949) (2.033) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses (bias correction inizialized by Blundell-Bond estimator) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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When the specifications are tested with the SYS-GMM estimators37 (Table 3 in Appendix) 
we find confirmation that the lagged dependent variable is always positive and highly 
significant, meaning that inequality is path dependent; however, as we can see, whereas this 
is the only variable which results to be relevant by using the LSDVC estimator, in the case 
of the GMM we also find a significant and negative result relatively to exports to 
Developing Countries.  Moreover, we confirm the negative sign for the coefficient of GDP 
and a positive and sometimes significant coefficient for SERVICE. With respect to the 
educational variable (SEC) we would have expected that the relative coefficient was 
negatively significant; on the contrary we find no relevant results in none of the tables 
commented so far. On this purpose, we go deeper into the analysis by focusing on the role 
of schooling and education in influencing income distribution through openness. 
Following Figini and Görg’s (2006) study, in Tables 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 we report the 
regressions with the interaction variables composed by SEC and each of the openness 
measures38. By using the FE estimator (Table 3.5.4), FDI variables now turn to be 
statistically significant, even though only at 10% level of significance, and more 
importantly, estimates shape a U-curve that only partially confirms (on the non linearity of 
the relationship) Figini and Görg’s model. In the short run the absorptive capacity of TCs 
labor, also developed by study careers, may enable firms to catch the positive spillovers 
coming from foreign firms. In the long run, when foreign companies require more 
advanced competencies, a deeper distinction between skilled and unskilled workers may 
occur, due to the absence of specific skills needed. However, the variable interacted with 
SEC is not significant, while only the squared interacted term is negatively significant 
indicating that an equalizing effect is present as expected.  When we consider the trade 
                                                 
37 The reliability of the SYS-GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments used in the 
regression. In order to check it, we consider two specification tests. The first, the Sargan test on over-
identifying restrictions, is based on the analysis of the moment conditions in the estimation process. Under 
the null hypothesis instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. Due to the fact that the Sargan test may 
not be reliable when the number of instruments exceeds the number of regressors, instruments are collapsed 
and we limit the use of lags (from the second to the third) for those variables which are used as instruments 
(Roodman, 2009). In some specifications the Sargan test rejects the validity of instruments at 1% level of 
significance. In these cases, we lag the instruments one year limiting their use to (3 4). In the second test 
under the null hypothesis the error term eit is not serially correlated. We do not reject the absence of 
correlation at first and second order. Taken together, these two specification tests support the use of the 
GMM estimation. 
38 From pairwise correlations we can see that values are never higher than 0.7%, indicating no serious 
problems of collinearity. However, as the interacted variables may present problems of collinearity, we 
estimate our specifications by orthogonalizing interacted variables and use the Gram-Schimdt procedure .We 
find that the results, both in terms of size and significance of coefficients, are similar to the original variables, 
thus confirming the reliability of the estimates presented. 
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variable, we find that only when interacted with education it is positively and weakly 
significant denoting that, even through this channel, the amount of inequality may first 
increase in the short run and then decrease. In this case the calculation of the partial 
derivative is a bit more complicated as we have to consider the partial derivative also with 
respect to terms interacted with education: δGINI/δOPEN = β1 + 2β2(OPEN) + β4(SEC) 
+ 2β5(SEC*OPEN). We find that 1% percentage increase in the FDI level decreases 
inequality by only 0.03% once we account for the role played by education. 
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Tab. 3.5.4 FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs through education, 1990-2006. FE 
regressions. (Dependent variable: Gini index) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
FDI(-1) -3.2730*      
 (1.602)      
FDISQ(-1) 0.7752*      
 (0.371)      
FDISEC(-1) 0.6021      
 (0.349)      
FDISECSQ(-1) -0.1540*      
 (0.080)      
TRADE(-1)  -4.6129     
  (4.358)     
TRADESQ(-1)  1.1693     
  (0.946)     
TRADESEC(-1)  1.6553*     
  (0.938)     
TRADESECSQ(-1)  -0.3285     
  (0.210)     
IMPED(-1)   -1.9924    
   (4.055)    
IMPEDSQ(-1)   0.5558    
   (0.916)    
IMPEDSEC(-1)   0.8221    
   (0.972)    
IMPEDSECSQ(-1)   -0.1743    
   (0.213)    
IMPING(-1)    -1.8516   
    (3.103)   
IMPINGSQ(-1)    0.6639   
    (1.027)   
IMPINGSEC(-1)    0.4175   
    (0.696)   
IMPINGSECSQ(-1)    -0.1439   
    (0.228)   
EXPED(-1)     -1.1744  
     (3.435)  
EXPEDSQ(-1)     0.0970  
     (0.771)  
EXPEDSEC(-1)     0.0086  
     (0.809)  
EXPEDSECSQ(-1)     0.0167  
     (0.180)  
EXPING(-1)      -0.4466 
      (2.277) 
EXPINGSQ(-1)      -0.1760 
      (0.590) 
EXPINGSEC(-1)      0.0933 
      (0.512) 
EXPINGSECSQ(-1)      0.0409 
      (0.133) 
GDP -0.4089 -0.4348* -0.3917 -0.3627 -0.3510 -0.3896 
 (0.273) (0.218) (0.334) (0.231) (0.292) (0.260) 
INFL 0.0030 0.0045 0.0032 0.0001 0.0042 0.0045 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
SERVICE 0.0008 -0.0830 0.1758 0.0796 0.0360 -0.1309 
 (0.226) (0.147) (0.247) (0.144) (0.157) (0.178) 
SEC -0.3705 0.0877 -0.3329 -0.1045 -0.3446 -0.3786 
 (0.475) (0.527) (0.380) (0.449) (0.403) (0.363) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.695 0.637 0.625 0.619 0.635 0.607 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 
F test 157.84*** 92.53*** 85.73*** 211.39*** 339.23*** 113.24*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Again we check the robustness of our results by estimating, through FE estimator, 
the interaction effect with the variable measuring tertiary education (Table 4 in the 
Appendix). In this case, we confirm, as before, that there are no significant results, with the 
exception of exports and imports to and from Developed Countries. This could indicate 
that a higher quality (rather than level) of education may have an important effect with 
respect to these trade flows. In particular, by finding significant and negative results when 
TIER is interacted with IMPED and EXPED we can say this variable contributes to 
decrease inequality in the short run. This may be due to the fact that being this resource 
less widespread among population39 it may actually contribute to increase inequality in the 
long run because there is a shortage of this resource, while, in the short run, it contributes 
to accelerate the adoption of the new technology due to specific skills needed. This shrinks 
the period of new technology adoption causing a decrease in inequality. 
Table 3.5.5 presents the results obtained using the LSDVC estimator: we first note 
the highly significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, confirming what found 
previously. The results obtained with the educational interaction term confirm the non 
linearity of the FDI-income inequality relationship, already stressed by the FE 
methodology. However, contrary to fixed effects estimations we find that all variables 
referring to FDI (FDI, FDISQ, FDISEC, FDISECSQ) are always significant at 1% 
confirming our expectations of non linearity of the relationship. The value of the marginal 
impact is -0.18, meaning that 1% increase in FDI may lead inequality to decrease by 0.18%, 
higher than what found in the static model. With the respect to the interaction terms, it 
seems that at first sight, higher education leads to higher inequality but this effect 
disappears when the squared term is considered. We explain this result by arguing that 
foreign penetration seems to exert a negative redistribution effect, although it is to remark 
that this increase in inequality is less consistent than the previous decrease following the 
implementation of FDI. With respect to trade flows, we find a highly significant coefficient 
for EXPING. While in the short run exports to Developing Countries decrease inequality, 
in the long run (EXPINGSQ) the relationship between the two variables becomes positive. 
Beyond the use of a different estimator, the interaction with SEC can bring out the indirect 
effects of education, and human capital in general, on export to Developing Countries. In 
the short run the production of low-medium technology goods to be exported may deepen 
the separation between skilled and unskilled labor through the channel of education 
                                                 
39 TIER has a mean of 38.87 % and standard deviation of 17.05 
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causing an increase in inequality because a higher amount of unskilled workers is needed. 
This effect can be followed by a decrease in the long run. The second interesting result 
matching the one highlighted before with respect to exports is relative to imports from 
Developing Countries: again, secondary education contributes first to increase and then 
decrease inequality. We have to note that by calculating the marginal effect of exports to 
Developing Countries, the value obtained is positive meaning that a 1% increase in exports 
leads GINI index to rise by 0.22%.The marginal effect is lower if calculated with respect to 
imports from Developing Countries which is equal to 0.19%. 
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Tab. 3.5.5 FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs through education, 1990-2006. LSDVC 
regressions. (Dependent variable: Gini index) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GINI(-1) 2.3008*** 1.3270 1.8349*** 1.9655*** 2.1058*** 2.1772*** 
 (0.003) (0.825) (0.022) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) 
FDI(-1) -14.1745***      
 (4.880)      
FDISQ(-1) 3.2783***      
 (1.154)      
FDISEC(-1) 3.0276***      
 (1.072)      
FDISECSQ(-1) -0.7133***      
 (0.253)      
TRADE(-1)  8.6483     
  (21.136)     
TRADESQ(-1)  -2.0716     
  (3.828)     
TRADESEC(-1)  -1.6949     
  (3.566)     
TRADESECSQ(-1)  0.4242     
  (0.743)     
IMPED(-1)   -10.2936    
   (6.741)    
IMPEDSQ(-1)   1.8523    
   (1.420)    
IMPEDSEC(-1)   1.9226    
   (1.311)    
IMPEDSECSQ(-1)   -0.3767    
   (0.295)    
IMPING(-1)    -16.4913***   
    (5.987)   
IMPINGSQ(-1)    5.3631***   
    (2.001)   
IMPINGSEC(-1)    3.6363***   
    (1.318)   
IMPINGSECSQ(-1)    -1.1779***   
    (0.439)   
EXPED(-1)     -9.2262  
     (6.879)  
EXPEDSQ(-1)     1.6520  
     (1.526)  
EXPEDSEC(-1)     2.1900  
     (1.500)  
EXPEDSECSQ(-1)     -0.3935  
     (0.337)  
EXPING(-1)      -15.2975*** 
      (4.757) 
EXPINGSQ(-1)      4.5880*** 
      (1.437) 
EXPINGSEC(-1)      3.3822*** 
      (1.072) 
EXPINGSECSQ(-1)      -1.0098*** 
      (0.322) 
GDP -0.5653 -0.4432 -0.8117 -0.3324 -0.3457 -0.4962 
 (0.560) (1.059) (0.516) (0.458) (0.512) (0.487) 
INFL -0.0262 -0.0027 -0.0075 -0.0198 -0.0321 -0.0452 
 (0.028) (0.067) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) 
SERVICE 2.7532*** 1.4005 1.4282*** 2.7853*** 2.1935*** 1.8957*** 
 (0.396) (1.351) (0.425) (0.342) (0.368) (0.406) 
SEC -0.6354 -0.0775 0.2660 -0.3809 -0.6360 -0.0318 
 (0.953) (1.896) (1.067) (1.015) (0.876) (0.883) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses (bias correction inizialized by Blundell-Bond estimator) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
106 
 
By running estimations with TIER we never find significant results except for the 
lagged dependent variable resulting always positive and significant. Estimates are available 
upon request. Furthermore, we need to note that, contrary to regressions with FE, we find 
the coefficients of  SERVICE to be almost always positive and strongly statistically 
significant, thus underlying the relevance of the service sector growth in rising inequality in 
TCs (Evans and Timberlake, 1980). The other variables are not all significant, even though 
they appear with the negative sign, confirming that higher inflation, GDP and education 
may lead to lower inequality. 
Table 5 in the Appendix reports the results relatively to the GMM estimations: in 
this case, while confirming the persistency of inequality, we find that variables displaying 
some effect on the Gini index are imports and exports from and to Developed Countries. 
In particular, EXPED shows a significant non-linear relationship with inequality index 
when interacted with SEC: it signals a positive correlation with income inequality in the 
short run and negative correlation in the long run. More importantly, SYS-GMM highlights 
the relevant equalizing role of education in the long run relatively to trade between TCs 
and Developed Countries. However, this effect is probably due to the endogeneity of some 
variables, such as SEC and GDP per capita that we are able to take into consideration 
through this estimation technique. Interestingly, we note that SEC in most of the 
specifications is positive and significant. As highlighted before, due to the weakness of the 
GMM estimators we need to interpret these results with cautions. 
3.6.     SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This chapter analyzes the results of a study on the openness-income inequality 
relationship with respect to a sample of 17 TCs over the period 1990-2006. We hypothesize 
that both FDI and trade might be significant determinants of income distribution within 
these countries, due to the increasing level of openness since 1989. The collapse of the 
socialist system led to a deep structural transformation of TCs, mainly based on 
privatization and liberalization; we add variables that could embody the potential 
distortions following such a radical change. Both stationary (FE estimator) and dynamic 
models (LSDVC estimator) are used. Our results partially match our theoretical 
expectations. As in the case of Bhandari (2007), Barlow et al. (2009) and Grimalda et al. 
(2010) FDI does not seem to be relevant in affecting income inequality in TCs when 
considered as single variable. We observe the same for the trade variable. For this reason 
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we try to dig deeper into the analysis by disaggregating trade in imports and exports, and by 
specifying the origin and destination of each flow. Both imports and exports lead to 
significant results, but they put into evidence different capacity of affecting inequality.  
Imports from Developed Countries emerge as the most significant flows; they are 
positively correlated with income inequality in the short run, and negatively in the long run. 
In a way Grimalda et al. (2010) report similar results, showing that imports from EU have a 
positive and relevant impact on the Gini index, at least in the case of the New Member 
States. A potential explanation is connected with the benefits spreading from Developed 
Countries due to the technological differential embodied in goods which enter TCs and 
raise the demand of skilled workers. Thus, if the initial increase in inequality may be traced 
back to the time needed to local firms to upgrade, later on new technological knowledge 
spreads through the imitation process, and inequality decreases.  
We test also the role of education, which is supposed to be crucial in countries 
characterized by a deep economic, social and institutional transformation. As TCs occupy a 
middle position between Developed and Developing Countries with respect to 
technological capabilities, their absorptive capacity is quite high and education alone does 
not contribute to create high differentials between skilled and unskilled workers; thus it is 
not among the main causes of within inequality. Nonetheless we find that this variable 
might channel and contribute to spread over trade benefits, especially in the case of exports 
to and imports from Developing Countries, over the long run. Contrariwise, in the short 
run an increasing inequality trend seems to appear. This result, however, seems to be 
sensitive to the way we measure the education system, as some opposite results seem to 
emerge when we consider the tertiary education; in this case the variable reduces inequality 
when interacted with openness variables. 
We can identify some limitations of the study that may be interesting avenues for 
further research. Firstly, even though we are able to investigate the disentangling of trade 
flows we are not able to distinguish FDI according to its different motivations. Indeed, 
asset seeking or asset exploiting FDI may actually cause a different effect on inequality. 
Furthermore, as we differentiate between secondary and tertiary school enrollment finding 
partially different results for interaction variables, further research could account for more 
precise measures of this variable seeing whether results change. Indeed, our results show 
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that the quality of policies aimed at improving and increasing the number of recipients of 
the educational system certainly plays a significant role. 
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Chapter 4 
Foreign Direct Investment 
and Firm Survival in 
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Foreign Direct Investment and Firm 
Survival in Transition Countries 
 
4.1.    INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1   Entry, exit and survival of firms 
The aim of this section is to consider TCs international openness from the 
standpoint of local entrepreneurship growth and development. The demographic trend of a 
country firm population may be a valid indicator of economic growth of that country, 
measured both in terms of production and entrepreneurship dynamism. Especially in TCs 
this kind of analysis allows to consider and weigh the changes that have occurred since the 
Transition to the market economy has started; as underlined in the previous chapters 
planned economies are characterized by very large firms, and the private initiative is poorly 
promoted, when not hampered. Firms and entrepreneurs, as well as governments and 
policies aiming at creating a more favorable environment for restructuring - and somehow 
reconstruction – are all important actors of this process, and so must be taken into 
consideration. We can distinguish two mechanisms behind this path. First a relocation of 
resources occurs through the movement of labor and capital to more productive firms. 
These firms are also more capable to adapt to the new higher level of market demand. One 
of the effects is the reduction or even the exit of those plants whose supply is higher than 
the existing demand. The second mechanism is related to the restructuring of existing firms 
leading to a renewal of the business environment; State owned enterprises (SOEs) in low 
competitive sectors are the most affected by these policies (EBRD Transition Report 
1999).  
Liberalization and privatization reforms launched during the Nineties have strongly 
favored the above-mentioned mechanisms and promoted the private initiative as well as 
the creation of new firms. New firms, not only in TCs, represent the most important 
driving force for employment, productivity growth and the introduction of innovations. 
However the entry of new firms and the exit of old scarcely competitive ones are strongly 
connected, although these devices occur differently between TCs. Data from the “Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey” within the “Transition Report 1999” 
 
111 
 
(EBRD, 1999) show that Poland, Hungary and Estonia have the highest ratio between the 
entrepreneurship increase and the state sector dismantling, among all TCs. At the bottom 
of the ranking we can find Azerbaijan, the Slovak Republic and Belarus. The uneven 
distribution of services (whenever they are available) aiming at supporting firm creation and 
growth, the lack or weakness of proper fiscal and legal systems, the lack of credit channels, 
the high level of corruption, the large share of the economic system occupied by the 
informal sector; these are among the main factors that may hamper the development of a 
strong and dynamic business environment in TCs (Aidis, 2005). If we look at the normal 
bureaucratic procedures required to launch a business activity we can see that the way is 
very long and full of obstacles, which discourage new potential entrepreneurs. The 
following figures show the average cost of business start up, measured as percentage of 
GNI. The graphs compare data related to TCs and the European Union-27 (EU27)40. 
Unfortunately, graphs refer only to the period 2003-2007 since previous data are not 
available.  
In Fig.1 we see that starts up costs in TCs are prominently higher than in the EU, 
even though they steady decline. In Fig.1.2 data are disaggregated by groups of countries41; 
the Baltics have the lowest costs, but still increasing; they are followed respectively by the 
EU27, CEE, CIS and SEE. It might be better to consider this indicator together with other 
macroeconomic and institutional indices; nonetheless a first glance can reveal that the level 
of start up costs is in line with the entry flows of firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 TCs (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia; Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia) are excluded from the UE-27.  
41 Baltics: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; CEE: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic; CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, the 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; SEE: Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. 
 
112 
 
Fig. 1.1  
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Fig. 1.3 and 1.4 show the trend in firms’ entry rate in TCs. In 2000 the entry rate of 
the EU27 firms is on average about two percentage points higher than the entry rate in 
TCs. Up to 2004 the two areas are characterized by similar trends; since that year the curve 
related to TCs rises consistently, and in 2006 overcomes the EU27 one. This change might 
be due to the accession of some TCs to the EU42; although the graphs do not make any 
distinction between domestic and foreign firms it is very likely that the number of foreign 
firms has significantly increased after the EU enlargement, especially in the CEE, and so 
the number of new business registered. More important, the integration has pushed these 
countries towards a renewal of business legislation and an improvement of support services 
for new firms. Fig. 1.4 introduces the distinction between groups of countries. The general 
trend is increasing; while the SEE shows the lowest entry rates, the Baltic Republics come 
out given their increasing number of new businesses. Data on the CIS are rather 
interesting; at the beginning the percentages seem to be higher than the ones reported by 
the other TCs. It is possible to give different explanations for such a trend. On the one 
hand from a pure statistical standpoint, data on Russian Federation might contribute to 
raise the group average; on the other hand both the massive privatization of the Nineties 
and the scarce attention given to the II type reforms (Svejnar, 2002)43 have encouraged the 
steady influence of State on economy (Estrin, 2002). For this reason, although no 
information on registered business ownership is available it is desirable to consider that still 
many firms might be state owned. Finally, even in Fig. 1.4 year 2006 seems to be relevant 
both for the CEE and SEE, confirming our previous assumption about the EU 
enlargement in 2004 and 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 In 2004 the three Baltic Republics, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia enter the 
EU; in 2007 it is the turn of Bulgaria and Romania. 
43 While the I type reforms deal with radical macroeconomic changes and the dismantling of communist 
institutions, the II type reforms are based on the development of a legal apparatus and the creation of new 
institutions.  
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Fig. 1.3 
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Entry rates do not represent the only significant indicators of business system 
dynamism within a country; it is sometimes worth to know, if possible, the exit rates as well 
as the survival likelihood of firms, which is also the aim of this section. Survival analysis by 
statistical non parametric methods, allows running a more exhaustive study about 
conditions which favor firms’ length on the market. Since the beginning new firms enter a 
“learning” process (the firm learning model) through which they acquire awareness of their 
productive capacity and consequently decide whether to go on or leave the market 
(Jovanovic, 1982). In this model entrepreneurship consciousness, and future expectations, 
matter. Both firm (i.e. size, age, productivity, ownership, number of subsidiaries) and 
market specific features (i.e. growth rate, concentration index, Minimum Efficient Scale-
MES44) affect the survival time. High entry rates do not necessarily correspond to a good 
functioning of the market, given that new firms are more likely to exit than existing ones 
(Mata and Portugal, 1994). Likewise too low exit rates are often synonymous of immobility 
and weak competitiveness. All these things considered, survival analysis especially in the 
case of TCs allows bringing out weaknesses and strengths of the productive system and the 
ability of firms to last on market. A dynamic industry must be characterized by a regular 
replacement of old firms by new ones; more important, an industry in which the most 
efficient firms survive longer represents a good starting point for a stable economic 
development. 
4.1.2. FDI and firm survival  
Recently, greater attention has been given to the role played by foreign companies 
in affecting survival of host countries’ firms. As previous chapters report, FDI has become 
such a relevant phenomenon in TCs that all possible related consequences must be taken 
into consideration within a local development analysis. FDI always implies the 
establishment of a relationship between the home country on the one side, and the host 
country on the other side. The intensity of this relationship changes according to the type 
of FDI (merger, acquisition, joint venture, greenfield), but also to the absorbing capacity of 
host country’s domestic firms and the legislative system which regulates foreign 
penetration. Whether foreign companies’ presence is good or bad for the stable length of 
domestic firms on market is far from being clear. Mechanisms triggered by FDI are so 
complex and interrelated that a deep analysis focused on geographical specificity is 
                                                 
44 MES can be seen as the estimate of the production scale beyond which costs become constant, further 
scale economies being negligible.   
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required. We can presume that foreign companies which generally have a higher 
technological level production may induce host countries’ firms to improve their 
performance, and so last longer; contrariwise, we can also think that the more productive 
and competitive foreign companies are, the more they may displace host countries’ firms 
from the local market. Which is the prevailing effect? Is there any other hidden mechanism 
which determines domestic firm survival? In this section I try to address the issue of the 
relationship between FDI and domestic firm survival in TCs, focusing on two countries 
which had different Transition paths: the Czech Republic and Estonia. The empirical 
analysis will bring out different results for the two cases, and show that foreign presence 
may imply different consequences.  
4.2.  THE LITERATURE 
4.2.1. Firm survival determinants  
Before moving on to the more specific literature on FDI and firms demographic 
trend in TCs, it is worthy to touch on the several contributions on general survival analysis. 
In most studies a significant attention has been paid to firm specific features, firstly size 
and age. As for size, measured by the number of employees or sales, firm survival is 
generally associated with the study of firm growth, thus many works - especially the early 
ones – analyze both the phenomena. One of the first attempts to deal with the topic 
concerned dates back to the work by Gibrat (1931). According to the so-called “Law of 
Gibrat” or “Law of Proportionate Effects” size and growth are independent. This law is 
supposed to hold when one of the following three conditions occurs: when firms leaving 
the industry are counted, when the same firms are excluded, and finally when only firms 
exceeding MES are considered.  Nonetheless subsequent empirical researches take into 
account problems of sample selection, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in growth 
rates, thus revealing a negative relationship between size and growth. Mansfield (1962) 
finds no evidence of the Gibrat’s law in any of its versions; contrariwise the author 
concludes that on the one hand small firms take a higher risk of failure than large ones; on 
the other hand those ones which survive show higher growth rates than large firms.  
Afterwards Evans (1987) extends the analysis to firm age, observing young 
companies and old companies at different times. In both cases the Gibrat’s law is rejected 
and furthermore survival probability increases with age, except for very old firms. Age 
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takes the same relevance also in Dunne and Hughes (1994)’s paper. The empirical analysis 
on 2000 quoted and unquoted companies in UK shows evidence of an inverted U-shaped 
size-failure relationship, which means that very small firms face a higher risk of exit than 
very large firms; medium companies are likewise more volatile than the other two 
categories. Growth and survival probability are linked through time and it seems that low 
growth rates of small and medium plants may increase their risk of failure in the following 
period. A further specification underlines the importance of start up size, so that new 
entrants experience better survival probability if they are large (Mata and Portugal, 1994). 
These findings on age-survival relationship broadly confirm the previous empirical results 
of Jovanovic (1982). As already mentioned the merit of this study is related to the “firm 
learning model”, which predicts that survival probability is a function of the efficiency 
level, and that an auto selection process takes place. Jovanovic predicts that those 
successful new entrants raise the awareness about their efficiency, and so contribute to 
experience high growth rates. On the contrary, those new establishments which are not 
efficient in the initial period of their lifecycle do not grow and may eventually decide to exit 
the market.  
In addition some authors analyze the role of innovation relatively to survival 
likelihood. This branch of literature supports the idea that the more innovative firms are, 
the longer they survive especially when small size is considered (Audretsch, 1991). 
Nonetheless Agarwall (1998) underlines that the relationship between size, age and 
technological activity is not monotonic. The first period of all new entrants lifecycle is 
supposed to be characterized by high exit hazard rates (Jovanovic, 1982). Nonetheless after 
this lapse the risk of failure changes according to the sector observed: it remains almost 
steady in low technological sectors, whereas it decreases first and increases only with the 
ninth year of firm lifecycle in high technological sectors. An interesting contribution comes 
finally from Cefis and Marsili (2006), whose study brings out that the effect of innovation 
on survival rates - the innovation premium – is stronger in young classes of firms, since 
young and large enterprises usually come from existing firms, whereas young firms that 
have just entered the market, are usually de novo. In this latter case innovation as the 
driving force of development and growth, acts in a more incisive way. 
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4.2.2. FDI and firm survival  
The key to understanding the impact of FDI on firms’ survival is to identify the 
distortions introduced within the economic system. Literature so far has distinguished 
different channels through which FDI can affect host countries’ entrepreneurship. In the 
theoretical model by Grossman (1984) both imports and FDI negatively affect the 
entrepreneurial system of a Less Developed Country (LDC) with only two sectors, the 
“traditional” agricultural one and the “modern” industrial one. On the one hand imports 
decrease wage incomes and, to a greater extent entrepreneurial profits; on the other hand 
FDI leads to a shift of a part of the entrepreneurial class to foreign firms, becoming new 
laborers. The result is an overall contraction of the domestic entrepreneurship in the LDC 
concerned.  
While Grossman’s predictions are fairly negative, Markusen and Venables (1999) 
outline different dynamics within host countries economies, as a consequence of FDI. Two 
processes are detected, that will be discussed in detail in Section 3: the competition effect 
resulting in domestic firms’ displacement (negative effect), and a vertical linkage effect which 
may increase the overall industry demand (positive effect). FDI is thus seen as “catalysts” 
for host countries industrial system through backward and forward linkages that are 
established between multinational and local firms. The model by Markusen and Venables 
(1999), unlike most of the literature so far, reveals the important role of linkages 
(Hirschmann, 1958; Kugler, 2006; Lin and Saggi, 2004; Rodríguez-Clare, 1996; Roy and 
Viaene, 1998). In the case of “horizontal linkages”, they are established within the same 
industry, but a few works have found evidence of their effect (Ayyagari and Kosová, 2010). 
Previously more attention had been give to productivity spillovers (Caves, 1971, 1974; 
Blomstrom et al, 1974; Blomstrom and Persson, 1983; Globerman, 1979) They refer to 
technological externalities and allow the transfer and acquisition of knowledge and 
intangible assets from company to company, thus contributing eventually to the increase of 
price-costs margins and, consequently may positively influence firm survival likelihood 
(Audretsch, 1991).  
In De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003)’s research on Belgium for instance, the 
competition effect generally overwhelms, and imports and FDI lead to local firms crowd 
out. Nonetheless the empirical evidence shows that the exit rate of domestic firms is lower 
in those industries with high concentration of foreign companies, suggesting that learning, 
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demonstration, networking and linkages effects may in the long run weaken competition 
negative impacts of internationalization. Görg and Strobl (2003) find evidence of spillovers 
in their analysis regarding the Irish industrial system. They point out that MNEs’ presence 
has positive effects on survival likelihood of the indigenous high technology sector firms. 
These industries are characterized by an intensive concentration of foreign 
investors, whereas domestic establishments basically belong to traditional sectors. Thus 
spillovers may occur between foreign and domestic firms, and improve the productive 
performance of the latter ones. Contrariwise there is no significant impact on domestic 
plants in the low technology industry, which could be explained by the poor absorptive 
capacity of Irish firms and their incapability of catching spillovers (Audretsch, 1991). These 
results are also in line with those found in Girma and Görg (2003)’s paper on the foreign 
acquisition impact on almost 400 UK firms in food and electronics industry. The analysis is 
based on a matching approach according to which a group of acquired plants is compared 
to another group with similar specific features composed of wholly domestic owned plants 
(the counterfactual). Foreign takeover causes a decrease of survival likelihood of acquired 
firms in both sectors observed, and a diminishing growth of unskilled employment in the 
electronics industry. However, both effects (productivity spillovers and linkages) may be 
vehicles of overall economic development and lead to “demand creation” (Ayyagari and 
Kosová, 2010) within the host countries’ market.  
In a further paper by Görg and Strobl (2004), which refers to previous analysis on 
the Irish industry (Görg and Strobl, 2003) productive spillovers and vertical linkages, are 
studied together. The authors control for both technological and pecuniary externalities on 
domestic plants development, in terms of entry, survival and growth. In addition to the 
competition effect and externalities a further effect has been identified which relates to the 
transfer of capital amount entering the host economy. If we account FDI as a MNE entry, 
or a transfer of capital input, capital endowment in the recipient industry rises; it lowers the 
average costs of production and improves the productive efficiency of the same sector. 
According to Barrios, Görg and Strobl (2005) the relationship between the net entry rate of 
domestic firms and the presence of foreign plants should follow a U-shaped curve, outlined 
by the fact that increasing capital endowment and vertical linkages take effect positively 
only in a later time; at the beginning the competition effect seems overwhelming. However 
it should be noticed that one of the initial assumptions is that FDI is not export-oriented; 
otherwise the effect on the net entry rate would be even larger. Moreover the competition 
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may be stronger than spillover and linkages effects in dynamic industries where new firms 
are fairly innovative, but weaker in static industries where imitation prevails (Burke, Görg 
and Hanley, 2007). 
4.2.3. FDI and firm survival in Transition Countries  
Literature on FDI-firm survival relationship in TCs is not extremely wide. A few 
works have a general approach and mostly control for those characteristics which are 
usually identified as the main determinants of survival. Konings and Xavier (2002) study 
the growth and survival of Slovenian firms over four years, from 1994 to 1998, confirming 
the positive effect of size on the probability of surviving. Studená (2004) underlines the 
importance of considering the Transition characteristics within the analysis of demographic 
dynamics. In her paper on the Slovak industry over the period 1993-1996 State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) are the most likely to drop out, due to the process of privatization and 
restructuring occurring in TCs since the beginning of the Nineties. More importantly, the 
authoress distinguishes between small and large firms and shows that in the first category 
the probability of survival increases with size, whereas the opposite occurs in the second 
group. These apparently unexpected results are related to the fact that most of small firms 
in the sample are new privatized plants and prove to be more competitive than large 
enterprises, which are still behind in the process of privatization.  
A more complex analysis is presented by Kejžar (2010). The aim of the paper is to 
assess whether the mechanisms triggered by foreign presence – namely competition effects, 
productivity spillovers, the establishment of vertical and horizontal linkages – occur and 
affect Slovenian manufacturing firms’ exit rate between 1994 and 2004. By using an 
instrumental variables probit model in order to account the potential endogeneity of FDI, 
regressions bring out that foreign firms’ presence fosters a sort of selection process within 
the domestic industrial population. While a crowding out effect is detected only for the 
least efficient firms, the probability of exiting decreases with skill intensity, measured by the 
average wage; this means that skilled intensive and efficient plants eventually are able to 
catch positive spillovers from foreign enterprises, which enables them to stay longer in the 
market. As for spillovers channeled through the linkages between domestic and foreign 
firms, empirical evidence suggests that the probability of exiting is positively correlated 
with forward linkages and negatively with backward linkages. No evidence is found for 
horizontal spillover effects. With regard to this last aspect Ayygari and Kosová (2010) come 
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to different conclusions; in a panel with more than 200 Czech firms they find evidence of 
the significant role of both horizontal and vertical spillovers, especially in the service sector 
rather than the manufacturing one. It is noteworthy that the dependent variable, unlike the 
previous paper, is now the entry rate of domestic firms, so FDI are found to be an 
incentive for local entrepreneurship. Nonetheless the results vary according to the industry 
concerned; intra-industry positive spillovers from FDI occur only in uncompetitive 
industries. 
4.3. THE MULTIPLE EFFECTS OF FDI  
Which mechanisms arise from FDI in the recipient economy? What occurs when 
MNEs enter a foreign country? The already mentioned model by Markusen and Venables 
(1999) can be seen as a good reference point in order to delve deeper into the consequent 
dynamics of foreign companies’ penetration. Therefore it might be useful to resume the 
baseline of it. The two authors use a one country model with two imperfect competitive 
industries of intermediates and consumption goods, respectively; in both cases we have 
increasing returns to scale. They assume that final products may be furnished by 
multinational, foreign or domestic firms, whereas intermediate goods can be produced 
exclusively by local plants. Within this framework MNEs and domestic firms are linked by 
input-output connections since the former ones may source from the latter ones. The entry of 
MNEs in the final goods industry causes a competition effect, through the decrease of the 
relative price index and profits. Given that domestic plants have generally lower 
productivity levels than entrant MNEs, and they serve only the domestic market, their sales 
will be reduced and their average costs will rise (Aitken and Harrison, 1999); the result is a 
displacement of local firms. This negative impact is balanced by the establishment of vertical 
linkages, both across downstream (backward) and upstream (forward) industries. First, 
MNEs drive up the demand of intermediates through backward linkages, so pushing down 
production costs and final prices; in turn also the production of domestic firms in the 
upstream industries is stimulated, through forward linkages. The contrast between these 
different forces and the prevalence of either two, determine the extent to which domestic 
firms stay in or exit the market. Nonetheless beyond FDI direct effects further processes 
must be accounted. The so called indirect competition occurs when the displacement of 
domestic plants is obviously followed by a decrease of the relative demand of intermediates 
(Markusen and Venables, 1999). If we do not exclusively focus on the survival (or exit) of 
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domestic firms, according to Markusen and Venables’ model FDI can be seen as catalyst 
for the local economic system development, thanks to the “cumulative causation” between 
domestic final goods and intermediates industry which is triggered by vertical linkages. On 
the other hand, by taking a closer glance at the survival issue the two authors argue that the 
coexistence between MNEs and domestic firms is not likely to occur and it might be 
restricted to specific conditions, such as a higher level of similarity in efficiency.  
In Fig. 3.1.a and 3.1.b an overview of connections between firms and consequent 
effects of MNEs’ entry with their correspondent sign, has been reported. Following the 
steps illustrated, some considerations have to be made in order to evaluate the overall 
impact on domestic business population. The first point concerns the intensity of the use of 
intermediates by MNEs. We can presume that the positive effects through backward linkages 
established with domestic firms are weaker if MNEs’ demand for intermediates is not so 
high, i.e. lower than the one of domestic plants in the same industry (final good industry). 
In this case both direct and indirect competition effects may prevail; the opposite situation 
is expected when MNEs use predominantly local intermediates.  
Fig.3.1.a 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Fig.3.1.b 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
A further important issue regards the difference in productive efficiency and the degree of 
products between the goods sold by entrants and those by local existing plants. The 
competition effect will be relevant if the efficiency gap is high and the degree of goods 
differentiation is low, so that goods are nearly perfect substitutes. Markusen and Venables 
(1999) also consider the situation when a complete crowding out of domestic firms occurs; in this 
case there is no net effect on intermediates (resulting in the difference between the 
backward linkages effect and the indirect competition effect) industry and only a positive 
impact through backward linkages is registered. What the model reviewed so far does not 
take into account, is the presence of MNEs also in the intermediate goods industry, as noted in 
Altomonte and Resmini (2002)’s paper. When this more realistic assumption is allowed, 
connections between MNEs and domestic firms turn out to be more complex and 
ambiguous. We can simplify the background by following the process step by step.  
a. The entry of MNEs in the final goods industry is still supposed to trigger 
positive effects through backward linkages, so that the demand for downstream 
firms increases.  
b. Unlike in the previous scenario, now the competition effect may be the cause of 
domestic firms’ displacement both in consumption and intermediate goods 
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industry. Overall supply of intermediates increases and leads to a reduction of 
the relative price index and profits; the less competitive firms exit the market.  
c. Nonetheless, upstream firms can take advantage of the increasing supply of 
intermediates industry through the establishment of forward linkages. It is 
plausible thinking that MNEs are able to better exploit this self-reinforcing 
mechanism rather than domestic firms do.  
It would seem that the potential positive force of vertical linkages may be biased toward 
MNEs development in the host country, and while their number is expected to increase 
both in downstream and upstream industries domestic firms’ survival is menaced.  
Again the role of entrant MNEs should be observed in detail, which is not always 
easy or possible through empirical analysis. Most important, as mentioned above, if MNEs 
in the consumption industry use intensively local intermediates, the competition effect may 
be mitigated by stronger and influent backward linkages. Whether FDI is catalyst of the 
development of the local business environment in host countries, as in Markusen and 
Venables’ (1999) model, or rather an obstacle merely managing to foster MNEs settlement, 
it might depend on country specificity; this is particularly important when the host 
economy is a Developing Country. In this regard the absorptive capacity of firms in the 
recipient country may matter considerably, especially when accounting for MNEs also in 
the intermediates industries. In fact, local firms which are able to catch technological 
spillovers across industries and within the same one, might easily face foreign 
competition45. In addition, it should be considered that in the long run the higher 
productive efficiency (than before) of domestic firms together with their lower costs could 
displace - or at least reduce - foreign presence in downstream industries.  The next sections 
try to deal with the issue of MNEs’ presence and domestic firms’ survival by focusing on 
two TCs which reveal a different reaction to foreign firms’ penetration.   
 
 
                                                 
45 Lin and Saggi (2005) delve into the establishment of a Vertical Technological Transfer from MNEs and 
their local suppliers in the host countries. With the support of a theoretical model based on oligopolistic 
competition they argue that demand creation through vertical linkages offsets competition if the technological 
gap between MNEs and domestic firms in the consumption goods industries is not very large.  
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4.4. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.4.1. Data  
Data on Czech Republic and Estonia are taken from Amadeus database provided 
by Bureau Van Dijk. This database collects financial and more general information on over 
15 million European companies and it is one of the best international sources for TCs, 
when national databases are not directly consultable. Different versions of Amadeus 
referring to six different years – from 2004 to 2009, the two both included - have been 
used. Since it is a historical database every yearly version contains information that date 
back to about ten years before, the last versions providing certainly more data than the 
ones from the Nineties. Nonetheless we need all six, in order to check the exit time of 
firms and then estimate their survival likelihood. For this purpose the last years with 
available data from each survey have been merged, thus allowing knowing the moment 
when firms exit. The criterion of identification of exiting firms has been based first on the 
Bureau Van Dijk code applied to every company entering the survey: if a code which is 
included in one version of the database does not appear in the version related to the 
following year, it means that the firm has exited. Secondly, the current activity status, i.e. 
active/inactive46, has also been considered as further check. For both countries the period 
covered ranges from 2003 to 2008. The samples include very large, large and small firms, 
both domestic and foreign47, thus leaving out only those ones with less than 15 employees, 
according to Amadeus definition. Given that generally small and very small firms may lack 
of constancy and accuracy concerning business information transfer, they have not been 
finally considered in the analysis. In addition, the range between very large and medium 
classes represents already a good indicator of size heterogeneity in the country business 
environment. The initial samples have been reduced, due to the presence of many missing 
values related to crucial variables. First, those firms with no name and date of 
incorporation reported have been dropped out of both samples. In addition, since the 
logarithm of all variables is taken, firms younger than one year old have neither been 
considered, in order to avoid too many missing values. The empirical evidence refers to 
manufacturing and services sectors, according to the 3-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 classification.  
                                                 
46 Firms in liquidation, in bankruptcy, dissolved, merged or demerged are all considered inactive.  
47 Foreign firms are those whose Ultimate Owner (UO) is not Czech (in the case of the Czech Republic) or 
Estonian (in the case of Estonia). The default definition of UO as a shareholder with 25% or more of the 
ownership has been kept.  
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4.4.2. The econometric approach            
The aim of the current study is to catch the effects of FDI on domestic plants 
survival in the concerned countries. In order to get a first outlook of survival, a Kaplan-
Meier function has been processed. This is a method based on maximum likelihood, and 
since it is non-parametric it does not require any assumption on the shape of the function 
analyzed. The Kaplan-Meier approach is based on the progressive product of survival 
probabilities related to every single observation in the sample. The survival likelihood 
obtained is constant in the lapses between two events (e.g. the exit of a firm). 
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where )(ˆ tS  is the estimated survivor function at time t, jd  is the number of subjects who 
experience the event at time jt  and jn  is the number of subjects who are still at risk of 
experiencing the event. 
tt j
  refers to the geometric sum of all cases occurring before, or at 
time t. Graphically, the Kaplan-Meier specification results in a step function according to 
which changes in values correspond to the onset of the event observed.  
Nonetheless firm survival analysis requires a closer examination that cannot be 
totally provided by the Kaplan-Meier approach. We fulfill this task by implementing the 
Cox proportional hazard model which, following most of recent studies dealing with this 
same topic (e.g. Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Burke, Görg and Hanley, 2008; Görg and 
Strobl, 2003; Mata and Portugal, 1994), seems to be the most suitable econometric 
approach. The Cox model is based on partial likelihood estimation which is in turn focused 
on events sequence, rather than on each individual spell like in maximum likelihood (Cox, 
1972). Consider our sample as a random sequence of spells, both censored and complete, 
and consider the risk that a specific event occurs - in our case the exit of a domestic firm. 
The presence of censored data48 is one of the main problematic issues of survival analysis; 
nonetheless it can be easily tackled by the Cox model, rather than other methods based on 
maximum likelihood estimation (e.g. logit and probit). 
                                                 
48 On the right side when the event at issue has not yet occurred at the time of observation, on the left side 
when the risk period leading to the event has started before the beginning of the observation time. 
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The hazard function (or rate) h(t) is given by 
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The numerator is the probability that the failure event occurs in a given interval and it is 
conditional to the survival of the subjects – i.e. domestic firms – up to that moment. The 
denominator is the length of the time range considered. The ratio can be rewrite in the 
following terms 
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Where f(t) is the probability density function and S(t) is the survival function. In the Cox 
model the hazard rate of the j-th subject becomes 
)exp()()|( 0 xjj xthxth   
(8) 
where )(0 th is the baseline hazard, jx are the covariates which are supposed to affect the 
failure probability and x  are the parameters. The exponential function (exp) has been 
chosen in order to avoid negative values of the hazard rate; nonetheless it could be 
replaced by any other different function. The use of a function is related to the feature of 
proportionality of this model, meaning that the hazard is multiplicatively proportional to 
the baseline (Cleves et al., 2008). That is allowing handling the fact that the probability of 
failure may vary over time. In this case in fact we should not check for the unconditional 
probability according to which the hazard rate is linked to a specific moment and its past 
specifications do not influence its current value. Contrariwise, we must refer to the fact that 
the probability in every point in time depends on its previous values (Kiefer, 1988). In the 
present analysis, for instance, firms’ exit-time potential relationship is thus taken into 
account. The first advantage of using the Cox proportional hazard model concerns the 
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absence of a specific parameterization (as in the case of the Kaplan-Meier function 
introduced above) of the baseline hazard function, and this reduces the risk of wrong 
assumptions about its shape that could in turn lead to strongly biased estimates. For this 
reason no intercept is estimated through this model, since the intercept is included in the 
baseline hazard.  
4.4.3. The econometric model 
As already argued, consequences on local business environment strongly depend on 
the way in which relationships between MNEs and domestic firms are established. This 
issue also relies on the functioning of these linkages and eventually on the length of foreign 
firms’ permanence on the territory of the host country. Given the changing and transitional 
nature of foreign penetration in TCs it is quite hard to venture hypothesis on final results. 
The concerning literature does not either give a clear cut off, some studies finding a 
positive impact on domestic survival thanks to technological spillovers spreading through 
vertical linkages (Djankov and Hoekman, 1999; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004), whereas some 
others point out a negative impact (Konings, 2001; Stančík, 2009). More important, a few 
analyses put on evidence the specificity of TCs and their diverse transition paths, by 
showing heterogeneous results for different countries (Damijan et al., 2003a, 2003b).  
On the main purpose of catching FDI effects on domestic firms’ survival three 
measures of foreign presence in the host economy have been computed: intra-industry 
foreign penetration (INTRA) and foreign penetration through backward (BACKWARD) 
and forward linkages (FORWARD), respectively. Intra-industry foreign penetration index 
is given by the share employment of foreign firms at time t, in industry j. The other two 
indices have been calculated starting from the vertical linkages coefficients, and by using 
the input-output (IO) tables available on the OECD website, which provide a matrix of 
sales and purchases of intermediates across industries within the economic system of a 
country49. The backward linkages index is defined as the share of intermediate purchases of 
industry j from the other i-industries on total output of industry j; symmetrically, the 
                                                 
49 IO tables are available every five years; tables of the Czech Republic and Estonia used in the current 
analysis refer to year 2005. In order to reduce the potential distortion, vertical linkages measures have been 
interacted with the time variable (years). In addition, since the aim is to focus only on foreign-domestic firms 
linkages imports, output produced for exports and final consumption have not been considered in the 
computation of the vertical linkages indices (Ayyagari and Kosová, 2010). Although both data from Amadeus 
and IO tables use the NACE Rev. 1.1. classification, they are based on 3-digit and 2-digit codes, respectively. 
In order to obtain a better comparability and reduce the risk of neglecting important effects backward and 
forward linkages have been weighted by the size of industry at 3-digit level. 
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forward linkages index represents the share of sales of industry j to the other i-industries on 
total demand of industry j50. Intermediates which are provided by industry j itself, as well as 
those remaining within it, have been excluded from the computation since they are part of 
intra-industry linkages. The final covariates included into the model (BACKWARD and 
FORWARD) are two interaction variables between these latest indices and INTRA.  
The other explanatory variables included in the empirical model are both firm (age, 
size and productivity) and industry specific (MES, the Herfindahl index). Age (AGE) is 
computed as the difference between the current year t and the year referring to the date of 
incorporation51; size (SIZE) is defined in terms of number of employees at time t. Given 
the previous literature related to the Law of Gibrat and most of the recent empirical 
evidence on firm survival (e.g. Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Evans, 1987; Mansfield, 1962; 
Mata and Portugal, 1994), these two characteristics are expected to be negatively related to 
the hazard rate, i.e. the probability of failure. Nonetheless an opposite result might emerge 
in regard to AGE, as many old SOEs have been replaced or just exited since the beginning 
of transition. Productivity (PRODUCTIVITY) is measured as the share of sales per 
employee at time t, and it is also supposed to show a negative coefficient, as more 
productive firms, which have on average higher growth rates, should be able to better deal 
with competition. On the other hand, competition within the most productive industries 
may result in higher exit rates of those same plants; in this case the analysis would require a 
further deeper test at industry level.  
In order to check the relevance of the market on firm survival, Minimum Efficieny 
Scale (MES) and the Herfindahl index (HCI) have been computed, at 3-digit NACE Rev. 
1.1. industry level. MES is the estimate of the production scale beyond which costs become 
constant, further scale economies being negligible. Two interpretations of MES leading to 
different expected results can be found in literature, and they are both well illustrated in 
two studies by Audretsch. In a first work (Audretsch, 1991) the author identifies a positive 
relationship between MES and price-cost margins, so that the higher the MES, the higher 
is the probability of firm survival. In a later paper Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), argue 
that the value of MES allows detecting firms’ costs disadvantage which depend on the gap 
between the output level of firms and the minimum efficient scale. Higher costs 
                                                 
50 Total demand is given by the sum of final demand (share of output for consumption, public expenditure 
and exportations) and the share of sales of industry i to the other j-industries.  
51 Since the natural logarithm of all variables has been considered, observations with age=0 have been 
dropped, in order to avoid too missing values and biased estimates (Kejžar, 2010).   
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disadvantage will correspond to higher values of MES, and eventually to lower firm 
survival likelihood. In our model this variable is computed as the median sales size in 
industry j at year t. The Herfindahl index is a concentration index which catches the degree 
of competition within industries, and it is measured as the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of all firms in industry j at year t. The empirical evidence related to this index 
follows the ambiguity discussed in the case of MES. Higher concentration might be seen as 
high price-costs margins – with a consequent positive effect on survival - or simply as 
increasing competition pushing less competitive firms out of the market. Nonetheless it 
often shows a non significant coefficient (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Girma and Görg, 2003; 
Kejžar, 2010). All variables are expressed in logarithmic form. By widening the analysis to 
vertical linkages and following Markusen and Venables (1999)’s reasoning, it is now more 
conceivable to advance the two simple hypotheses which will be tested hereinafter.  
Hypothesis 1: FDI impact on domestic firms’ survival through vertical inter-
industries linkages is more relevant than the one occurring through horizontal intra-
industry linkages. It is very likely that MNEs, especially at the beginning of FDI flows, 
establish connections with upstream or downstream industries rather than within the same 
industry. Cost-advantages and a greater availability of inputs and intermediates can be the 
first driving force for MNEs to invest in a Developing Country. Moreover the greater the 
technological gap between the entrant firms and the local ones, the more remarkable are 
the effects on the recipient economic system. Hypothesis 2: FDI impact on domestic firms’ 
survival through both backward and forward linkages is positive. The entry of MNEs 
drives the increase of demand in downstream industries, which in turn fosters the growth 
of firms which are provided by these industries. 
4.5. COUNTRY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
4.5.1. Statistics  
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 253,610 observations related to 45,622 
firms52. The whole sample is useful in order to elaborate statistics and compute the 
independent variables added into the model. Nonetheless, as it will be explained in 
paragraph 5.2.2, foreign firms are excluded from final samples used in the econometric 
regressions, since the study focuses on host country firms’ population trend. Tab. 5.1 
                                                 
52 See Statistics, Tab.1.a – 1.d. 
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reports the number of domestic and foreign firms, according to year and sector, while Fig. 
5.1 shows the demographic trend in a clearer way. The services sector is the largest one. 
Moreover, if we look at the share of each firms’ category on the total, it is noticeable that 
foreign presence is consistently greater than domestic one in both sectors. This could be 
partly due to the composition of the sample, excluding small and micro firms which 
represent however an important part of TCs business environment, and are mainly 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector. By looking at the growth rate of the number of 
firms, the services sector seems to attract more foreign firms (15.7%) than the 
manufacturing one (9.2%). In general, while the number of domestic plants decreases, the 
table shows that more and more foreign firms settle in the Czech Republic over time. More 
important, it is worth to notice that the absolute values of growth rates related to domestic 
firms (-24.1% for manufacturing and -17.2% for services) are always higher than the ones 
related to foreign firm. Domestic business environment shrinks more than foreign 
penetration increases, especially in the manufacturing sector. This allows us to deduce in 
which direction the empirical results might go, although a proper deeper analysis is 
required.  
Tab. 5.1: Distribution of domestic and foreign firms in the Czech Republic, by sector 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Domestic 
firms  
Domestic 
firms on 
total  
 
Foreign 
firms  
Foreign 
firms on 
total 
 
Total 
2003 3,062 0.344 5,834 0.656 8,896 
2004 2,916 0.328 5,964 0.672 8,880 
2005 2,848 0.314 6,234 0.686 9,082 
2006 2,733 0.301 6,363 0.699 9,096 
2007 2,558 0.285 6,431 0.715 8,989 
2008 2,323 0.267 6,371 0.733 8,694 
Growth rate 
2003-2008 
- 24.1%  + 9.2%   
 
Services 
 
Domestic 
firms  
Domestic 
firms on 
total 
 
Foreign 
firms  
Foreign 
firms on 
total 
Total 
2003 9,540 0.330 19,388 0.670 28,928 
2004 9,638 0.322 20,278 0.678 29,916 
2005 9,800 0.314 21,363 0.686 31,163 
2006 9,654 0.304 22,077 0.696 31,731 
2007 8,644 0.277 22,587 0.723 31,231 
2008 7,894 0.260 22,439 0.740 30,333 
Growth rate 
2003-2008 
- 17.2%  + 15.7%   
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Fig.5.1 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
The Kaplan-Meier function is a recommended approach in order to catch the 
survivor trend within the groups used to analyze the subjects concerned, e.g. firms. A step 
survivor curve for each categorical covariate is shaped relatively to the analysis time used, 
which here corresponds to six years. Groups are proportionate when the related curves 
overlap, or when they figure strongly parallel. Nonetheless the composition of the sample 
and the number of subjects in each category may not always ease the interpretation of the 
graph. On this purpose the Kaplan-Meier approach is generally accompanied by a test for 
the equality of the survivor functions, which is a Log-rank test in the current analysis. This 
is a non parametric method which computes the number of both the events observed in 
the sample and the expected events, the ones occurring the two categories being equal.  
In Fig. 5.2 the analysis is applied to all firms, disaggregated by sector. Survivor 
curves are almost overlapping in the final period, whereas up to 2006 the services sector 
shows higher survival probabilities, which is in line with our previous statistics on firms 
population trend. Likewise the number of expected events computed by the Log-rank test 
does not substantially differs from the number of observed events, in both sectors. 
Nonetheless, by considering the Chi-square test p-value (0.07), we do reject the null 
Firms population trend in Czech Republic, 2003-2008.            
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hypothesis of equality of survivor functions between manufacturing and services sectors at 
10% significance level.   
Fig.5.2  
 
Log-rank test 
Sector 
Events observed 
(failure) 
Events expected 
(failure) 
Manufacturing  1998 2069 
Services  7355 7284 
Total 9353 9353 
   
chi2(1) = 3.310   
Pr>chi2 = 0.0690   
Source: author’s elaboration 
In Fig.5.3 the situation is much clearer and the graph shows strongly distinct curves 
for the two categories, domestic and foreign firms. As expected foreign firms report higher 
survival likelihood than domestic ones. The results are confirmed by the Log-rank test 
which shows a much more significant p-value than in the previous case, thus leading to 
reject again the null hypothesis of equality.  
Further statistics on firm survival trend in the Czech Republic are provided in 
Appendix (Tables 6.a, 6.b, 6.c, 6.d) 
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Fig. 5.3  
 
Log-rank test 
Sector 
Events observed 
(failure) 
Events expected 
(failure) 
Manufacturing  5533 2759 
Services  3820 6594 
Total 9353 9353 
   
chi2(1) = 4157   
Pr>chi2 = 0.0000   
Source: author’s elaboration 
4.5.2. Results 
On the main purpose of observing domestic plants’ survival probability, and 
catching to which extend MNEs may affect it over time, foreign firms have been dropped 
out of the final sample. The Cox Proportional Hazard model has been applied first to the 
sample including both manufacturing and services firms, gathering 83,199 observations for 
15,054 firms; afterwards the two sectors have been analyzed individually, thus obtaining a 
subsample of 19,262 observations and 3,406 firms in the manufacturing sector, and 
another subsample of 63,937 observations corresponding to 11,719 firms in the services 
sector. All regressions have been run by stratifying the estimates according to 2-digit 
industry level. In this way, assuming all observations with equal values being in the same 
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stratum, we allow different coefficient across industries and a baseline hazard unique within 
each of them. 
In Tab. 5.2 a life table of the domestic firms’ sample reports the number of 
observations related to failures (deaths) and censored data (lost), as well as the survival 
probability (survival) for each interval of the analysis time. For instance, 98.9% of domestic 
manufacturing firms has survived between 2003 and 2004 and beyond; likewise, the same 
has occurred to 99.3% of domestic firms in the services sector. Although year 2009 is not 
considered in the current analysis it must be included in the table, since data on failures in 
2008 are available, and those firms which do not exit remain alive along 2008. The 
probability of survival decreases over time in both sectors, and it is slightly higher in the 
services sector till the last year period (2008-2009), when the tendency is inverted. 
Moreover, the survival probability in the manufacturing sector shows higher growth rates 
in the first years, whereas the increase falls more consistently up to 2005.  
Tab. 5.2: Life table of the Czech Republic sample 
Interval 
Totals at 
the 
beginning 
(obs.) 
Deaths 
(obs.) 
Lost 
(obs.) 
Survival 
Standard 
errors 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Manufacturing        
2003 - 2004 19,262 194 2,868 0.989 0.0008 0.988 - 0.991 
2004 - 2005 16,200 341 2,769 0.966 0.0014 0.963 - 0.969 
2005 - 2006 13,090 505 2,685 0.925 0.0023 0.920 - 0.929 
2006 - 2007 9,900 741 2,494 0.846 0.0035 0.839 - 0.852 
2007 - 2008 6,665 1,033 2,271 0.688 0.0053 0.677 - 0.698 
2008 - 2009 3,361 1,180 2,181 0.330 0.0076 0.315 - 0.345 
Services        
2003 - 2004 63,937 413 9,127 0.993 0.0003 0.992 - 0.994 
2004 - 2005 54,397 667 9,384 0.980 0.0006 0.979 - 0.981 
2005 - 2006 44,346 1,197 9,271 0.950 0.0010 0.948 - 0.952 
2006 - 2007 33,878 2,677 8,181 0.865 0.0018 0.861 - 0.868 
2007 - 2008 23,020 3,796 7,531 0.694 0.0029 0.689 - 0.700 
2008 - 2009 11,693 4,340 7,353 0.318 0.0041 0.310 - 0.326 
Source: author’s elaboration 
All the following tables report the Cox coefficients, rather than the hazard ratios. 
Positive (negative) values of these coefficients refer to higher (lower) hazard ratios and 
lower (higher) survival. Table 5.3.a reports the results for the sample including only 
domestic firms from both sectors. Seven specifications are provided considering firm, 
industry and foreign penetration characteristics. SIZE shows significant and negative 
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coefficients, as in most literature concerned, so that the larger the firm the smaller the 
probability of exiting the market. HCI is also significant but always positive, since a higher 
concentration level in the market may lower the survival probability. The last five columns 
are the most interesting ones, since they include FDI proxies. Only foreign penetration 
through forward linkages (FORWARD) seems to affect significantly and negatively 
domestic firms’ survival. In column 5, value 0.0101 means that a 10% point raise in foreign 
presence across upstream industries increases the rate of hazard, reducing firms’ survival. 
The effect is confirmed in columns 6 where both backward and forward linkages are 
accounted, and in column 7 which includes also horizontal linkages. The other covariates 
do not report any significant values. The non significance of AGE might be due to the 
exclusion of firms which are younger than one year old from a sample composed mostly of 
young and very young plants53.   
Tab. 5.3.a: The Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Czech Republic. Manufacturing and 
service sectors (2003-2008) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AGE -0.0918 -0.1581 -0.1265 -0.1596 -0.1588 -0.1589 -0.1268 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
SIZE -0.1876** -0.2104*** -0.1993** -0.2033** -0.1959** -0.1958** -0.1910** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.1138 -0.1208 -0.1315 -0.1215 -0.1251 -0.1252 -0.1334 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
MES   0.1052 0.1397 0.1103 0.1499 0.1497 0.1749 
  (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
HCI  1.6666* 2.6624** 1.5697** 1.6958*** 1.6854*** 2.7215** 
  (0.97) (1.04) (1.16) (1.01) (1.16) (1.31) 
INTRA    1.9263    1.7598 
   (1.73)    (1.75) 
BACKWARD     0.0046  -0.0003 -0.0053 
    (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) 
FORWARD      0.0101** 0.0100** 0.0079* 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
Number of 
observations 8,479 8,479 8,479 8,479 8,479 8,479 8,479 
Number of firms 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248 
Wald chi-square test 
9.402 
(0.0244) 
12.22 
(0.0319) 
15.05 
(0.0198) 
19.33 
(0.0036) 
18.53 
(0.0050) 
18.78 
(0.0089) 
20.35 
(0.0091) 
Notes: a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 refer to significance levels. 
b) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at 3-digit Nace Rev.11. level in parentheses. 
c) Baseline hazard stratified by 2digit Nace Rev.1.1. industry level. 
d) p-values of the Wald chi-square test in parenthesis 
Source: author’s elaboration 
                                                 
53 In the manufacturing and service sectors domestic firms younger than 15 years old represent 96.3% and 
97.5% of the domestic sample, respectively.   
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Tables 5.3.b and 5.3.c summarize the estimates for manufacturing and services 
sectors, respectively. In the manufacturing sector (Tab. 5.3.b) - similarly to estimates we 
obtained in the general sample - SIZE seems to be an important feature for domestic firms’ 
survival. MES also shows a significant and positive coefficient which might be connected 
to the increase of cost disadvantages for the firm, as suggested by Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995); this in turn should make more difficult the permanence of firms on the 
market. HCI is significant only in columns 4 and 6, revealing a potential correlation with 
BACKWARD54. The significance of these variables does not occur in the services sector 
(Tab. 5.3.c), where contrariwise the only relevant predictor seems to be HCI, which shows 
a positive coefficient in all specifications, exactly as in Tab. 5.3.a. The same results 
concerning HCI emerging both in Tab. 5.3.a and Tab. 5.3.c may indicate that the 
concentration index effect on firms’ survival in the services sector is stronger than the 
effect stemming from the presence of cost disadvantages in the manufacturing sector. As 
for foreign penetration, in Tab. 5.3.b again MNEs effects channeled through vertical 
linkages (BACKWARD and FORWARD) are more noteworthy than through horizontal 
linkages (INTRA). In the last three columns both FDI proxies across downstream and 
upstream industries result in a positive and important connection with firms’ exit. From the 
coefficients of these variables, along with the non significance of FORWARD in column 6, 
we can deduce that in the manufacturing sector foreign presence through backward 
linkages exerts a stronger effect on firms’ failure probability than through forward linkages. 
Nonetheless BACKWARD is not relevant in column 7, since the other two foreign 
penetration proxies (INTRA and FORWARD) may absorb part of its statistical 
significance. Contrariwise, in Tab. 5.3.c vertical linkages measures are never significant and 
even report a negative sign, meaning that foreign presence in upstream and downstream 
industries may promote domestic firms’ survival; however this effect is found to be too 
weak in the services sector.  
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Further regressions run by excluding HCI from the model still give strongly significant values of 
BACKWARD, so that both variables are accounted in following estimates.  
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Tab. 5.3.b: The Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Czech Republic. The manufacturing sector (2003-
2008) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AGE 0.0335 -0.1646 -0.2629 -0.1911 -0.2606 -0.2122 -0.2639 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.39) (0.43) (0.42) (0.45) (0.43) 
SIZE -0.4774 -0.7746*** -0.7700*** -0.7174*** -0.6903*** -0.6915*** -0.6975*** 
 (0.29) (0.20) (0.29) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24) (0.26) 
PRODUCTIVI
TY -0.7205 -0.3779 -0.6660 -0.4778 -0.3193 -0.4614 -0.5275 
 (1.27) (0.68) (1.31) (0.70) (0.61) (0.66) (0.85) 
MES  1.2199*** 1.4081*** 1.6317*** 1.6035*** 1.7419*** 1.6599*** 
  (0.35) (0.36) (0.41) (0.58) (0.46) (0.41) 
HCI  -0.5086 1.9958 -6.9931** -2.1603 -7.9981** -4.3968 
  (1.41) (2.43) (3.45) (3.39) (3.54) (4.91) 
INTRA   5.2128    2.2196 
   (3.30)    (3.42) 
BACKWARD    0.1561***  0.1487* 0.1018 
    (0.07)  (0.09) (0.07) 
FORWARD     0.0197** 0.0071 0.0048 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Number of 
observations 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 
Number of 
firms 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544 
Wald chi-square 
test 
7.834 
(0.0496) 
39.63 
(0.0000) 
50.19 
(0.0000) 
48.32 
(0.0000) 
55.07 
(0.0000) 
55.81 
(0.0000) 
55.13 
(0.0000) 
Notes: a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 refer to significance levels. 
b) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at 3-digit Nace Rev.11. level in parentheses. 
c) Baseline hazard stratified by 2digit Nace Rev.1.1. industry level. 
d) p-values of the Wald chi-square test in parenthesis 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Tab. 5.3.c: The Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Czech Republic. The service sector (2003-2008) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AGE -0.0808 -0.1270 -0.1141 -0.1239 -0.1280 -0.1271 -0.0989 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
SIZE -0.1042 -0.0804 -0.0782 -0.0814 -0.0841 -0.0840 -0.0822 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
PRODUCTIV
ITY -0.1062 -0.1057 -0.1077 -0.1055 -0.1053 -0.1053 -0.1083 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
MES  -0.1183 -0.1021 -0.1149 -0.1085 -0.1088 -0.0691 
  (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28) 
HCI   2.6693*** 2.9960** 2.7572** 2.7194** 2.7371** 3.5181** 
  (0.88) (1.28) (0.90) (0.87) (0.91) (1.76) 
INTRA   0.5461    1.1650 
   (1.94)    (2.39) 
BACKWARD    -0.0057  -0.0018 -0.0050 
    (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
FORWARD     -0.0362 -0.0292 -0.0338 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
        
Number of 
observations 5625 5625 5625 5625 5625 5625 5625 
Number of 
firms 3705 3705 3705 3705 3705 3705 3705 
Wald chi-
square test 
2.427 
(0.4887) 
10.93 
(0.0528) 
11.79 
(0.0669) 
13.03 
(0.0720) 
11.58 
(0.0178) 
16.94 
(0.0421) 
16.10 
(0.0410) 
Notes: a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 refer to significance levels. 
b) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at 3-digit Nace Rev.11. level in parentheses. 
c) Baseline hazard stratified by 2digit Nace Rev.1.1. industry level. 
d) p-values of the Wald chi-square test in parenthesis 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Such differences in importance of vertical linkages as channel of FDI can be found 
in previous studies on the Czech Republic (Kippenberg, 2005; Stančík, 2009). The negative 
coefficient in the manufacturing sector reveals that the increasing demand of intermediates 
coming from new foreign entrants in final industries does not favor domestic plants, as 
predicted by Markusen and Venables (1999). In order to have a deeper look at the 
dynamics within each sector Tab. 5.4 summarizes the presence of firms over time 
according to whether they belong to final goods or intermediates industries55. The number 
of foreign firms in the manufacturing sector which produce intermediate goods (column 
B.2) increases over time, and with a greater extend than domestic firms (column A.2). The 
increasing presence of foreign firms is noticeable also in the final goods industries, 
although the variation rate between 2003 and 2008 is smaller (15.07% and 21.68% for the 
                                                 
55 In order to identify intermediates industries, a new dummy has been created. It takes value 1 when forward 
linkages variable is higher than 0.5, meaning that more than 50% of total sales is represented by intermediate 
goods.   
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manufacturing and services sector, respectively) than the one observed in the intermediates 
industries (15.22% and 24.56% for the manufacturing and services sector, respectively). 
The table shows the same situation for the services sector (columns C.2 e D.2). 
Nonetheless, the Cox regressions applied to the services sector subsample do not report 
any significance, relatively to the vertical linkages. In this case the foreign supply might not 
substitute the domestic one, leading to a nil effect on firms’ survival (Kippenberg, 2005). In 
addition, it is quite logical to think about the services sector in TCs as a whole of very new 
and dynamic industries which include young local firms with high skilled labor. As a 
consequence, it is very likely that the absorptive capacity of firms, which allows catching 
positive spillovers from FDI, is higher in the services sector, thus fostering potentially 
domestic survival (Kejžar, 2010)56.  
Tab. 5.4: Distribution of firms in the Czech Republic. Final goods and intermediates industries 
 Manufacturing  Services  
 
Domestic 
firms  
Foreign 
firms  
Domestic 
firms  
Foreign 
firms  
Final goods 
industries 
A.1 B.1 C.1 D.1 
2003 2,333 4,744 9,035 18,297 
2004 2,372 4,925 9,522 19,408 
2005 2,439 5,179 9,926 20,605 
2006 2,478 5,342 10,297 21,547 
2007 2,531 5,459 10,747 22,265 
2008 2,575 5,494 11,094 22,459 
Intermediates 
industries 
A.2 B.2 C.2 D.2 
2003 729 1,090 505 1,091 
2004 738 1,128 529 1,190 
2005 751 1,184 542 1,255 
2006 757 1,225 561 1,313 
2007 773 1,251 580 1,347 
2008 786 1,256 599 1,359 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Regarding the negative effect of foreign presence through forward linkages in the 
manufacturing sector (Tab. 5.3.c) it might be the consequence of the competition effect 
arising in upstream industries. On the one side more and more foreign firms enter 
downstream industries and give a boost to local production, whereas on the other side they 
                                                 
56 From Tab.1.c and Tab.1.d (final session of “Statistics”) it is possible to notice that the mean of 
PRODUCTIVITY, measured as sales per employment at time t, is actually higher in the services sector (2.545) 
than in the manufacturing sector (1.938). 
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may produce only for MNEs located in upstream industries. In this scenario the potential 
catalyst effects depicted by Markusen and Venables (1999) are absorbed exclusively by 
foreign firms, and as a consequence domestic firms face several difficulties in remaining on 
the market. 
4.6. COUNTRY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: ESTONIA 
4.6.1. Statistics 
Also in the case of Estonia the final sample is an unbalanced panel composed of 
61,219 observations for 12,949 firms. The picture outlined in Tab. 5.5 and Fig. 5.4 does not 
differ substantially from the one referring to the Czech Republic. Services represent the 
largest sector and in the overall productive system considered there are more foreign firms 
than domestic ones, which might also be related to the sample characteristics, as mentioned 
above. However, the increasing foreign penetration is noticeable especially in the services 
sector (+17%). Contrariwise the number of domestic firms shrinks considerably and with 
higher rates not only than the increase in the number of foreign firms, but also than the 
decrease registered in the Czech Republic. The sector the most stricken is again the 
manufacturing one (-62.5%).  
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Tab. 5.5: Distribution of domestic and foreign firms in Estonia, by sector. 
Manufacturing 
Domestic 
firms 
Domestic 
firms on 
total 
Foreign 
firms 
Foreign 
firms on 
total 
Total 
2003 578 0.270 1,565 0.730 2,143 
2004 592 0.267 1,626 0.733 2,218 
2005 479 0.220 1,702 0.780 2,181 
2006 387 0.181 1,747 0.819 2,134 
2007 324 0.158 1,726 0.842 2,050 
2008 217 0.114 1,682 0.886 1,899 
Growth rate 
2003-2008 
- 62.5%  + 7.5%   
Services 
Domestic 
firms 
Domestic 
firms on 
total 
Foreign 
firms 
Foreign 
firms on 
total 
Total 
2003 2,444 0.305 5,559 0.695 8,003 
2004 2,499 0.304 5,727 0.696 8,226 
2005 2,182 0.264 6,093 0.736 8,275 
2006 1,866 0.224 6,468 0.776 8,334 
2007 1,590 0.195 6,583 0.805 8,173 
2008 1,178 0.153 6,505 0.847 7,683 
Growth rate 
2003-2008 
- 51.8%  + 17%   
Source: author’s elaboration 
Fig. 5.4 
 
We run a Kaplan-Meier function, accompanied by a Log-rank test in order to 
display differences in survival likelihood between sectors firstly, and kind of ownership, 
secondly. The overall impression is not so different from before. Nonetheless Fig. 5.5, 
related to all firms disaggregated by sector, shows lower survival likelihood for the services 
Firms population trend in Estonia, 2003-2008. 
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sector, which is not exactly what we expected from the first table of statistics. On this 
purpose the analysis needs further evidence that will be afterwards applied by running the 
Cox regressions. However, the Log-rank test, with a p-value of 0.03, allows rejecting the 
null hypothesis of equality of survival functions between sectors at 5% significance level.      
Fig. 5.5 
 
Log-rank test 
Sector 
Events observed 
(failure) 
Events expected 
(failure) 
Manufacturing  818 871.3 
Services  3,575 3,522 
Total 4,393 4,393 
   
chi2(1) = 4.480   
Pr>chi2 = 0.0363   
Source: author’s elaboration 
Fig. 5.6 applies the Kaplan-Meier function to domestic and foreign firms, 
separately. Again, foreign firms seem having a higher probability of survival than domestic 
ones, except for the first period, when the curve relative to foreign firms is slightly under 
the correspondent domestic one. The two functions appear clearly distinct, and we reject 
the null hypothesis of equality between categories for a strongly significant Chi-square test.    
Further statistics on firm survival trend in the Estonia are provided in Appendix 
(Tables 7.a, 7.b, 7.c, 7.d) 
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Fig. 5.6 
 
Log-rank test 
Sector 
Events observed 
(failure) 
Events expected 
(failure) 
Manufacturing  2489 958 
Services  1904 3435 
Total 4393 4393 
   
chi2(1) = 3410   
Pr>chi2 = 0.0000   
Source: author’s elaboration 
4.6.2. Results 
Following the approach applied to the Czech Republic, the sample of Estonian 
firms has been split in two subsamples containing manufacturing and services domestic 
plants, respectively; once again foreign firms have been dropped out in order to focus on 
FDI effects on local business development. The initial sample including both 
manufacturing and services sectors has 20,302 observations for 3,636 firms. The following 
analysis on the manufacturing sector uses a sample of 3,721 observations and 669 firms, 
whereas the one on the services sector is based on 16,581 observations and 3,016 firms.  
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The life table reported in Tab. 5.6 shows how consistently the survival probability 
of domestic firms has decreased over time in both the sectors considered. In the 
manufacturing sector at the beginning of the analysis time firms have a 99.9% probability 
of remaining on the market, whereas in the last period they record only 7.3% of 
probability. Likewise, in the services sector the initial probability of 99.4% falls down to 
11.3% in the last lapse observed. The capacity of lasting seems to be higher in the case of 
the services firms from interval 2005-2006. By comparing these statistics with the Kaplan-
Meier function, disaggregated by sector in Fig. 5.5, we can notice that the step curve of the 
services sector is slightly below the one of the manufacturing sector. The different 
composition of samples has to be considered in finding an explanation for such 
dissimilarity: in Fig. 5.5 both domestic and foreign firms are taken, whereas in Tab. 5.6 
foreign firms are excluded, so that the volatility of foreign firms in the services sector might 
be higher than in the manufacturing one. Further empirical proves by implementing the 
Kaplan-Meier function may confirm this hypothesis57. 
Tab. 5.6 Life table of Estonia sample 
Interval 
Totals at 
the 
beginning 
(obs.) 
Deaths 
(obs.) 
Lost 
(obs.) 
Survival 
Standard 
Errors 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Manufacturing        
2003 – 2004 3,721 2 576 0.999 0.0004 0.998 - 1.000 
2004 – 2005 3,143 136 458 0.953 0.0039 0.944 - 0.960 
2005 – 2006 2,549 246 369 0.854 0.0069 0.840 - 0.867 
2006 – 2007 1,934 314 319 0.703 0.0096 0.683 - 0.721 
2007 – 2008  1,301 427 221 0.451 0.0115 0.428 - 0.473 
2008 – 2009 653 471 182 0.073 0.0072 0.060 - 0.088 
Services        
2003 – 2004 16,581 94 2,350 0.994 0.0006 0.993 - 0.995 
2004 – 2005  14,137 559 2,034 0.952 0.0019 0.948 - 0.955 
2005 – 2006  11,544 1,000 1,741 0.862 0.0032 0.856 - 0.869 
2006 – 2007 8,803 1,255 1,611 0.727 0.0044 0.718 - 0.736 
2007 – 2008  5,937 1,700 1,254 0.494 0.0055 0.483 - 0.505 
2008 – 2009  2,983 1,875 1,108 0.113 0.0044 0.104 - 0.122 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Table 5.7.a summarizes the results of the Cox stratified regressions for the sample 
including both manufacturing and services sectors. The econometric model is developed 
                                                 
57 See Fig. 5.7.a and Fig. 5.7.b in Statistics. The Kaplan-Meier curves for each of the two sectors, 
disaggregated by the nationality of the ownership shows that survival probability of foreign firms in the 
services sector is slightly lower than in the manufacturing one.   
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through seven specifications (columns) referring to firm, market and foreign penetration 
characteristics respectively, as in the previous country analysis. Coefficients rather than 
hazard ratios are reported. Firm specific features are all significant. AGE and SIZE show 
negative signs as expected, which means that the older (larger) the domestic firm, the 
higher its survival probability is. Contrariwise PRODUCTIVITY is positively related to 
firms’ exit, which is not what we would expect. A possible explanation could be that the 
most efficient domestic firms are also the most likely to be taken over by MNEs, since 
merges are among the definitions of firms’ failure. Nonetheless the fact that the same 
variable shows a negative coefficient in the case of Czech Republic might be linked to the 
different privatization paths followed by the two countries. Soon after the collapse of the 
socialist system Estonia opened sharply its economy to foreign investors, whereas the 
Czech Republic was more cautious about its openness. Takes over by MNEs might be at a 
further stage - or already completed - in Estonia, comparatively to the Czech Republic. 
Market characteristics (MES and HCI) do not seem to be relevant, except when foreign 
penetration through forward linkages is considered (columns 5, 6 and 7); in that case MES 
assumes significant negative values, eventually supporting Audretsch (1991)’ reasoning. In 
this first step of analysis BACKWARD and FORWARD are never relevant, whereas 
INTRA shows a positive significant coefficient in column 7, which might be a potential 
sign of collinearity since the two vertical linkages measures are interacted with the 
horizontal linkages one.  
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Tab: 5.7.a: The Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Estonia. Manufacturing and services sectors (2003-
2008) 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AGE -0.4020** -0.4181** -0.4025* -0.4181** -0.4282* -0.4242* -0.4189* 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
SIZE -0.4886*** -0.4660*** -0.4433*** -0.4659*** -0.4696*** -0.4695*** -0.4345*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
PRODUCTIVIT
Y 0.2535*** 0.2506*** 0.2298*** 0.2501*** 0.2444*** 0.2434*** 0.2103*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
MES  -0.3563 -0.3670 -0.3550 -0.4139* -0.4113* -0.4684* 
  (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) 
HCI  -0.7917 0.6373 -0.7973 0.8202 0.8123 4.2027** 
  (2.69) (2.07) (2.71) (1.86) (1.86) (2.05) 
INTRA   2.1835    3.6793** 
   (2.04)    (1.50) 
BACKWARD    -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
FORWARD     -0.0261 -0.0262 -0.0372 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
        
Number of 
observations 3,208 3,208 3,208 3,208 3,208 3,208 3,208 
Number of firms 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 
Wald chi-square 
test 
66.98 
(0.0000) 
68.51 
(0.0000) 
71.28 
(0.0000) 
68.65 
(0.0000) 
72.27 
(0.0000) 
72.55 
(0.0000) 
70.14 
(0.0000) 
Notes: a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 refer to significance levels. 
b) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at 3-digit Nace Rev.11. level in parentheses. 
c) Baseline hazard stratified by 2digit Nace Rev.1.1. industry level. 
d) p-values of the Wald chi-square test in parenthesis 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Afterwards, the sample of domestic firms is split into two subsamples. Tables 5.7.b 
and 5.7.c show the estimates referring to the manufacturing and the services sectors, 
respectively. As for the first one (Tab. 5.7.b) SIZE is the most significant variable (and 
negative as previously found) among firm specific features; the exception occurs when 
INTRA is added (column 3). The non relevance of AGE coefficients in the regressions 
applied to the manufacturing sector might be due, as in the estimates of the Czech 
Republic, to the fact that firms younger than one year old have been dropped, in order to 
reduce the number of missing values while using the logarithmic form of the variable. 
Moreover, in contrast to the results from Tab. 5.7.a the positive sign of AGE implies lower 
survival probability of domestic firms. Nonetheless in Tab. 5.7.c AGE regains strong 
significance and negative values, thus confirming the expected relationship between age 
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and firm survival. What should be noticed is that most of the sample, in both cases, is 
composed by young and very young firms. Domestic firms younger than 15 years old 
represent about 95.8% of total domestic manufacturing sample, and in the services sector 
the percentage is even a little higher (97.8%). However, while the service sector is relatively 
“new” and rapidly developing in TCs, the manufacturing one may include some of the old 
SOEs still existing, whose probability of exiting the market is higher than the one of the 
new entrants, because of their lower competitiveness, or because of privatization policies. 
This remark can help explaining the reason why AGE shows a positive (although not 
significant) coefficient only in the manufacturing sector. PRODUCTIVITY is still 
positively related to domestic firms exit in both sectors, although it appears much more 
relevant in the services case (Tab. 5.7.c). Regarding the market variables, only MES is 
found to be significant and negative in the service sector, in all specifications of the model. 
Now we focus the attention on foreign penetration effects on domestic business 
development (columns 3 to 7). FDI impact within the same industry is not significant in 
either of the two sectors, although always positive. Vertical linkages seem to be more 
important; nonetheless the empirical evidence is not as strong as in the previous case of the 
Czech Republic. In Table 5.7.b BACKWARD is significant and negative only when it is 
included in the model together with FORWARD (columns 6 and 7), which might not be a 
trustworthy prove to state the importance of MNEs linkages with downstream local 
industries, relatively to firms survival. On the other side, in Table 5.7.c BACKWARD 
looses significance (although the coefficients are still negative), whereas FORWARD 
acquires and assumes negative values. According to the results obtained, vertical linkages in 
Estonia may channel foreign presence and eventually make it an engine of local business 
development. This is coherent with previous studies on technological rather than pecuniary 
externalities which find that knowledge spills from foreign firms over domestic ones 
(Damijan and Knell, 2005), thus eventually fostering local innovation activity (Vahter, 
2010). 
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Tab. 5.7.b The Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Estonia. The manufacturing sector (2003-2008) 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AGE 0.0897 0.1209 0.1124 0.1874 0.1201 0.1533 0.1466 
 (0.41) (0.46) (0.42) (0.50) (0.49) (0.54) (0.48) 
SIZE -0.5444*** -0.5556** -0.4144 -0.5559** -0.5525** -0.5254** -0.4050 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) 
PRODUCTIVIT
Y 0.3541* 0.3532* 0.3851* 0.2522 0.3627* 0.1993 0.2743 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.16) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20) 
MES  0.1510 -0.0819 0.2188 0.3939 0.3774 0.0842 
  (0.55) (0.43) (0.56) (0.65) (0.54) (0.48) 
HCI  -1.3447 6.5520 0.9886 -19.3930 -11.3190 1.6840 
  (5.22) (7.26) (2.97) (21.20) (13.36) (10.56) 
INTRA   9.1066    8.6602 
   (6.93)    (7.38) 
BACKWARD    -0.0040  -0.0062** -0.0056** 
    (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
FORWARD     0.0982 0.0861 0.0551 
     (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
        
Number of 
observations 554 554 554 554 554 554 554 
Number of firms 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 
Wald chi-square 
test 
15.38 
(0.0015) 
17.73 
(0.0033) 
16.92 
(0.0096) 
23.34 
(0.0005) 
15.90 
(0.0143) 
23.55 
(0.0014) 
33.60 
(0.0000) 
Notes: a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 refer to significance levels. 
b) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at 3-digit Nace Rev.11. level in parentheses. 
c) Baseline hazard stratified by 2digit Nace Rev.1.1. industry level. 
d) p-values of the Wald chi-square test in parenthesis 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Tab. 5.7.c: The Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Estonia. The services sector (2003-2008) 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AGE -0.5396** -0.5754*** -0.5736*** -0.5754*** -0.6087*** -0.6101*** -0.6429*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
SIZE -0.4973*** -0.4779*** -0.4633*** -0.4779*** -0.4895*** -0.4891*** -0.4639*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
PRODUCTIVITY 0.2582*** 0.2595*** 0.2422*** 0.2594*** 0.2565*** 0.2537*** 0.2264** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
MES  -0.4644** -0.4910* -0.4643** -0.5789** -0.5738** -0.7315*** 
  (0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
HCI  -1.6658 -0.4636 -1.6669 -0.2093 -0.1632 3.9721* 
  (3.98) (2.83) (4.05) (1.89) (1.90) (2.15) 
INTRA   1.9254    4.4256*** 
   (2.28)    (1.65) 
BACKWARD    -0.0000  -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
FORWARD     -0.0503* -0.0516* -0.0700*** 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
        
Number of 
observations 2,655 2,655 2,655 2,655 2655 2655 2655 
Number of firms 922 922 922 922 922 922 922 
Wald chi-square test 
57.21 
(0.0000) 
69.99 
(0.0000) 
71.91 
(0.0000) 
70.00 
(0.0000) 
93.22 
(0.0000) 
93.41 
(0.0000) 
97.94 
(0.0000) 
Notes: a) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 refer to significance levels. 
b) Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at 3-digit Nace Rev.11. level in parentheses. 
c) Baseline hazard stratified by 2digit Nace Rev.1.1. industry level. 
d) p-values of the Wald chi-square test in parenthesis 
Source: author’s elaboration 
The statistical table concerning the number of firms in the intermediates industries 
reported for Czech Republic (Tab. 5.4) is now constructed for Estonia (Tab. 5.8). The 
number of foreign firms producing goods for upstream industries increases over time, both 
in manufacturing (column B.2) and services (column D.2) sectors. Unlike what Czech 
statistics reveal for Estonia the growth rate in the number of foreign firms in final goods 
industries (20.3% and 32.7% for the manufacturing and services sectors, respectively) is 
higher than in intermediates industries (14.8% and 37.3% for the manufacturing and 
services sectors, respectively) only in the manufacturing sector. Foreign services firms 
producing for upstream industries exert positive effects through forward linkages which are 
not exclusively caught by other MNEs.  
In this regard three issues are to be highlighted. First, the significance of 
BACKWARD and FORWARD is found to be weaker in Estonia than in the Czech 
Republic, which leads to think that the increasing presence of MNEs producing 
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intermediates has not the same relevance in both countries. Second, in neither case 
BACKWARD shows significance in the services sector, thus revealing the possible 
presence of positive spillovers from FDI which increase local firms survival probability. 
And eventually, as suggested by Kippenberg (2005), domestic production is not substituted 
by the foreign one. Finally, the already mentioned difference between the privatization 
programs implemented during the first years of transition may explain why in Czech 
Republic the negative impact of FDI through vertical linkages (Tab. 5.3.a and Tab. 5.3.b) is 
much stronger than the one found in the Estonia analysis. De facto, the Czech Republic 
went through a mass privatization plan based on the distribution (free or at nominal cost) - 
to the whole population - of vouchers representing the shares of SOEs. This approach 
contributed on the one side to keep FDI at a quite low level - comparatively to other 
countries like Hungary and Poland - till 1998 when inward FDI flows sharply increased; on 
the other side, it allowed neither building proper corporate governance nor fostering 
incentives for restructuring (Zemplinerová and Benáček, 1997). Contrariwise, Estonia 
privatization path focused mainly on massive sold of SOEs assets to foreign investors; 
being less radical, this kind of privatization might have led to a gradual catch of 
international knowledge spillovers by domestic firms quite early in the Estonian transition 
process (Damijan and Knell, 2005), so that foreign penetration cannot been considered as 
the main cause of the diminishing survival of Estonian domestic firms. This deduction 
eventually confirms what reported in the “Transition Report 1999” (EBRD, 1999), 
according to which Estonia is one among TCs with the highest ratio between the 
entrepreneurship increase and the state sector dismantling.58   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 See § 1.1 
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Tab. 5.8: Distribution of firms in Estonia. Final goods and intermediates industries 
 Manufacturing  Services  
 
Domestic 
firms  
Foreign 
firms  
Domestic 
firms  
Foreign 
firms  
Final goods 
industries 
A.1 B.1 C.1 D.1 
2003 525 1330 1881 4171 
2004 541 1414 1997 4502 
2005 559 1501 2106 4856 
2006 573 1573 2209 5244 
2007 587 1585 2285 5493 
2008 591 1600 2304 5536 
Intermediates 
industries 
A.2 B.2 C.2 D.2 
2003 53 235 563 1,388 
2004 53 244 596 1,518 
2005 56 256 635 1,649 
2006 60 265 657 1,801 
2007 61 268 669 1,887 
2008 62 270 679 1,906 
Source: author’s elaboration 
4.7. FINAL REMARKS 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of FDI on domestic firm survival 
in TCs. Different samples composed of domestic plants have been analyzed by 
implementing the non parametric Cox Proportional Hazard model. In order to delve 
deeper into the matter the initial samples have been disentangled, and the manufacturing 
and services sectors have been observed separately. The study underpins on the 
comparison between two TCs, the Czech Republic and Estonia, over the period 2003-
2008. Given the availability of data, these countries represent an interesting example of 
how the heterogeneity of the transition path during the Nineties might have influenced the 
local business development. The current empirical analysis intends to catch the impact of 
FDI through the relationships established between domestic and foreign firms. On this 
purpose, measures of both horizontal and vertical linkages have been computed. 
In paragraph 4.3 two hypotheses have been advanced.  
Hypothesis 1: FDI impact on domestic firms’ survival through vertical inter-industries linkages is 
more relevant than the one occurring through horizontal intra-industry linkages. This hypothesis has 
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been confirmed by the estimates, and it is coherent with the previous empirical literature 
concerned (Damijan et al., 2003a, 2003b; Kejžar, 2010; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). 
Hypothesis 2: FDI impact on domestic firms’ survival through both backward and forward 
linkages is positive. This hypothesis is confirmed only for Estonia, where vertical linkages 
appear as ones among the catalysts of local development, according to the model by 
Markusen and Venables (1999). Contrariwise, in the Czech Republic FDI channeled 
through vertical linkages is found to threaten domestic firms’ lifecycle in the manufacturing 
sector, whereas no statistical significance emerges from the services sectors. The increasing 
penetration of MNEs especially in the intermediates industries - and in a lesser extent in 
the final goods industries - absorbs the important positive pecuniary externalities that could 
stem from FDI. Our findings are still coherent with previous studies focusing on FDI 
spillovers in the Czech Republic and Estonia. The different impacts of FDI on domestic 
firms’ survival may be related to the specific privatization path followed by the two 
countries during the early stages of transition. The Czech Republic implemented a mass 
privatization program, which gave – at least till 1998 - scarce importance to foreign firms. 
A completely different approach drove the Estonian privatization path, and it focused 
mainly on massive sold of SOEs assets to foreign investors. As a consequence knowledge 
from MNEs might have started to spill over domestic firms soon at the beginning of 
transition, thus avoiding the strong crowding out effect detected in the Czech Republic. 
Foreign penetration cannot be considered as the main cause of the diminishing survival of 
Estonian domestic firms, which is however evident from Tab. 5.5. and Tab. 5.6. The 
framework depicted allows supposing that in Estonia there might be a higher degree of 
homogenization between MNEs and domestic firms than in the Czech Republic.  
As for the other covariates added to the model, the empirical evidence stresses that 
among firm specific features SIZE is the most relevant one in both countries; in line with 
the literature concerned the larger the firm the higher the survival probability. Nonetheless 
AGE and PRODUCTIVITY show a stronger effect in the case of Estonia reporting a 
negative sign and an unexpected positive sign, respectively. Results on industry features are 
less uniform between the two countries, and depend on the sector considered. 
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Conclusions 
 
In the last twenty years the Eastern part of the Euro-Asiatic continent has been 
involved in a long and complex, still on-going process of transformation called Transition. 
This phenomenon has been representing the outcome of the establishment (and 
consequent dismantling) of a Socialist order in all countries that either were part of the 
URSS or were aligned with its international policy. After the end of the Cold War and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the aim of the ex-socialist countries governments (already launched 
since the beginning of the Eighties in the most advanced countries of the area, like Poland 
and Hungary) was to transform their economic system into an efficient market-oriented 
machine. The model was clearly the one coming from the Western world that however had 
been shaping capitalism for almost two centuries yet. This difference does not represent an 
irrelevant particular within the story of the recent evolution of TCs.  
 
Although here we have tried to focus on the economic aspects of the argument, 
Transition concerns several fields interconnected and mutually influencing. Thus, a close 
analysis of this topic should consider such deep interdependence between the economic, 
legal, political, social spheres, even though focusing on one of them. After twenty years 
since the beginning of Transition, the study of its consequences still does not lead to clear 
conclusions, this given both to the variety of countries involved and to the contradictory 
aspects arising within each of them. From the yearly Transition Reports of the EBRD it 
appears that TCs, which are usually analyzed by clustering them into areas in order to 
simplify the comparisons (as in the current work), have reached important steps in terms of 
economic development, but still lack of efficiency especially in the legal field. In most cases 
the reforms introduced with the Transition have triggered a new situation totally in contrast 
with the one existing on the previous socialist scenario. The economic measures based on 
macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization and privatization met a framework which was 
not completely prepared to such a drastic change, and the fragile political restructuring was 
mixed up with the social precariousness which had to face a totally new labor market.  
 
This present study aims at delving deeper into the main faces of Transition and the 
relationship between it and international openness of TCs, by focusing on some specific 
consequences of this complex phenomenon. Great attention has been given to the 
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economic aspects, as already mentioned, although without neglecting the importance of the 
political, legal and social transformation. The area concerned is characterized by a 
considerable variety of countries, with different historical paths and economic political 
development over the past; in order to deal with this heterogeneity TCs have been 
clustered into four areas which allow to simplify the comparison and the examination of 
each Transition factor. The thesis has been developed along two parts, the first one mostly 
theoretical and based on the most important contributions of the literature concerned, and 
the second section that aims at establishing a link between theory and reality. The first two 
chapters are extremely functional to the following ones, since they give both the author and 
the reader the cognitive instruments to start a proper empirical analysis. The choice of 
starting from the concept of “Transition” in Chapter 1 raises the issue about what should be 
included into the analysis and what could be excluded. In particular, an  analytical 
standpoint based on a path dependence approach lets us emphasize the importance of 
the process rather than the final destination of the whole transformation. Thus, it is 
possible to treat the argument with the critical view that a mere transplantation of a socio-
economic structure does not work efficiently, since every country must start from its 
relative availability of resources and capacities. This remark sheds light on some distortions 
emerged along the transitional period and it is still evident in many of the countries 
concerned. The heterogeneity between countries has also appeared in the intensity with 
which the measures were applied; some countries used an evolutionary approach based 
on a gradual shift to the new economic order whereas some others chose the shortest way 
of the shock therapy (suggested by the modern theories of the time) that however turned 
out to be the less successful. Countries specifications and the nature of some drastic 
reforms imposed by outside (in primis the international institutions) have been deeply 
shaping the future and development of TCs, bringing out some critical situations still 
existing, such as inflation, unemployment, social inequalities, increasing irregular economy, 
etc.....  
 
The sudden openness of TCs to the international markets, further on stressed by 
the almost total commercial closing of the previous period, represents the second object of 
the current analytical study.  The focus of Chapter 2 on the evolution of trade flows from 
and to TCs and economic foreign presence within their boundaries (Inward FDI) gives a 
general picture of TCs place in the world over the year. Together with some data and 
graphs, the summary of the principal literature regarding this topic allows to identify some 
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of the determinants of Inward FDI in TCs. Among these we find: market potential, the 
geographical proximity, the relative labor costs, the availability of skilled labor, but also the 
macroeconomic situation of the host country and the degree of development along the 
privatization path.  
 
At this point the interest on TCs has been paid to some effects of their 
international openness; on the one side there is the establishment of new business 
relationships with foreigners (by focusing on Inward FDI), on the other side there still 
remains Transition, with all its peculiarities and evolution along its implementation. The 
empirical analysis in the second half of the thesis has focused on delving deeper into the 
issues which may hopefully represent object for future studies in order to broaden the 
analytical points of view and improve the results. The effects considered can be deemed as 
belonging to an original sphere far from the common aspects taken by most of researchers 
in this field. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of international openness on income inequality in 
TCs, whereas Chapter 4 is about the probability of TCs domestic firms survival after the 
entrance of foreign firms. Both chapters aim at being single Working Papers for 
publication; although the connection between them may appear as fairly weak, the main 
aim of the author is to highlight those factors that have been overlooked so far by both 
theoretical and empirical research, and  that might add up to understand better the 
complexity of Transition within globalization other than work out good policies for its future 
evolution. Beyond the econometric methodologies used, the results obtained are quite 
interesting, and in some cases the empirical evidence goes the opposite way from initial 
expectations.  
 
In Chapter 3 the effects of Inward  FDI have been compared with the effects of 
trade flows, and different specifications of the same model have been tested in order to 
obtain a wider range of potential results. The analysis is built around the linearity (or non-
linearity) of the income inequality-openness relationship and extends to the role of 
education (in terms of secondary school enrollment ratio) relatively to this relationship. 
When education is not considered within the model both the static and dynamic estimators 
reveal the non significance of FDI upon the trend of inequality. Contrariwise, an inverted-
U curve is shaped for imports from Developed Countries, which means that the Gini 
Index, chosen as measure of inequality, first increases and then decreases. The 
interpretation of the coefficients leads to think that these flows bring more sophisticated 
 
157 
 
technology creating a gap between those firms able to upgrade their assets and the rest of 
local firms. Equally, a non linear relationship, although in the opposite direction, is shown 
between exports to Developed Countries and inequality. The requirements of higher 
technological exports production may lead to an upgrading in TCs, causing a gap between 
skilled and unskilled workers which is difficult to be filled in the long run. Different results 
emerged when education has been considered into the analysis. In both static and dynamic 
specifications FDI now turn to be statistically significant and non linear relatively to 
income inequality, shaping a U-curve. In the short run the absorptive capacity of TCs leads 
to catch the positive spillovers coming from foreign firms, whereas in the long run there 
occurs a greater distinction between skilled and unskilled workers due to the requirements 
of higher technological products by foreign companies. Furthermore, both export and 
import flows to and from Developing Countries are highly relevant and shape a U-curve 
with income inequality. In particular, in the short run the production of low medium 
technology goods may deepen the separation between skilled and unskilled labor through 
the channel of education causing an increase in inequality. By testing the role of education, 
which is supposed to be crucial in countries characterized by a deep economic, social and 
institutional transformation, the empirical analysis has shown that this variable is not 
among the main causes of within inequality. As TCs occupy a middle position between 
Developed and Developing Countries with respect to technological capabilities, their 
absorptive capacity is quite high and education alone does not contribute to create high 
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. Nonetheless, education might channel 
and contribute to spread over trade benefits, especially in the case of flows to and from 
Developing Countries, over the long run. Contrariwise, in the short run an increasing trend 
seems to appear. This result, however might be influenced by the indicator chosen 
(secondary or tertiary school enrollment ratio); in the case we use the tertiary school 
enrollment ratio there is a reduction of inequality when the variable is interacted with 
openness variables.  
 
The low level of income inequality within a society can be deemed as a good 
parameter for testing the  level of development of a country, even though with 
globalization it is becoming more and more difficult to monitor wealth distribution among 
the population. However, wealth is given by the productive capacity of a country, and in 
particular by the competitiveness and efficiency of local firms. This is what this thesis has 
attempted to deepen in Chapter 4, relatively to TCs and the increasing presence of foreign 
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MNEs on their territory. The empirical analysis has focused on the capacity of survival of 
TCs domestic firms in the presence of intensive Inward FDI. With Transition two 
mechanisms have been triggered: a relocation of resources on the one side, and a 
restructuring of the existing firms on the other side. This evolution brought about the raise 
of a private sector that was almost non-existent under the socialism, and new 
entrepreneurial activities took place. Nonetheless, high rates of entry and exit do not 
necessarily represent high dynamism within the entrepreneurial environment, especially in 
countries with a recent development of the private sector, such as the ones taken here. 
Thus, the attention has been paid to the capability of young firms of lasting on the market 
rather than on entry and exit, and it has been studied through the modern and largely 
appreciated partial likelihood estimation method called the Cox Proportional Hazard Method. 
The study applied to the Czech Republic and Estonia has shown different effects of 
Inward FDI on domestic firm survival, mainly depending on the privatization path of each 
country. Furthermore, the analysis has been developed by assuming that foreign presence 
exerts potential benefits through pecuniary externalities, thus complementing previous 
works considering only technological externalities. In the Czech Republic foreign presence 
channeled through vertical linkages increases the failure probability of domestic firms; in 
particular, the increasing demand of intermediates coming from MNEs in consumers 
goods industries does not boost at all the production of the Czech plants, which is striking 
especially in the manufacturing sector. Contrariwise, in Estonia both backward and forward 
linkages (in the manufacturing and service sector, respectively) seem to positively affect the 
survival probability of domestic firms. This heterogeneity in results may be explained by 
the the fact that the Czech Republic and Estonia implemented different privatization plans;  
while the former chose the mass privatization giving all along the first period low 
importance to foreign firms, the latter sold most of SOEs assets to foreign investors 
fostering their presence within the national economic system since the beginning of 
Transition. As a consequence knowledge from MNEs might have started to spill over 
domestic firms   very early in the Nineties, thus avoiding the strong crowding out effect 
detected in the Czech Republic. 
 
The study developed within the current thesis has put on evidence several aspects 
of Transition and its interconnection with international openness. The choice of paying 
attention to this complex phenomenon still in evolution together with the increasing 
involvement of Eastern ex-socialist Countries into the international economic system stems 
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from the tighter and tighter relations linking these countries with our Western Economies. 
Most of TCs have recently become destinations of business externalization led by many 
Western MNEs and also SMEs which have often provoked contrasting opinions by both 
economists and consumers. This is  something we see everyday that cannot be neglected, 
and our investments in TCs also depend on how far their development goes. In this sense, 
the deepening of the economic evolution of Transition host countries seems to be very 
useful, also considered that the Western World, together with the international institutions, 
was the main supporter of Transition measures. Certainly, this study needs further 
contributions both from the point of view of the theoretical development and the 
econometric analysis; nonetheless, it can be considered a valid starting point, or a good 
tool, for  delving deeper the Transition. It has been found that FDI may eventually be good 
for local development, in terms of social equality and survival of domestic firms, which are 
both important features within a perspective of growth and social wealth. The former 
allows to everybody the same opportunities, the latter guarantees the economic 
independence to a country. At the same time, we can draw that some aspects which are 
typical of the transitional path, such as privatization  methods, can strongly influence the 
effects of foreign presence. Given that Transition is anything but finished, especially in the 
CISCs or SEECs, it is  important that future research focuses on negative and positive 
consequences of international openness in a more specific way directed to every single 
country concerned, and with special attention paid to Inward FDI. This deepening must be 
carried out in order to identify the critical fields were international (coming from EBRD 
for instance) and national policies are supposed to  strengthen their efficiency.           
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Tab. 1: CPI 2010 of TCs 
Position 
in the 
world 
ranking 
Transition 
Country 
CPI 2010 
score 
 
 
 
26 ESTONIA 6.5 87 ALBANIA 3.3 
27 SLOVENIA 6.4 91 BOSNIA HERZ. 3.2 
41 POLAND 5.3 105 KAZAKHSTAN 2.9 
46 LITHUANIA 5.0 105 MOLDOVA 2.9 
50 HUNGARY 4.7 110 KOSOVO 2.8 
53 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
4.6 123 ARMENIA 2.6 
59 LATVIA 4.3 127 BELARUS 2.5 
59 SLOVAKIA 4.3 134 AZERBAIJAN 2.4 
62 CROATIA 4.1 134 UKRAINE 2.4 
62 MACEDONIA 4.1 154 RUSSIA 2.1 
68 GEORGIA .8 155 TAJIISTAN 2.1 
69 MONTENEGRO 3.7 164 KYRGYZSTAN 2.0 
69 ROMANIA 3.7 162 TURKMENISTAN 1.6 
73 BULGARIA 3.6 162 UZBEKISTAN 1.6 
78 SERBIA 3.5    
 
Source: CPI 2010 Report – Transparency International 
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Tab. 2: Descriptive Statistics and Pair-wise correlations 
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Tab. 3: FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs, 1990-2006. SYS-GMM regressions. 
(Dependent variable: Gini index) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GINI(-1) 1.0246*** 0.7634*** 0.9630*** 1.0445*** 0.6475*** 0.7471*** 
 (0.209) (0.140) (0.213) (0.226) (0.077) (0.137) 
FDI(-1) -0.0614      
 (0.110)      
FDISQ(-1) -0.0066      
 (0.007)      
TRADE(-1)  4.4424     
  (7.036)     
TRADESQ(-1)  -0.5044     
  (0.778)     
IMPED(-1)   -1.2341    
   (3.060)    
IMPEDSQ(-1)   0.1637    
   (0.427)    
IMPING(-1)    -0.2764   
    (0.365)   
IMPINGSQ(-1)    0.0570   
    (0.073)   
EXPED(-1)     0.2048  
     (0.611)  
EXPEDSQ(-1)     0.0042  
     (0.104)  
EXPING(-1)      0.2058** 
      (0.092) 
EXPINGSQ(-1)      -0.0797*** 
      (0.024) 
GDP 0.1502 0.0719 -0.1047 0.0704 -0.3552** -0.2944** 
 (0.212) (0.119) (0.081) (0.083) (0.155) (0.133) 
INFL -0.0030 0.0073 0.0072 -0.0016 0.0378 0.0128 
 (0.027) (0.013) (0.036) (0.014) (0.043) (0.023) 
SEC -0.5184 -0.3210 0.1464 -0.3345 0.4914 0.0791 
 (0.840) (0.391) (0.446) (0.389) (0.628) (0.641) 
SERVICE -0.1554 -0.0846 0.2806 -0.0313 0.5998** 0.5272* 
 (0.353) (0.301) (0.229) (0.177) (0.281) (0.300) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Number of 
countries 
16 16 16 16 16 16 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.308 0.156 0.0857 0.560 0.0238 0.524 
AR1 (p-value) 0.152 0.0931 0.202 0.234 0.147 0.144 
AR2 (p-value) 0.897 0.872 0.658 0.751 0.344 0.277 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In column 2,3,5,6 we limited instruments to (3 4) lags, while in column 4 they are limited to (4 5) lags. 
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Tab. 4:  FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs through  education (tertiary), 1990-2006. 
FE regressions. (Dependent variable: Gini index) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
FDI(-1) 0.0026      
 (0.027)      
FDISQ(-1) -0.0017      
 (0.003)      
FDITIER(-1) -0.0084      
 (0.009)      
FDITIERSQ(-
1) 
0.0011      
 (0.002)      
TRADE(-1)  -0.8785     
  (1.004)     
TRADESQ(-1)  0.1645     
  (0.135)     
TRADETIER(
-1) 
 0.2353*     
  (0.127)     
TRADETIER
SQ(-1) 
 -0.0452*     
  (0.023)     
IMPED(-1)   -0.3363    
   (0.605)    
IMPEDSQ(-1)   -0.1063    
   (0.067)    
IMPEDTIER(
-1) 
  -0.2473*    
   (0.124)    
IMPEDTIERS
Q(-1) 
  0.0766***    
   (0.026)    
IMPING(-1)    -0.5175   
    (0.406)   
IMPINGSQ(-
1) 
   0.1541   
    (0.089)   
IMPINGTIER
(-1) 
   0.1611   
    (0.115)   
IMPINGTIER
SQ(-1) 
   -0.0441   
    (0.026)   
EXPED(-1)     -0.0733  
     (0.368)  
EXPEDSQ(-1)     -0.1444*  
     (0.078)  
EXPEDTIER(
-1) 
    -0.3280***  
     (0.080)  
EXPEDTIER
SQ(-1) 
    0.0914***  
     (0.019)  
EXPING(-1)      -0.2843 
      (0.542) 
EXPINGSQ(-
1) 
     0.1289 
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      (0.190) 
EXPINGTIE
R(-1) 
     0.0761 
      (0.159) 
EXPINGTIE
RSQ(-1) 
     -0.0368 
      (0.053) 
GDP -0.1553 -0.0501 -0.0433 -0.1216 -0.1607 -0.1149 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.104) (0.147) (0.133) (0.150) 
INFL 0.0044 0.0111 0.0067 0.0027 0.0146* 0.0082 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
SERVICE 0.2038 0.1716 0.0207 0.1621 0.1292 0.3000* 
 (0.128) (0.139) (0.163) (0.127) (0.124) (0.145) 
TIER 0.1916*** 0.0467 -0.2184 0.0762 -0.1922 0.1810 
 (0.059) (0.188) (0.153) (0.130) (0.135) (0.166) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 112 114 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.533 0.507 0.614 0.526 0.659 0.521 
Number of 
countries 
16 16 16 16 16 16 
F test 192.77*** 14.99*** 115.59*** 17.27*** 151.31*** 71.77*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tab. 5:  FDI and trade effects on income inequality in TCs through education, 1990-2006. SYS-GMM 
regressions. (Dependent variable: Gini index) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GINI(-1) 0.6448*** 0.5217*** 0.4795*** 0.3929*** 0.7012*** 0.5649*** 
 (0.110) (0.082) (0.142) (0.143) (0.201) (0.149) 
FDI(-1) -15.8235***      
 (5.336)      
FDISQ(-1) 3.0342***      
 (1.047)      
FDISEC(-1) 3.4038***      
 (1.154)      
FDISECSQ(-1) -0.6534***      
 (0.225)      
TRADE(-1)  0.3845     
  (7.042)     
TRADESQ(-1)  -0.0707     
  (1.376)     
TRADESEC(-1)  0.3693     
  (1.386)     
TRADESECSQ(-1)  -0.0387     
  (0.286)     
IMPED(-1)   -8.8991*    
   (5.329)    
IMPEDSQ(-1)   2.2065    
   (1.440)    
IMPEDSEC(-1)   2.9260**    
   (1.214)    
IMPEDSECSQ(-1)   -0.6194*    
   (0.326)    
IMPING(-1)    6.7196   
    (6.654)   
IMPINGSQ(-1)    -0.8377   
    (2.114)   
IMPINGSEC(-1)    -1.5596   
    (1.491)   
IMPINGSECSQ(-1)    0.2067   
    (0.458)   
EXPED(-1)     -12.4781**  
     (4.952)  
EXPEDSQ(-1)     2.8083***  
     (0.970)  
EXPEDSEC(-1)     2.6283**  
     (1.021)  
EXPEDSECSQ(-1)     -0.6071***  
     (0.207)  
EXPING(-1)      7.0051 
      (7.635) 
EXPINGSQ(-1)      -1.3396 
      (1.040) 
EXPINGSEC(-1)      -1.5269 
      (1.692) 
EXPINGSECSQ(-1)      0.0649 
      (0.051) 
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GDP -0.0960 -0.0846* -0.1772 0.0554 -0.0698 -0.1138 
 (0.085) (0.045) (0.122) (0.109) (0.089) (0.082) 
INFL -0.0121 -0.0032 -0.0245 -0.0192 -0.0149 -0.0260 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.018) 
SERVICE -3.9780*** -0.9256 -1.6116 0.1978 -0.7670 0.0198 
 (1.230) (0.867) (1.266) (1.408) (0.923) (1.065) 
SEC 0.2277 0.2120* 0.7287** 0.2400 0.3231** 0.3582** 
 (0.303) (0.128) (0.290) (0.288) (0.148) (0.171) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.0488 0.226 0.631 0.0174 0.0117 0.0660 
AR1 (p-value) 0.0183 0.111 0.163 0.217 0.174 0.110 
AR2 (p-value) 0.612 0.351 0.563 0.716 0.446 0.272 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In column 1,2,3,4 we limited instruments to (3 4) lags. 
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Tab. 6.a: The Czech Republic; foreign and domestic firms in both manufacturing and services sectors. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE 253,610 22,731 13,665 1 45,691 
AGE 251,156 2.059 0.687 0 4.443 
SIZE 30,864 7.760 1.876 0 15.89 
PRODUCTIVITY 27,822 2.453 1.318 0 12.26 
MES 247,278 7.572 1.127 0 14.94 
HCI 253,610 0.0970 0.191 0 1 
INTRA 247,717 0.659 0.186 0 1 
 
BACKWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
230,666 14.51 52.18 -172.0 3,196 
 
FORWARD  
(foreign penetration 
through)  
 
230,666 8.001 36.94 0 1,655 
 
 
Tab. 6.b: The Czech Republic: domestic firms in both manufacturing and services sectors. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE  83,199 21,727 14,186 1 45,691 
AGE 83,199 2.129 0.696 0 4.443 
SIZE 9,454 7.856 1.910 0 15.25 
PRODUCTIVITY 8,501 2.340 1.276 0 11.66 
MES 80,905 7.598 1.170 0 14.33 
HCI 83,199 0.105 0.202 0 1 
INTRA 81,083 0.633 0.201 0 1 
 
BACKWARD  
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
69,463 14.56 52.49 -172.0 3,196 
 
FORWARD  
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
69,463 7.824 34.72 0 1655 
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Tab. 6.c: The Czech Republic: domestic firms in the manufacturing sector. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE 19,262 21,742 14,722 1 45,689 
AGE 19,262 2.280 0.629 0 4.443 
SIZE 3,035 8.382 1.569 0.693 14.11 
PRODUCTIVITY 2,864 1.938 0.730 0.191 8.758 
MES 18,349 8.240 1.180 0 14.33 
HCI 19,262 0.190 0.243 0 1 
INTRA 18,518 0.594 0.245 0 1 
 
BACKWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
15,613 19.17 37.07 -58.75 527.9 
 
FORWARD  
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
15,613 19.46 62.78 0 1,655 
 
 
 
Tab. 6.d: The Czech Republic: domestic firms in the services sector. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE 63,937 21,722 14,020 4 45,691 
AGE 63,937 2.084 0.709 0 4.331 
SIZE 6,419 7.607 2.003 0 15.25 
PRODUCTIVITY 5,637 2.545 1.436 0 11.66 
MES 62,556 7.410 1.099 0.693 13.89 
HCI 63,937 0.0799 0.180 0 1 
INTRA 62,565 0.644 0.184 0 1 
 
BACKWARD  
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
53,860 13.23 56.11 -172.0 3,196 
 
FORWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
53,860 4.456 19.05 0 417.2 
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Tab. 7.a: Estonia; foreign and domestic firms in both manufacturing and services sectors 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE 70,794 6,002 3524 1 13,533 
AGE 70,764 1.946 0.775 0 4.700 
SIZE 41,516 6.093 2.322 0 14.40 
PRODUCTIVITY 31,112 2.579 1.535 0 20.78 
MES 70,221 6.227 1.257 0 11.53 
HCI 70,794 0.0556 0.120 0 1 
INTRA 69,911 0.881 0.129 0 1 
 
BACKWARD  
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
60,705 89.91 1927 -63502 90,122 
 
FORWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
60,705 13.58 36.20 -6.179 1,447 
 
 
 
Tab. 7.b: Estonia: domestic firms in both manufacturing and services sectors. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE 20302 5800 3345 1 13491 
AGE 20284 2.021 0.775 0 4.691 
SIZE 4489 6.143 2.350 0 12.66 
PRODUCTIVITY 3278 2.469 1.612 0 14.75 
MES 19803 6.106 1.280 1.609 11.53 
HCI 20302 0.0587 0.132 0 1 
INTRA 19710 0.841 0.161 0 1 
 
BACKWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
13997 49.81 1537 -13172 80964 
 
FORWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
13997 13.80 40.43 -1.561 1447 
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Tab. 7.c: Estonia: domestic firms in the manufacturing sector. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE 3721 5146 3102 1 13477 
AGE 3721 2.191 0.713 0 4.673 
SIZE 630 6.734 2.093 0 11.39 
PRODUCTIVITY 562 2.124 1.126 0 10.76 
MES 3442 6.453 1.166 1.609 11.53 
HCI 3721 0.0984 0.187 0 1 
INTRA 3431 0.888 0.141 0 1 
 
BACKWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
2432 51.88 228.3 -369.1 7473 
 
FORWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
2432 23.40 54.78 -1.561 849.7 
 
 
 
Tab. 7.d: Estonia: domestic firms in the services sector. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ID CODE 16581 5946 3380 2 13491 
AGE 16563 1.984 0.783 0 4.691 
SIZE 3859 6.047 2.376 0 12.66 
PRODUCTIVITY 2716 2.540 1.687 0 14.75 
MES 16361 6.033 1.291 1.609 10.48 
HCI 16581 0.0498 0.115 0 1 
INTRA 16279 0.831 0.163 0 1 
 
BACKWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
11567 49.36 1688 -13172 80964 
 
FORWARD 
(foreign penetration 
through) 
 
11567 11.78 36.39 -0.814 1447 
 
 
 
